Science and the steppe: Agronomists, nomads, and the settler colony on the Kazakh steppe, 1881-1917 by Seitz, John Britton
Graduate Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations 
2019 
Science and the steppe: Agronomists, nomads, and the settler 
colony on the Kazakh steppe, 1881-1917 
John Britton Seitz 
Iowa State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd 
 Part of the History of Science, Technology, and Medicine Commons, Slavic Languages and Societies 
Commons, and the Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Seitz, John Britton, "Science and the steppe: Agronomists, nomads, and the settler colony on the Kazakh 
steppe, 1881-1917" (2019). Graduate Theses and Dissertations. 17777. 
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/17777 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and 
Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and 
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, 
please contact digirep@iastate.edu. 





John Britton Seitz 
 
 
A dissertation submitted to the graduate faculty 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
 
Major: Rural, Agricultural, Technological, and Environmental History 
 
Program of Study Committee: 
James T. Andrews, Major Professor 
Julie Courtwright 
Kathleen Hilliard 
Michael Christopher Low 





The student author, whose presentation of the scholarship herein was approved by the program 
of study committee, is solely responsible for the content of this dissertation. The Graduate 
College will ensure this dissertation is globally accessible and will not permit alterations after a 





































































CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………..1 
 
CHAPTER TWO: STEPPE SCHOOLS…………………………………………………………21 
 
CHAPTER THREE: EXPERIMENTAL FIELDS………………………………………………67 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: GRAZING THE STEPPE…………………………………………………112 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: PLANTING THE STEPPE………………………………………………...145 
 
CHAPTER SIX: THE ‘PLAGUE’ OF ARIDITY……………………………………………...174 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE TECHNO-SETTLER COLONY VERSUS THE LOCUST……….219 
 
CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION:  















LIST OF FIGURES 
Page 
 
Figure 5.1. Snezhniki with Well and Pond Illustrated and Described…………………180 
 
Figure 5.2. An Animal Powered “Chigir” on the Kazakh Steppe……………………...190 
 
Figure 5.3. Well with Filter and Supply Pond in the Background Built by the 
Resettlement Administration…………………………………………………………...205 
 






















 I have incurred a great number of debts while completing this project, which is to be 
expected for a project that in some ways began over a decade and a half ago. Certainly, the help 
and patience I have been given is worth more than a few words here, however, I hope they will 
suffice for now. I firmly believe no one writes a dissertation alone, therefore the strengths of this 
project lie in the communal effort, kindness, and wisdom I have been given along the way. 
 I have received significant financial support to complete this work, for which I am 
grateful. Though there are no citations or immediate examples from my time on a Fulbright in 
Kazakhstan 2005-6, I cannot imagine this dissertation being written or even conceived of without 
that support. Perhaps, it is the foundational piece, for it was while I was in Kostanay researching 
the Virgin Lands Campaign, that I realized that I had no idea what I was doing, because I had not 
really thought much about Kazakhstan before Khrushchev. In many ways, this dissertation is an 
attempt to fill that gap in my own knowledge. In addition, I received summer research support 
from the Iowa State Department of History’s “Anonymous Donor,” and also the Garst 
Dissertation Fellowship. In 2016-2017, I was grateful to be supported by the ASEEES Cohen-
Tucker Dissertation Completion Fellowship for research in Russia and Kazakhstan. Finally, the 
Mellon/ACLS Dissertation Completion Fellowship gave me generous support while writing. 
 I have a number of academic debts whose work and guidance is in these pages, albeit in 
sometimes hidden ways. I am eternally grateful to Elena Duzs, Christopher Lemelin, and 
Fillipova for their patience and excellence in the Russian Department during my time Dickinson 
College. Also at Dickinson, my introduction to Russian history by Karl Qualls as well as his 
constant support and advice has been invaluable. In addition, I must express my deep 
appreciation to my host family during my time in Moscow, 2003-4. Irina and Elena 
vi 
 
Alexandrovna not only taught me much, but Elena Alexandrovna’s stories about evacuation to 
Tashkent during the war were my first firsthand introduction to Central Asia. At Indiana 
University, thanks to my patient and dedicated Kazakh teachers Aigerim Turlybekova, Dana 
Ziyabekova, and Marzhan Arenova. In addition, Devin DeWeese, Ron Sela, Bill Johnston, and 
Kevin Martin are challenging teachers, and supportive advisors. I am also grateful to Michael 
Hancock-Parmer and Kristoffer Rees for their insights and encouragement. Of course, I must 
also thank “the gang” without whom I cannot imagine my time in Bloomington being so warm, 
fun, and intellectually stimulating. Elizabeth Geballe, Holly Schreiber, Sally and Hess Yntema, 
Michael Young, Hubert Izienicki, and Meg Arenberg, thank you for taking in this poor orphan. 
 I count myself very lucky to have ended up completing my PhD at Iowa State University. 
The History Department, with its focus on rural, environmental, and technological history has 
allowed me to explore this topic and develop as a thinker through a strong thematic lens rather 
than simply a geographic or chronological one. The highest praise must go to my advisor, James 
T. Andrews, he is a brilliant scholar and a supportive yet critical reader. I cannot say enough 
about how lucky I am to have had his support, guidance, and insight over the years, and I am 
truly thankful. In addition, Kathy Hilliard has been a crucial supporter and careful reader whose 
questions often cut right to the heart of my own questions, sometimes without me fully realizing. 
Her kind and generous spirit is a real gift to the academy. Pam Riney-Kehrberg and Julie 
Courtwright have been wonderfully supportive mentors and incisive critics, your insights into the 
American experience of rurality and your deep love of the places you study has been invaluable 
and inspiring. Jana Byars, your support, insights, and friendship was crucial to bringing this 
project to fruition, thank you. John Monroe, Larry McDonnell, and Michael Bailey have also 
been supportive and inspiring teachers and mentors. Of course, the highest praise goes to 
vii 
 
Jennifer Rivera whose wisdom and generosity is both legendary and well-deserved. Finally, 
although he came quite late in my time in Ames, Chris Low’s fingerprints are all over this work 
and his friendship, advice, and generosity have kept me going and inspired me to aim higher 
countless times during this project and beyond. Beyond Iowa State I have benefitted from the 
advice and encouragement from several scholars including Ian Campbell, Willard Sunderland, 
Virginia Martin, Matthew Payne, and Sam Dolbee, thank you.  
 I was fortunate to find myself with a group of wonderful and incredibly clever graduate 
students at Iowa State. Your conversations, camaraderie, and challenges have made me grow as a 
scholar and a person in countless ways. Most especially thank you to Maria Howe, Kelly Wenig, 
and Rachel Kleinschmidt for convincing me while surveying the metropolis of Manhattan that 
there really was a place for me in Ames, you were not wrong. Thanks also to my comrade 
Caroline Schoonover for her ability to mix humor with an inspiring spirit to fight for what is 
right, to Katherine Warming, whose mind is like a steel trap, yet who has a kind and clever heart, 
and Mickey Belding for your incisiveness and helping this Appalachian begin to understand the 
Midwest. Thanks also to Lindsay Bell for showing what true generosity and friendship look like, 
to Brandon Duxbury for your quiet yet profound insights, and to Nick Waldrop, Matt Margis, 
Aimee Burch, and Mark Howe for your friendship and intellects. To the entire Lloyd family, 
especially Fred, thank you for making me feel at home in far Iowa. Finally, thank you to my dear 
friend, intellectual sparring partner, and devoted scholar Margret Weber, your friendship and 
kindness as well as your challenges and insights have helped me grow and I am grateful to you. 
  During my time abroad, I have also incurred several debts. In Kostanay I cannot thank 
enough Gaukhar Galikhan, my first Kazakh tutor and an invaluable guide and friend who helped 
show me just how wondrous and proud Kazakh history is, and how great its future can be. Also 
viii 
 
in Kostanay, Kristina Prokhorova and Timur Khassanov, thank you so much for your kindness 
and friendship, and for your wonderful souls. Finally, the Peace Corps crew in Kostanay, 
Tommy Elwood, Dan Wienecke, Abby Schmidt, and Nicole Stivaletta Contini, thank you for 
your friendship during some difficult times. In Moscow 2016, and since then, thank you to Susan 
Grunewald, Erin Hutchinson, and Kelsey Norris for your camaraderie. My time in St. Petersburg 
was wonderfully improved by the hospitality and friendship of my fellow kommunalka 
roommates Olga, Anton, and Snezhanka, thank you for the adventures. In Almaty, I am grateful 
to the help, guidance, and continued support of Gulmira Sultangalieva and the staff and students 
at Al-Farabi Kazakh National University. Also, Saule Sateyeva is a true friend and staunch ally, 
thank you for your kindness and support. Most especially, my deep thanks and gratitude to Sean 
McDaniel for your camaraderie, advice, and commiseration in the Almaty and St. Petersburg 
archives and beyond. Also, to Missy and Shea for your friendship, hospitality, and humor. 
 Finally, thanks to my family who have been supportive and patient as I traveled and 
wrote. My brothers Drew and Blaine, always engaging debating partners got me off to any early 
start. To Concho and Conwy for demanding walks and useful perspective on what matters. My 
parents Jacob and Susan who always encouraged me to explore, and who taught me so much 
about the world and service to it and our fellow humans. It is especially bittersweet to think that 
my father will not read this work for many reasons, but in large part because his own scholarship 
on Kenyan agricultural and colonial history made an imprint on framing this work. What is more 
his model of curiosity and as a teacher has had a deep and abiding effect on me, as well as on 
lives of countless other students. Finally, and most importantly to my love Savanna Lyons to 
whom, along with my dad, this work is dedicated. Darlin’, your patience is appreciated, your 




In the late nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, Russian 
officials and scientists undertook a project of exploiting the Kazakh Steppe to turn it into an 
agricultural breadbasket. However, this project ran into difficulties both among the indigenous 
nomadic Kazakh population and with the challenges of farming in a new environment. 
Therefore, officials and scientists turned to another group to attempt to transform the steppe: 
peasant settlers from European Russia. While they did not fully overcome the challenges and 
achieve their most extreme visions for the steppe, this process that included demographic, 
scientific, and economic changes would have far reaching affects on the story of Kazakhstan 














CHAPTER ONE:  INTRODUCTION 
 
Agricultural science was central to Russia’s colonial project on the Kazakh steppe at the 
turn of the twentieth century. While fundamentally agricultural in nature, this project extended 
beyond crops and animals and transformed the environment, society, demographics, and 
economy of the region in ways that had far reaching consequences. Imperial authorities sought to 
change the region from one that was dominated by nomads and pastoralism into a zone of 
sedentary peasant farmers. Utilizing the most up to date farming practices and technologies, they 
hoped to integrate the steppe more fully into the empire and world grain markets. While, like 
most colonial undertakings, it did not always achieve the exact outcomes authorities sought as 
quickly as they had hoped, this dissertation argues that agricultural science was central to 
transforming the steppe and its inhabitants. However, the story of this transformation is not a 
simple narrative of how science and imperial power enacted their vision on the steppe without 
resistance or setbacks. Instead, it is also the story of how those setbacks and that resistance 
interacted with and sometimes contested and thwarted the visions, technologies, and ideologies 
of imperial power on the steppe.     
Nevertheless, today Kazakhstan is annually among the top ten wheat producing countries 
in the world. This is a direct legacy of the strategies, research, and infrastructures developed by 
imperial administrators and scientists.1 While it was not until the Soviet period that sedentary 
agriculture achieved supremacy on the steppe, this dissertation argues that this development has 
colonial roots that predate Soviet rule. However, these roots were not only colonial, they also 
                                                 
1 The topic of change and continuity in science across the 1917 is a well-studied topic see for example: James T. 
Andrews “N. A. Rubakin and the Popularization of Science in Russia.” Russian History/Histoire Russe 16, no.1 
(1989):9–30, Stephen Brain, Song of the Forest: Russian Forestry and Stalinist Environmentalism (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011), and for overviews that connect both periods: Alexander Vucinich, Science in 
Russian Culture, 1861-1917 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970) and Loren R. Graham, Science in Russia 
and the Soviet Union a Short History (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
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involved science which was an inherent aspect of the colonial project, and it was this interaction 
of science and colonial administration that is the focus for this study and also the catalyst for the 
environmental, agricultural, and social changes that followed. 
Early attempts to remake the steppe according to colonial visions included an important 
role for indigenous Kazakhs.2 Imperial authorities encouraged them to give up their nomadism 
(and semi-nomadism) in favor of sedentary agriculture. Agricultural scientists played a key role 
in these plans, serving as teachers of new methods of animal breeding, feeding, and care. They 
also taught nomads how to use plows, seed drills, and mowers. However, Kazakhs stubbornly 
resisted these changes, all of which threatened to upend their nomadic society.3 On the other 
hand, the challenges of transferring agricultural practices developed in European Russia to a 
Central Asian steppe environment doomed this approach to failure.4 By the early twentieth 
century, with the explosive growth in the agricultural sciences and in the number of agronomists, 
imperial officials changed their tactics.5 Instead of focusing this new agronomic infrastructure on 
local Kazakhs, the empire largely turned its attention to supporting peasant settlers from 
                                                 
2 On the Kazakh navigation of the colonial bureaucracy see, Ian W. Campbell, Knowledge at the Ends of Empire: 
Kazakh Intermediaries and Russian Rule on the Steppe, 1731-1917 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017). 
3 On Kazakh armed resistance to Russian rule see: Steven Sabol, “Kazakh Resistance to Russian Colonization: 
Interpreting the Kenesary Kasimov Revolt, 1837-1847” Central Asian Review 22 no. 2-3 (2003): 231-252.  
4 On the challenges Russian science and settlers faced when moving from a forest to a steppe environment in an 
earlier period see, David Moon, The Plough that Broke the Steppes: Agriculture and Environment on Russia’s 
Grasslands, 1700-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). Moon’s work is especially important as it 
illustrates how the agronomists arriving on the Kazakh steppe, already had significant experience in a similar—
although not identical—steppe environment, and many of the theories and practices they brought with them had 
already been developed on the steppe further to the West.  
5 There is a vast literature on the growth of the agronomic bureaucracy in the late imperial period: Ilya Gerasimov, 
Modernism and Public Reform in Late Imperial Russia: Rural Professionals and Self-Organization, 1905-1930 
(Houndsmills: Palgrave, 2009); Kimitatka Matsuzato “The Fate of Agronomists in Rural Russia: Their Quantitative 
Dynamics from 1911 to 1917” Russian Review 55 no. 2 (April 1996): 172-200; Olga Elina, “Between Local 
Practices and Global Knowledge: Public Initiatives in the Development of Agricultural Science in Russia in the 
Nineteenth Century and Early Twentieth Century” Centaurus 56 no. 2 (November 2014): 305-329; Ilya Gerasimov, 
“’Russians into Peasants?’ The Politics of Self-Organization and Paradoxes of the Public Modernization Campaign 
in the Countryside in Late Imperial Russia” Journal of Modern European History 2 no. 2 (2004): 232-253. 
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European Russia. Officials hoped these transplants would serve as the vanguard of the 
environmental and economic changes they had envisaged.6  
However, in spite of massive state intervention, the settler colonial project in the Kazakh 
steppe constantly teetered on the verge of failure. These investments were necessary if officials 
were going to maintain the settler colony on the Kazakh steppe. While diverse environmentally, 
many areas of the steppe were incredibly inhospitable to sedentary agriculture, and just keeping 
peasant settlers alive was a massive undertaking that illustrates the deeply held belief in the 
project by officials and agronomists. It is estimated that around 22% of the settlers in the most 
intense period of settlement (between 1896-1917) gave up and returned home.7 However, 
officials and the majority of settlers believed in the project enough to continue even in the face of 
incredible setbacks like drought, famine, and disease. 
While also revolutionizing the steppe environment, authorities also hoped to transform 
these Russian peasant settlers from inefficient communal farmers into an independent yeomanry. 
They wanted these farmers to utilize the newest production methods and technologies in order to 
exploit the steppe, turning it into an agricultural breadbasket capable of financing Russia’s 
emergent industrialization. Their plans required an expansive agronomic bureaucracy as well as 
new institutions like experimental farms, laboratories, and agricultural schools. They would also 
require new physical infrastructures from grain silos and farm machinery stations to stockyards 
and grain elevators. This human, institutional, and physical infrastructure formed the basis of a 
nascent frontier technostate, which would eventually develop over the course of the colonial 
                                                 
6 On how the Stolypin Reforms to modernize Russian agriculture and peasant settlement to Siberia and Central Asia 
were linked see, George Yaney, The Urge to Mobilize: Agrarian Reform in Russia, 1861-1930 (Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 1982). 




encounter on the steppe.8 It would also set the region on a new trajectory toward the 
scientifically integrated and heavily capitalized sedentary agriculture that would fully emerge 
after 1917.9  
In addition to connecting the history of science on the steppe across the 1917 divide, this 
dissertation makes several other interventions into Russian history. Most fundamentally, it seeks 
to further explore the history of Russia as a colonial power. This is a sometimes contentious 
position within some groups of Russian historians, especially those in Russia itself.10 However, 
this dissertation makes clear that the realities of power and of the destruction of Kazakh ways of 
life to benefit settlers indicate the steppe was the site of a rather typical settler colonial 
encounter. In addition to making a case for the Kazakh steppe as a site of settler colonialism, it 
also adds to the discussion in Russian history on the connection between science and empire. It 
builds on the work of scholars like Nathaniel Knight, David Moon, and Maya Peterson who 
examine how colonial encounters affect and are affected by science.11 However, unlike these 
scholars who focus on empire and colonialism, it seeks to engage specifically with settler 
colonialism as the lens of analysis.  
                                                 
8 For the term “nascent frontier technostate” see Michael Christopher Low, “Ottoman Infrastructures of the Saudi 
Hydro-State: The Technopolitics of Pilgrimage and Potable Water in the Hijaz,” Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 57 no. 4 (October 2015): 946. 
9 On post 1917 agricultural change in Kazakhstan, Niccolo Pianciola, “The Collectivization Famine in Kazakhstan, 
1931-1933” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 25 no. ¾ (Fall 2001): 237-251 and Matthew J. Payne “Seeing Like a Soviet 
State:  Settlement of Nomadic Kazakhs, 1928-1934,” Writing the Stalin Era: Sheila Fitzpatrick and Soviet 
Historiography eds. Golfo Alexopolus, et. al (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011): 59-86. 
10 Igor Grachev and Pavel Rykin, “A European View of Asiatic History” trans. Catriona Kelly Forum for 
Anthropology and Culture 1 (2004): 395-401. 
11 Nathaniel Knight, “Science, Empire, and Nationality: Ethnography in the Russian Geographical Society, 1845-
1855” in Imperial Russia: New Histories for the Empire, eds. Jane Burbank and David Ransel (Bloomington, 
Indiana University Press, 1998) and  Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making 
of the Soviet Union (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); David Moon, “The Russian Academy of Sciences 
Expeditions to the Steppes in the Late Eighteenth Century” The Slavonic and East European Review 88 no. 1/2 
(January/April 2010): 204-236; Maya Peterson, “Engineering Empire: Russian and Foreign Hydraulic Experts in 
Central Asia, 1887-1917” Cahiers du monde russe 57 no. 1 (2016): 442-466 and Pipe Dreams: Water and Empire in 
Central Asia’s Aral Sea Basin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).  
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This framework is important, because this work argues that science on the steppe is best 
understood as “settler colonial science.” This particular type of science was marked by several 
important aspects. First, it sought not only a transformation of the landscape, but it also sought a 
transformation of people which, in a deviation from more typical colonial science, largely 
ignored indigenous Kazakhs. Instead the targets of remaking were the settlers. This took many 
forms and was a multi-layered process that included both Cossack and peasant settlers. Drawing 
on Veracini’s notion of how settler projects aim to “an exemplary model of social 
organization.”12 In the Kazakh steppe, this was complicated by the ambiguous way officials 
viewed peasants and Cossacks as both more advanced than the Kazakhs, and less advanced than 
they would have liked. However, in spite of this multi-layered attempt at remaking peasants as 
well as the environment, settler colonial science was always fundamentally about aiding the 
settlers and dispossessing the Native. This is in spite of the fact that much of the knowledge and 
practices that underpinned settler colonial agricultural science on the steppe was influenced by, 
or even appropriated from indigenous knowledge.    
In addition to their role as targets of settler colonial science, this dissertation also 
contributes to our understanding of how peasants who migrated to the Kazakh steppe were part 
of a larger Russian story.13 While migration was a focus of policymakers behind the Stolypin 
reforms much study of this phenomenon in earlier periods examined the issue from the center. 
More recent studies, such as Willard Sunderland’s which this dissertation seeks to complement 
have begun to examine the issue with a more peripheral lens.14 This work builds on these 
                                                 
12 Lorenzo Veracini, Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 9. 
13 Yaney, The Urge to Mobilize; Demko, The Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan. 
14 Willard Sunderland, Taming the Wild Field: Colonization and Empire on the Russian Steppe (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2004). 
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previous approaches that have emphasized the political aspects of peasant settlement by 
centering the questions of science, technology, and environment in its analysis. 
Finally, this dissertation is also a history of science and of the environment in the Russian 
Empire.15 It seeks to continue the conversation by framing the discussion of these two aspects as 
connected and seeks to meld them together. The environment was a major factor driving the 
work of scientists on the steppe. While things like professional identity and state power were at 
work, and are discussed in this dissertation, it seeks to explore the interactions between science 
and the environment.16 Recently, there has been important pioneering work done addressing the 
agriculture and science in imperial period by historians like David Moon, Anastasia Fedotova, 
and on the Kazakh Steppe specifically by Ian W. Campbell.17 This work follows in a similar 
vein, and seeks to emphasize how settler colonialism affected ideas about the environment and 
the nature of the science being practiced. It also posits a particular mode of domination in the 
form of “settler ecology.” Some analyses of science and empire emphasize the way scientists and 
officials attempted to use science to dominate the landscape. Instead, “settler ecology” described 
in this dissertation is a process that recognizes the insights of ecology and connectivities within 
the natural world, and puts those insights into the service, not of dominating nature, but instead 
of dominating and dispossessing indigenous peoples and cultures.  
                                                 
15 On the history of Russian and Soviet science see, Alexander Vucinich, Science in Russian Culture and Loren R. 
Graham, Science in Russia and the Soviet Union.  
16 Two important theoretical guides for this focus on the Soviet period: Douglas Weiner, Little Corner of Freedom: 
Russian Nature Protection from Stalin to Gorbachev (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Stephen 
Brain, Song of the Forest. 
17 David Moon, The Plow That Broke the Steppe: Agriculture and Environment on Russia’s Grasslands, 1700-1914 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Marina Loskutova and Anastasia Fedotova “The Rise of Applied 
Entomology in the Russian Empire: Governmental, Public, and Academic Responses to Insect Pest Outbreaks, 
1840-1894” in New Perspectives on the History of Life Sciences and Agriculture Edited by Denise Phillips and 
Sharon Kingsland (New York: Springer, 2015); Ian W. Campbell, “’The Scourge of Stock Raising”: Zhut, Limiting 
Environments, and the Economic Transformation of the Kazakh Steppe” in Eurasian Environments: Nature and 




 Additionally, this dissertation is a story about what is today Kazakhstan. While Kazakhs 
are not the central actors in this story, they are uppermost in the concerns of settler colonialism 
and the author. While settler colonialism is often about the story of indigenous resistance and 
colonial power, as Veracini said, “It is important that we focus on the settler, on what they do, 
and how they think about what they do. True, they have been the traditional subject of historical 
inquiry, and only recently the experience of indigenous people in settler contexts has been the 
subject of extensive scholarly activity. And yet, there are also risk intrinsic in focusing primarily 
on indigenous peoples and their experiences.”18 Since those creating agricultural science were 
overwhelmingly Russian, and their archival record is rich, this dissertation is focused on their 
work. However, it seeks to focus on the agronomists in a way that recognizes Kazakhs and also 
peasant settlers as important actors. It is certainly imperfect in doing this, however, it does 
identify key areas that are easily overlooked where scientists were being resisted or navigated, 
and even more importantly, where Kazakh and peasant knowledge was ignored and then 
absorbed by the agronomic bureaucracy. As such, these groups played a key role in the creation 
of this science even if their contributions were hidden or outright stolen and claimed by Russian 
science.  
Kazakhstan is also central in the considerations of this work because later Soviet 
developments have their antecedents in the labor of earlier imperial agronomists. In addition to 
its large agricultural sector, today Kazakhstan is ethnically diverse, “developed” and urban, in 
large part because of a history that includes arguably genocide and ecocide. These developments 
are connected. The Soviet Virgin Lands project in Kazakhstan, beginning in the 1950s, brought 
millions of settlers to the region and made it a site of investment by the Soviet government was 
                                                 
18 Veracini, Settler Colonialism, 20. 
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crucial to Kazakhstan’s history.19 However, this project was a continuation of a vision that took 
hold in the first decades of the 20th century. That same vision was what brought the social and 
human catastrophe of the imperial dispossessions and poverty, then the famine and destruction of 
Collectivization which finally made the land more truly “empty” by the time of the Virgin Lands 
Campaign.20 While these developments were not inevitable, especially in the specifics of how 
they were carried out, they do have deep roots, and the earlier work of imperial officials and their 
science gave the Soviets a firm foundation of infrastructure, knowledge, and imagination 
grounded in a settler colonial ethos of what the steppe was and what it could become. 
In addition to its contributions to the history of Russia and Kazakhstan as well as the 
subfields of science and empire and science and the environment, this dissertation also explores 
the ways in which the colonial encounter on the Kazakh steppe and its accompanied 
development of steppe agronomy represented a particular brand of empire and field of study: 
settler colonialism.21 Settler colonial studies posits that these colonies were fundamentally 
different form other forms of colonialism and revolves around the ways settlement changed 
colonialism. While scholars of Central Asia have begun to address settler colonialism in the 
region, at present it is still rarely used as a primary lens of analysis.22 What is more, while some 
scholars refer to a settler colony and even sometimes use the phrase “settler colonialism” they 
                                                 
19 On the Virgin Lands Campaign see, Martin McCauley, Khrushchev and the Development of Soviet Agriculture: 
The Virgin Land Programme, 1953–1964 (London: Macmillan, 1976). 
20 On Collectivization in the Kazakh steppe see: Sarah Cameron, The Hungry Steppe: Famine, Violence, and the 
Making of Soviet Kazakhstan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018); Payne, “Seeing Like a Soviet State,” 59-86; 
Niccolo Pianciola, “Famine in the Steppe. The Collectivization of Agriculture and the Kazak Herdsmen, 1928-
1934,” Cahiers du monde russe, 45, no. 1-2 (2004): 137-192. 
21 For Settler Colonialism see: Patrick Wolf, Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: The 
Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic Event (London: Cassell, 1999) and Veracini, Settler Colonialism: A 
Theoretical Overview.  
22 On the application of the term to Central Asia see, Alexander Morrison in The Routledge Handbook of the History 
of Settler Colonialism, Lorenzo Veracini & Ed Cavanagh (ed.)  (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017) pp.313-326. 
Alexander Morrison, "Peasant Settlers and the ‘Civilising Mission’in Russian Turkestan, 1865–1917." The Journal 
of Imperial and Commonwealth History 43, no. 3 (2015): 387-417. 
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typically do not engage with the theoretical ideas of settler colonialism that extend beyond 
colonialism plus settlers.23 
This dissertation seeks to make two main interventions in the discussion of settler 
colonial studies. First, it emphasizes the usefulness and compatibility of settler colonial theory 
with materialist approaches, and secondly, it seeks to make a claim for a particular type of settler 
colonialism that is represented in the Kazakh steppe. Recognizing that settler colonial studies is 
often centered in cultural history, my research seeks to bring in a more material angle.24 
Grounding the story of settler colonialism on the Kazakh steppe in the physical changes to the 
environment and society brought by agricultural science, this dissertation strengthens the 
arguments of settler colonialism as a unique form of colonialism that is fundamentally about the 
destruction of indigenous peoples in the service of empire and the privileges of settlers. 
 This material approach also contributes to the small body of research on Central Asia that 
seeks to move beyond the lenses of Islam or nationality.25 While both played an important role, 
focus on these aspects of society has dominated research in the region. This dissertation 
addresses this shortcoming because in addition to settler colonialism, it engages with ideas 
                                                 
23Sunderland frequently refers to settlers and their particular attitudes, but does not use the term “settler colonialism” 
see: Willard Sunderland “Peasant Pioneering: Russian Peasant Settlers Describe Colonization and the Eastern 
Frontier, 1880s-1910s” Journal of Social History 34 no. 4 (Summer 2001): 895-922. However, he does see the story 
of the steppe as one of colonialism, though he often also uses the term, “imperialism” see, “The Ministry of Asiatic 
Russia: The Colonial Office That Never Was but Might Have Been” Slavic Review 69 no. 1 (Spring 2010): 120-150. 
Jeff Sahadeo is more willing to take on the colonialism and settlement, but he focuses on regions further south in 
modern day Uzbekistan, Jeff Sahadeo, Russian Colonial Society in Tashkent (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2007). Steven Sabol recognizes the similarities between the United States and the Kazakh Steppe as colonies, 
but refers to them with the problematic term, “internal colonization” instead, Steven Sabol, “The Touch of 
Civilization”: Comparing American and Russian Internal Colonization (Boulder: University of Colorado Press, 
2017). 
24 On the development of settler colonial studies and its tendency toward cultural history see, Lorenzo Veracini, 
“’Settler Colonialism’: Career of a Concept” Journal of Commonwealth Studies 41 no. 2 (2013): 313-333. For an 
example of this type of approach see, Scott Lauria Morgensen, “Settler Homonationalism: Theorizing Settler 
Colonialism within Queer Modernities” A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 16 no. 1-2 (2010): 105-131. 
25 On nationality see for example Steven Sabol, Russian Colonization and the Birth of Kazakh National 
Consciousness (New York: Palgrave, 2003); Daniel Brower, Turkestan and the Fate of the Russian Empire 
(London: Routledge, 2002). On Islam one of the best examples is, Adeeb Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural 
Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).  
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pioneered by environmental historians in Ottoman, North African, and Middle Eastern history.26 
These historians and this dissertation do not ignore the role of Islam or nationality, but use 
environmental history to examine the interactions of society, politics, economy, and the 
environment in an Islamic colonial setting.   
 In order to examine these interactions it is necessary to uncover the hidden voices and 
intentions in the colonial environment. However, finding these hidden voices, deconstructing the 
effects context had on science, and identifying the deep ideological effect settler colonialism had 
on this story requires a critical lens. In addition to settler colonialism, this dissertation also 
utilizes an analytical lens grounded in technopolitics as described by Paul N. Edwards and 
Gabrielle Hecht as, “hybrids of technical systems and political practices that produce new forms 
of power and agency.”27  In this case, agronomy was just such a hybrid of systems and practices. 
However, it is sometimes difficult to identify this hybrid because it was often hidden and a 
colonial environment especially could give the appearance that “the realm of intentions and ideas 
seems to come first and… [controls and organizes] the nonhuman.”28 Therefore, it is necessary to 
interrogate the words and deeds of agricultural scientists in order to probe at their assumptions. 
My own approach to technopolitics sees it as a basket of tools and technologies and their 
associated expertise that were both shaped by forces like capitalism, colonialism, the 
environment, and bureaucratic power while at the same time shaping and defining those forces as 
                                                 
26 Some of the most important examples include: Alan Mikhail, Nature and Empire in Ottoman Egypt: An 
Environmental History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Toby Jones, Desert Kingdom: How Oil 
Forged Modern Saudi Arabia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010); Diana K. Davis, Resurrecting the 
Granary of Rome: Environmental History and French Colonial Expansion in North Africa (Athens: Ohio University 
Press, 2007). 
27 Paul N. Edwards and Gabrielle Hecht, “History and the Technopolitics of Identity: The Case of Apartheid South 
Africa,” Journal of Southern African Studies, 36 no. 3 (September 2010): 619. 
28 Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-politics, Modernity (Berkeley, University of California Press, 
2002), pg. 43. 
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well as the environment and people on the steppe, or at least attempting to do so, usually with 
mixed results.   
However, the technopolitical lens is not only a lens for deconstructing and reading 
sources, it is also a chronological tool. Technopolitics is usually framed as a twentieth century 
phenomenon, especially the idea of a technopolitical state. Therefore, this dissertation tracks the 
development of technopolitical power across time. When the dissertation begins in 1881, the 
steppe was not yet the site of a technostate, in fact, even on the eve of the First World War when 
this dissertation ends, it is more apt to label the steppe as a nascent frontier technostate. The 
institutions that would make up this technostate were under development during the course of 
increasing settlement. As such, this dissertation fits within other approaches like Willard 
Sunderland’s ideas of trend toward a growing bureaucratic apparatus on the steppe that 
culminated in an eventual phase he called “correct colonization.”29  
However, while Sunderland and others have examined the steppe primarily through a 
political lens, this dissertation is focused on how political power and science were intertwined 
and developed in unison with one another simultaneous to the science that underpinned the 
settler colonial project being created. This instability of technopolitics driven by the dual nature 
of scientists as having political and administrative power while still having identities as scientists 
in part helps explain the difficulties and failures faced by imperial authorities on the steppe. 
Nevertheless, because of the certainty that settler colonialism provided as an ideology, this 
instability did not lead to those same scientist-administrators giving up on the dream and on the 
work. Therefore, the technopolitical project continued in spite of setbacks and failures and the 
ideology of grain-driven settlement continued to hold such promise that it outlived even the 
                                                 
29 Sunderland, Taming the Wild Field, 177-222. 
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empire and Stalinist purges until it was implemented on a massive scale under Khrushchev. 
Nevertheless, it did not outlive the infrastructure created by the nascent technostate, nor—at least 
in people like the agronomist Sokrat’ Chaianov—did it always outlive the scientists themselves.  
Beyond emphasizing a material approach to settler colonial history, this dissertation aims 
to begin to make a case for a particular type of settler colonialism that occurred as a global 
phenomenon in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which I term “grain-driven 
settler colonialism.” The Kazakh steppe in some ways serves as a case study for this 
phenomenon, but it is not only a case study, because the phenomenon was not one that occurred 
in several places as distinct developments. Instead, this phenomenon and intellectual framework 
is unique in part because it links these regions which existed as part of a global moment where 
ideas, people, and outcomes were shared across imperial borders.  
In the late nineteenth century, several settler colonial states began a new phase of 
settlement. This new phase was centered around white settlement on arid and semi-arid lands 
that was built upon grain farming. This process was driven both by rapid industrialization that 
created a need to feed rapidly expanding cities, and also by an emboldened scientific class of 
agronomists and policy makers that believed they now possessed—and in many cases actually 
possessed—the tools to make grain agriculture profitable in previously uninhabitable 
environments.30 Regions as diverse as the High Plains in the United States and Canada, French 
North Africa, British East Africa, South Africa, Australia, the Pampas of Argentina, Siberia, and 
the Kazakh Steppe were all part of this process. As such they were all competitor nations who 
sought to entice and encourage settlers and compete on world grain markets for dominance, 
                                                 
30 For an excellent example of the connection between the development of cities and the development of an 




especially in wheat.31 Yet they were also simultaneously sharing knowledge about how to 
develop irrigation, dry farm, battle locusts, drill wells, and even share crop varieties from across 
the globe.32  
In a similar way to how Daniel Hedrick and others argued that technological changes 
drove the scramble for Africa as diseases could now be battled and steam transport could move 
goods and people; the science and technology of applied agronomy were part of what made this 
grain-driven settler colonialism possible.33 However, this was not simply a technological 
determinist story. While technology made it possible, the implementation and creation of this 
technology and science was driven by the impulses and ideologies of settler colonialism that 
sought more than just taking of land, but also the establishment of market relations, and what 
Veracini described as an attempt at, “constituting an exemplary model of social organization” in 
the form of “correct” land use.34 What is more, settler colonial ideas were not only encouraging 
while science was enabling, the two were actually working iteratively in these new arid 
environments to create new knowledge to enable settlement and agricultural change. It is 
therefore impossible to separate out the settler colonial experience and ideas from the science 
that was created to help settlement along because these processes were simultaneous.  
Settler colonial spaces were also not only sites of creating knowledge, if they were to 
work, they needed to also be sites of science popularization. Agronomists had to convince 
settlers to adopt the practices they recommended. All of these regions were also sites to varying 
                                                 
31 On one axis of this competition and trade see, Carl E. Soldberg The Praries and the Pampas: Agricultural Policy 
in Canada and Argentina, 188-1930 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997). A crucial early influence on 
thinking about the global and local nature of this development is Jacob Raymond Seitz, “A History fo the Samia 
Location in Western Kenya, 1890-1930” (PhD diss., West Virginia University, 1978). 
32 For example see, Maya Peterson, “US to USSSR: American Experts, Irrigation, and Cotton in Soviet Central 
Asia, 1929-1932 Environmental History 21 no. 3 (July 2016): 442-446. 
33 Daniel R. Headrick, Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (New 
York, Oxford University Press, 1981). 
34 Veracini, Settler Colonialism, 8-9. 
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degrees and success of agricultural extension work, even if it was not always called by such a 
name.35 However, the fact that this popularization work was conducted by scientists who were 
themselves new to working in these environments—and therefore, not entirely experts—meant 
that this popularization faced significant challenges. 
 While this dissertation posits the idea of grain-driven settler colonial settlement as a new 
global phase, it does not seek to create a massive comparative study of these regions. Instead, it 
focuses on just one of these regions and connects the processes that occurred there to this global 
story both by focusing on individuals whose work and ideas crossed international boundaries, 
and by reflecting on the similarity of impulse, and—perhaps just as important—outcomes. In 
many ways the Kazakh steppe is not even the most exemplary example of a region of this 
phenomenon. Nevertheless, while none of these regions succeeded or failed to the same degree 
or in the same ways, the scientists who were part of this process were all engaged in a global 
project that on the whole transformed all of these regions as well as the nature of the global grain 
trade which not only supplied urban areas with the food they needed to grow and continue 
industrial expansion, but also which underpinned the very creation of capital to build factories 
and mills.  
Therefore, the Kazakh steppe is not simply a case study that illustrates how similar things 
were happening in other regions. In some ways it is instead helpful to think of this dissertation as 
framing a new region made up of all the grain-driven settler colonial environments, and to think 
of the science created on the steppe as both local and also part of the knowledge that enabled 
                                                 
35 R. V. Scott, The Reluctant Farmer: The Rise of Agricultural Extension to 1914 (Champaign: University of Illinois 
Press, 1971); Edmund de Schweinitz Brunner, et. al., Farmers of the World: The Development of Agricultural 
Extension (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), Warren Hunt et. al., “The Many Turnings of Agricultural 
Extension in Australia” The Journal of Agricultural Education and Extension 18 no. 1 (February 2012): 9-26; 
Joseph Hodge, Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism 
(Athens: University of Ohio Press, 2007). 
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increased settlement in other regions. This was true whether referring to steppe native Boris 
Uvarov who went on to work on the problem of locusts in the British Empire, or the varieties of 
wheat or alfalfa that came from Central Asia and collected by Russian agronomists and then 
were planted in the United States and Canada.36 The boundaries between these empires are clear 
and real, yet, analyzed from this angle, the boundaries between the Kazakh Steppe and the 
Pampas become less important in certain cases than the boundaries between Manitoba and 
Toronto. Therefore, rather than focusing on comparison, this dissertation focuses on the linkages 
of the Kazakh steppe and its developing settler colonial agronomy with other settler colonial 
regions and understands the Kazakh steppe as both unique and also as a part of larger holistic 
phenomena of grain-driven settler colonialism. 
In spite of this attempt to reframe the boundaries of a grain-driven settler colonial world, 
there were real boundaries on the steppe as well. However, this dissertation, like the indigenous 
Kazakhs, does not always respect those boundaries. Nevertheless, some general outline of the 
administration of the steppe is useful. Before the Russian empire began penetration of the steppe 
beginning in the eighteenth century, most of what is today Kazakhstan was occupied by nomadic 
Kazakhs who kept herds of mostly horses and sheep, and made long range migrations in search 
of seasonal pasture. However, they did not wander in the steppe, the patterns were coordinated 
by kinship groups. The largest groupings of the Kazakhs were the three zhus (sometimes called 
hordes). The Uly Zhus (Senior Zhus) occupied the lands to the south, the Orta Zhus (Middle 
Zhus) lived in lands of most of modern day central and eastern Kazakhstan, and the Kishi Zhus 
                                                 
36 A. A. Fedotova and A. V. Kouprianov, “Archival Research Reveals the True Date of Birth of the Father of Locust 
Phase Theory, Sir Boris Uvarov, FRS” Euroasian Entomological Journal (2016): 321-327. David Moon, “In the 
Russians’ Steppes: The Introduction of Russian Wheat on the Great Plains of the United States of America” Journal 
of Global History 3 no. 2 (July 2008): 203-225. 
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(Junior Zhus) nomadized on lands in the west of modern day Kazakhstan. During the period 
discussed in this dissertation, the Kazakhs still lived on these same lands.  
Imperial authorities were ambivalent about supporting or suppressing peasant settlement 
up until the early years of the twentieth century. In fact, most settlers to the steppe may have 
been illegal settlers who the government sometimes tried to hinder, and other times supported 
even if the settlement was officially illegal. This illegal settlement was coupled with legal 
Cossack settlements that established military fortification lines and Cossack villages along the 
edges of the steppe in an attempt to surround the Kazakhs. The first official law that governed 
peasant settlement in the steppe region were called the Temporary Rules for Resettlement which 
were created in 1881. By 1889, the government issued another reorganization to regulate the 
flow and settlement of peasants to the region called the Resettlement Act. This act officially 
designated Akmolisk, Semipalatinsk, and Semirechye, three steppe oblasts (regions), as sites of 
peasant settlement. In 1891 Turgai and Uralsk oblasts were added to the list. 
The governance of these regions is complicated because they did not constitute a single 
region in the thinking of the Russian empire as a whole in terms of governance. Instead, the 
region was divided between the Steppe Governor-Generalship (Akmolinsk and Semipalatinsk) 
and the Governor-Generalship of Turkestan (which included Semirechye and the rest of Russian 
Central Asia).37 Turgai and Uralsk were not a part of either Governor-Generalships. Each oblast 
was then divided into uezds. However, there were other different administrative levels as well, 
such as volosti that were an attempt to establish administrative boundaries for nomadic Kazakhs, 
as well as lands of the Cossack Hosts that were not officially part of the regular administrative 
divisions. The situation was complicated even more as the Resettlement Administration grew in 
                                                 
37 Semirechye was briefly part of the Steppe Governor-Generalship. 
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size, and began to serve as a kind of government within the boundaries of official administration. 
Therefore, agronomic aid on the steppe could, at different times, come from the level of 
governor-generalship, oblast, uezd, volost, Cossack host, resettlement district, or even the Trans-
Siberian Railway Commission. It was complicated and often led to work being duplicated or not 
done by anyone as responsibilities were not always clear. Therefore, rather than focus on 
particular aspects of administrative-level agronomic work, this dissertation attempts to get a 
sample of the diverse providers of agronomic work and attempt to understand them as a group. 
This is a complicated project, but also, given the frequent personnel exchanges between different 
levels and types of government administration, some clear values and processes being to emerge.     
 This dissertation comprises six chapters that trace how agricultural science developed and 
changed the steppe while simultaneously being developed and changed by the settler colonial 
environment of the steppe itself. Chapter 1, “Steppe School” focuses on the early attempts by 
bureaucrats and agricultural scientists to transform the steppe by training young Kazakh boys in 
the basics of agricultural science and sedentary agriculture. This project proved more difficult 
than first thought due to resistance of Kazakhs, and eventually was modified to include the 
children of Cossacks and later Russian peasant settlers. While the schools attempted to remake 
the students, in the end they were more effective as means of expanding the reach of agricultural 
scientists into the steppe. They also created an opportunity for the agronomic bureaucracy to 
learn about the new environment, conduct experiments on crop varieties and growing practices, 
and served as early sites of agronomic outreach. 
 Chapter 2, “Experimental Fields” describes the growth in the numbers and work of 
agricultural specialists who arrived on the steppe following waves of peasant colonization 
beginning in the 1890s. It examines the work of this new bureaucracy not only at the level of 
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policy in St. Petersburg, but on the steppe itself. It is especially focused on telling the story of 
how the bureaucracy and its science did not come fully formed to the steppe, but was rather 
created there, and was therefore intimately tied to and influenced by the ideas and ideology of 
settler colonialism. This chapter concentrates on the work of Sokrat’ Chaianov at the Timiriazev 
Experimental Field to explore the process of how science developed on the steppe. It also 
establishes a continuity through Chaianov’s work on the steppe 1907-1911 with his later role in 
Khruschev’s Virgin Lands Campaign in the 1950s.    
 Chapter 3, “Grazing the Steppe” examines the plans and projects of agricultural scientists 
and bureaucrats to turn the steppe into an exporter of animal products. However, the focus of 
these plans was not always on encouraging better nomadic husbandry or expansive ranching. 
Instead agronomists often centered their efforts on building sedentary mixed dairy farming and 
sought improved dairy stock, feeding, and care practices. This chapter concentrates on the 
difficulties agronomists faced in establishing dairy cooperatives and illustrates how the ideas and 
cultural values of settler colonialism often created un-scientific and culturally chauvinistic 
notions of what made “good agriculture.” 
 Chapter 4 “Planting the Steppe” describes imperial, peasant, and Kazakh attempts to 
grow grain in the steppe. It focuses on projects that encouraged planting imported wheat varieties 
and their associated difficulties. It also examines the competition wheat received from other 
indigenous crops like millet that were better adapted to the steppe environment, and how 
agronomists reacted to the challenges posed to their authority by these crops. This chapter also 
centers the role of global grain markets in the assumptions of scientists and discusses how the 
steppe was part of the growth of the Russian Empire as a grain producer and examines the 
environmental implications of these assumptions. 
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 Chapter 5 “The “Plague” of Aridity” explores the challenges of practicing agriculture in 
the arid steppe environment and what effects this had on the work and thinking of agronomists. It 
is focused especially on the hydrotechnical work of the Resettlement Administration and sees 
irrigation projects as a chance for imperial authorities to inscribe their narrative of modernity on 
the steppe environment in a very tangible way. However, this chapter also illustrates how the 
quest for water was also about disease and links the search for clean water with the fears and 
realities of the global spread of diseases like cholera. Ironically, the threat of these diseases was 
continually increasing due to the further penetration of market ties. In addition there was an 
increase in settlers from regions near the Black Sea ports that were often sources of cholera 
outbreaks in European Russia.  
 Chapter 6 “The Technostate vs. the Locust” examines attempts to solve the critical threat 
of locusts. It traces the changing methods of locust control from physical control practiced by 
settlers that imperial authorities absorbed into their cannon by “scientizing” them much as they 
had done with irrigation technologies. It then describes the failed project of biological control of 
locusts through bacteria, a project that did not see widespread adoption but that illustrates the 
steppe’s role in a global network of scientists. This signaled a change in scale for the empire as it 
sought eradication of the locust instead of the amelioration of the problem. Biological control 
experiments on the steppe were conducted in consultation with the biologist Konstantin 
Merezhkovskii. His connections to global research in locust control with scientists in Argentina, 
Algeria, and at the Pasteur Institute in Paris tells an important story about this peripheral region’s 
interconnectedness with a global network of scientists.  
The chapter concludes with the large spraying campaigns on the eve of the First World 
War as the highest expression of the nascent frontier technostate that built on the developments 
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described in earlier chapters. In order to protect newly important wheat crops from locusts, this 
project, led by agronomists, sprayed thousands of acres with pesticides imported via newly 
constructed rail networks (that also exported the grain that the pesticides protected), and reached 
into every local community in the region through relationships with local village headmen and 
progressive farming elements. This apparatus and the corresponding reordering of knowledge, 
people, the environment, and economics served as an important precursor to later Soviet projects. 
Furthermore, the survival of much of the infrastructure, personnel, research, and assumptions 
made the steppe fertile ground for Soviet projects of Stalinist Collectivization and the Virgin 






























CHAPTER TWO: STEPPE SCHOOLS 
 
In 1907, N. Krishtofovich, an agronomist working for the Governor Generalship of the 
Steppe, was tasked with making an inspection tour of the nine agricultural schools located in the 
region. During a tour that covered nearly 3,500 versts,38 he encountered a wide array of 
successes and failures. Some schools had well-kept buildings and others contained falling-down 
classrooms. Some housed well-tended farms and gardens and at others there were little more 
than weeds where crops should have been growing. He even found one school that “only existed 
on paper.”39 When visiting the school in Atbasar and inspecting a weed patch where the school 
wheat fields had been planted, a pupil asked him, “What are we supposed to do if they teach us 
one way in the classroom and in the fields they do things entirely differently?”40 Krishtofovich 
had no answer for the boy, but the interchange reflects the contradictions and challenges inherent 
in the creation and administration of lower agricultural schools in the unfamiliar environment of 
the Kazakh steppe.  
More broadly, the project of agricultural schools also represents the contradictions and 
challenges of Russian imperial agronomists’ attempts to deploy agronomic knowledge and 
expertise as a technology of power on the steppe in spite of their limited knowledge of the 
region. Experts like Krishtofovich might have had significant scientific training, but their 
experience with farming in the steppe environment, even as late as 1907, was still limited. 
However, this limited knowledge did not hinder the imperial agronomic bureaucracy from 
                                                 
38 1 verst equals .66 miles 
39 Tsentral’nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Respubliki Kazakhstan [Central State Archive of the Republic of Kazakhstan] 
hereafter referred to as, TsGARK. TsGARK f. 64, op. 1, d. 6138, l. 21, “Otchet agronoma pri Stepnom General 
gubernatore Krishtofovicha o sostoianii nizshii sel’skokhoziastvennykh shkol Stepnogo kraia v 1907” January 7- 
July 28, 1908. 
40 Ibid., l. 14,   
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establishing these schools—meant to teach the basics of farming to students, Kazakh and 
Russian alike—on the steppe already in the 1880s.  
While schools like the one in Atbasar were largely considered to be a failure by the time 
of Krishtofovich’s report, they also played an important role as sites of information gathering 
about a new environment and informed the agricultural bureaucracy about the challenges faced 
when attempting to practice scientific farming on the steppe. Although they were conceived and 
deployed as sites of remaking and science popularization, they were in fact more effective as 
places of knowledge creation and experimentation. Agricultural schools were an important early 
phase in the construction of the scientific knowledge infrastructure that officials hoped could 
exploit the steppe and bring it more fully into both the world capitalist system and the Russian 
Empire.41 In other words, they represent an important material attempt to remake both the people 
and environment of the steppe so that they might better serve the aims of the empire. Therefore, 
in spite of their failures, they are important for what they can tell us about the ideologies 
underpinning the steppe settler colony and how they actually functioned on the ground.   
The story of the creation and administration of these schools does not illustrate simply the 
introduction to the steppe of a fully formed agricultural science and its related ideologies. Rather, 
this science and these ideas were formed on the steppe simultaneous to attempts at their 
popularization.42 Therefore, their study can shed light on an important aspect of the history of 
                                                 
41 There is a large amount of research on the connection between science and technology and colonialism, one of the 
first works to focus on this connection is Headrick, Tools of Empire. In the Russian imperial context much of this 
type of study has focused on ethnography, two particularly important works are: Knight, “Science, Empire, and 
Nationality” and Hirsch, Empire of Nations.   
42 On science popularization in Russia more broadly see: Andrews “N. A. Rubakin and the Popularization of Science 
in Russia,”, and for this process in the provinces in the late imperial to early Soviet period see, James T. Andrews, 
“Iaroslavl Naturalists and the Soviet State, 1917–1931” in Provincial Landscapes: The Local Dimensions of Soviet 
Power, ed. Donald J. Raleigh (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2002), 105-24. 
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science in the late Russian Empire.43 As such, it contributes to the debates about the connection 
between civil society and agricultural science in the late imperial period. Many of these debates 
have centered around whether the state or civil society was the catalyst for scientific 
development.44 Others have discussed whether the center or periphery was more important in the 
growth of Russian science.45 This chapter—and dissertation more broadly—seek to illustrate 
how in the steppe at least, previous frameworks about the creation of agricultural science are not 
always as useful as they might be in some other regions of the empire. Instead, it seeks to 
examine the creation of science on the steppe by grounding the discussion in the reality of how 
settler colonialism—both as a physical presence and an ideological framework— drove the 
creation and administration of agricultural schools and imbued the scientific research they 
conducted and popularized with a settler colonial ethos.46  
However, agricultural schools were not only made up classrooms, farms, and curriculum. 
They were also composed of students, and in the early days of the schools, Kazakh students were 
the primary—and sometimes the only—target. Examining lower agricultural schools on the 
steppe through the lens of what they meant for Kazakhs adds to our understanding of Russian 
rule over Muslim subjects in the steppe and can add context to broader debates about the 
                                                 
43 The two most important overviews of this topic are: Alexander Vucinich, Science in Russian Culture and Graham, 
Science in Russia and the Soviet Union.  
44 Anastasia Fedotova, “The Beetle Question: The Growing Problem of Insect Infestation in South Russia in the Late 
Nineteenth Century” Slavonic and East European Review 93 no. 1 (January 2015): 66-95. 
45 Olga Elina makes this one of her central criticisms of Graham and Vucinich in Elina, “Between Local Practices 
and Global Knowledge”. 
46 Alexander Morrison similarly showed that because of the realities of settler colonial citizenship operated in a 
different way in Turkestan, Alexander Morrison, “Metropole, Colony, and Imperial Citizenship in the Russian 
Empire” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 13 no. 2 (Spring 2012): 327-364. 
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disputed colonial nature of the Russian Empire’s involvement in Central Asia and its reliance on 
racial and ethnic difference.47  
Steppe Study and the Creation of Settler Colonial Science 
Lower agricultural schools were one of the earliest opportunities for imperial agricultural 
scientists in the steppe to actually farm according to their own methods. This is especially 
significant because in 1887, the year the first agricultural schools opened, imperial officials still 
lacked detailed information on steppe environments and on how well or poorly certain crops, 
animals, and plants weathered the steppe. However, the schools were not founded as sites of 
experimentation, instead they grew into that role due to their physical existence in a colonized 
environment.  
Although some schools like the Zaisan Kazakh Agricultural school were founded under 
their own rules and guidelines, eventually all agricultural schools on the steppe came under the 
category of lower agricultural schools ostensibly under the imperial ministry responsible for 
agriculture.48 These agricultural schools, whether on the steppe or in European Russia, were 
founded to teach pupils (usually Russian peasants) in both the practical and theoretical aspects of 
agriculture along with basic reading and math. In order to teach practical agriculture every 
school was supposed to have a school farm where students could learn and practice agriculture 
according to scientific standards. It was these farms that would serve as the basis of an important 
process of experimentation, adaptation, and eventual science popularization on the steppe.    
                                                 
47 For debate about what role Orientalism and by extension race played in the Russian Empire see: Adeeb Khalid, 
“Russian History and the Debate Over Orientalism” and Nathaniel Knight, “On Russian Orientalism: A Response to 
Adeeb Khalid” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 1 no. 4 (Fall 2000): 691-715. 
48 The Russian Empire had a shifting and complex and hierarchical collection of different types of schools. The 
“lower” (sometimes translated as “elementary”) in this instance refers not to the age of students, but to it being the 
type of school intended for farm laborers and farmers instead of those who might manage larger estates or work in 
government. Those students would attend either secondary agricultural schools (of which there were 15 in the whole 
empire by 1917) or higher agricultural schools (neither of which existed on the steppe). W.S. Jeisen, Secondary 
Agricultural Schools in Russia (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1917), 10. 
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In 1887 however, one of the first agricultural schools to open on the steppe, the Zaisan 
Kazakh Agricultural School did not have a farm. This school had a more specific focus than 
most schools as its stated purpose was the “dissemination of agricultural knowledge among the 
Kazakh population.” Instruction was supposed to take two years with a possible supplementary 
year, and was open to any Kazakh boy of good health aged between ten and eighteen years old. It 
was to carry out this task through a mix of practical and theoretical learning. Practical learning 
was to take place on the school’s farm, where during the summer months students were expected 
to work and learn how to use farm machinery and modern farming practices. The theoretical 
learning was to take place in a regular classroom and included rudimentary subjects like basic 
math and science as well as Russian language.49 However, it took nearly a year after opening 
(March 1888) before the school was able to secure a farm location 12 versts from the school 
building in town. The land itself was located between the Vyusen’yu and Bitpak-su rivers, 
however, it was not irrigated.50 On April 12 the students and teachers moved to the new farm site 
and began conducting “practical classes” on irrigation, plowing, and planting.51  
 For all agricultural schools like Zaisan, securing land was the first step in establishing a 
school farm, and the process was often time consuming. It was unclear who was responsible for 
supplying the land, whether they should choose the best land, or simply take what was available, 
or if the school should even pay for it. Even in the 1880s, especially in more humid regions of 
the northern steppe that were quickly filling up with peasant settlers, good land was sometimes 
hard to come by. For example, in Pavlodar, which was already the site of significant peasant 
settlement by the late 1880s, school officials selected a 1,000 desiatin52 piece of land because it 
                                                 
49 TsGARK f.64, op.1 d. 6083a, l. 25, “Otchet o Zaisanskoi kirghizskoi sel’skokhoziaistvennoi shkole, 1889.”  
50 Ibid., l. 1.  
51 Ibid., ll. 22.  
52 1 desiatin equals roughly 1 hectare or 2.47 acres.  
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was neither particularly good or bad. Reports described it as having a “steppe character” with 
good soil and a good well, and it was previously the site of Kazakh pasture. Therefore, it had 
good potential, but was not yet improved. This location was specifically selected because 
officials wanted to show what proper agricultural methods could do on a regular piece of land.53  
School officials in Pavlodar recognized that at least part of their role was to improve 
peasant settler agriculture since schools were meant to serve those living in their environs. 
Nevertheless, it was not peasant settlers who were expected to front the capital for this 
investment in the future. Instead the land was taken from Kazakhs. There were nine agricultural 
schools eventually established in the steppe, and potentially thousands of good Kazakh pasture 
lands were taken for the creation of schools. Importantly, these schools were neither sought after, 
nor particularly well received by most Kazakhs. While this was not the only or the grossest 
injustice done to the Kazakhs in the Russian pursuit of a steppe settler colony, it was significant, 
and it reflects how even something as benign as schools came at a cost in the settler colonial 
environment. 
Breaking ground and planting for the first season at Zaisan in 1888 was completed under 
the supervision of the school head, Ignaitii Mikhailovich Lisovskii. Lisovskii had finished a 
course at the Gorygoretskaia Agricultural School and then worked for several years on the 
estates of the nobleman L. D. Viazemskii in European Russia.54 He then completed a practical 
course in agriculture.55 On paper, Lisovskii had impeccable credentials with both a practical and 
theoretical background in agriculture. However, he appears to have had no experience with dry 
environments like the one in Zaisan, and in its first years under Lisovskii, the school struggled 
                                                 
53 TsGARK f. 64, op. 1, d. 6084a ll. 1-3. “Otchet Pavlodarskoi sel’sko-khoziaistvennoi shkoly, 1892.” 
54 Today the Goregoretskaia school is the Belorussian State Agricultural Academy. 
55 TsGARK f. 64, op. 1, d. 6083a, l. 26. 
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because of this shortcoming. While the land taken from the Kazakhs in Pavlodar was eventually 
turned into a somewhat profitable school farm, the same cannot be said for Zaisan. The Zaisan 
region is in the far East of Semipalatinsk Oblast, and the town is less than 50 miles from the 
Chinese border. It is also significantly drier than other steppe regions. In the early days of the 
school, officials at Zaisan spent significant time deciding whether the region was more similar to 
the irrigated regions to the south or if it was suitable for un-irrigated agriculture like regions to 
the north. Eventually school officials recognized that agriculture would be impossible on the 
Zaisan farm without irrigation, however, they did so only through much trial and error, that was 
funded with government taxes.56  
After securing a location for the farm, the next question was what to plant. In spite of the 
fact that several showed significant independence, the heads of lower agricultural schools were 
given directives by the agronomy section of the Governor Generalship about what to plant. 
These represent one of the first opportunities for the relatively small agronomic staff at the 
Governor Generalship to gain systematic information on what plants grew well across a broad 
cross section of the massive steppe region. However, these directives also reveal that the 
agronomic section was not simply a group of objective scientists that were only curious about 
what plants grew best in the steppe. Instead, they came to the steppe with plans to transform it.  
The prescriptive directives illustrate how even several decades before the expansion of 
the agronomic bureaucracy under the Resettlement Administration, officials showed an 
overwhelming preference for grain farming. Instructions from the agronomy section told school 
farms to plant five desisatins each of spring rye and wheat as well as four desiatins of oats and 
one desiatin of millet. The remaining area was supposed to be planted with ½ a desiatin of 
                                                 
56 TsGARK f. 64, op. 1, d. 6083a, ll. 73-76. 
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potatoes, one desiatin of buckwheat and less than a half desiatin of peas.57 The fact that officials 
were uninterested in prioritizing the planting of fodder crops demonstrates how focused officials 
were in transforming the steppe into a particular kind of agricultural zone in spite of already 
mounting evidence that the steppe (especially in dry regions like Zaisan) would not easily 
become a grain producing region.58 Lisovskii did report planting some pasture and fodder crops; 
however, he argued that caring for them took precious water away from grain crops and therefore 
he was opposed to giving them too much focus. Instead, the school cut some hay from wild 
grasses and let the livestock graze on the open steppe.59 
However, a preference for grain crops did not signify a partiality toward all grains. 
Officials encouraged an overwhelming focus on particular types of grain crops that were not 
always well-suited to the steppe environment—wheat and rye. Interestingly, this was not 
necessarily because they fetched a higher price in the region. In fact, at Zaisan in 1889, the one 
grain crop that showed significant promise—millet—was relegated to only 1/5 the area officials 
wanted to dedicate to wheat or rye. This occurred despite the fact that in the second year of the 
school farm, millet brought in twice as much profit on just half as much land as did wheat. It 
should be noted that by the second year, either because of the inability to get seed or because 
school officials recognized the profits to be made with millet, the plan from the agronomic 
section was not carried out. Instead, the farm only planted just under 4.5 desiatins of wheat, 
almost two desiatins of barley, two desiatins of oats, lesser amounts of buckwheat, peas, flax, 
                                                 
57 TsGARK f. 64, op. 1, d. 6088 ll. 3-4, “Materialy Zaisanskoi sel’sko-khoziastvennoi shkoly”, September 1894-
February 1900.  
58 For discussion of the debates taking place in Russian science about the limitations of planting grain in arid steppe 
regions see, David Moon, The Plow That Broke the Steppe: Agriculture and Environment on Russia’s Grasslands, 
1700-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 89-166. 
59 TsGARK f. 64 op. 1, d. 6083a. ll. 9-12. 
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hemp, corn, and clover, and 2.5 desiatins of millet.60 In spite of the difficulties in growing wheat, 
the farm planted several acres of it every year and nearly every year yielded a poor crop.61  
 In addition to directives on how much and which crops to plant, school officials also were 
tasked with reporting on the school in a very regimented format that was dictated not by officials 
in Omsk, but by those in St. Petersburg who set reporting requirements for all lower agricultural 
schools.62 In spite of—or perhaps because of—the challenges of an unfamiliar environment 
Zaisan became a significant experiment site, an impulse exhibited at other lower agricultural 
schools.  Although apparently not required by the agronomy section, under Lisovskii’s direction 
the school planted orchards of apples, pears and by the second year plums and cherries. What is 
more, the varieties they planted were not local unimproved varieties but were the best varieties 
available from the Petrovskii Agricultural Academy in Orlovsk.63 In addition, there were plans 
for planting forest trees to supply wood for heating and building.64  
 Lisovskii’s interest in fruit was not only due to his curiosity as a scientist, and his focus 
on these crops illustrates how it was sometimes difficult to untangle what drove steppe 
agronomists to ask certain research questions over others. Although the school’s fruit trees had 
not yet been in the ground a year, by 1889, Lisovskii was already promising a “great future” for 
orchardry in the entire Zaisan region. While he believed climatic conditions were well suited to 
orchards, he also felt that “economic conditions were no less favorable.” Lisovskii pointed out 
that while it was close to the Zheti-Su (Semirechye) region where fruit trees grew very well, 
                                                 
60 Ibid., ll. 3-4.  
61 TsGARK f. 64, op. 1, d. 6088, l. 36, Report by the Head of the Zaisan School Saenko to the Agronomy Section of 
the Governor Generalship of the Steppe, 19 January 1895. 
62 TsGARK f. 64, op. 1, d. 3020, ll. 6-21. Programa godovago otcheta po nizshim sel’skokhoziastvennim shkolam 
(St. Petersburg: Tipografia Kirshbauma, 1888). 
63 TsGARK f. 64, op. 1, d. 6083a, l. 17. 
64 On the challenge and long-time quest of foresting the steppe see and Russian forestry more generally see: Stephen 
Brain, Song of the Forest, especially chapters 1 and 2.    
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there were no easy transportation routes linking the two regions so they were not in 
competition.65 He believed the Zaisan region had the advantage of being linked via the Irtysh 
River to other regions further north such as the Irtysh valley and Siberia where fruit growing was 
more challenging, yet which had seen large amounts of recent peasant settlement.66 Lisovskii’s 
vision for regional linkages and agricultural specialization predated by nearly three quarters of a 
century more famous plans by the Soviets.67   
 The influence of economic considerations on the choices surrounding scientific 
experimentation in agricultural schools was not limited to the question of orchards. In the same 
report, Lisovskii discussed how the school farm should operate on a profit-driven logic that 
should be copied by farmers in the region. From the first year of operation, school farms were 
supposed to keep meticulous records about costs and profits. This was in part because while 
schools did receive government funding, the goal was for them to be self-supporting, and 
officials hoped the farms and workshops could pay for the schools’ upkeep.68 Lisovskii was 
particularly fastidious in his record keeping. He included costs for seed, equipment, labor, and 
irrigation. In the first year of operation, he appeared surprised that in spite of a late harvest, 
frosts, and pest damage the school farm made a profit of 131 rubles. He also noted that one of the 
biggest expenses—the digging of irrigation ditches—would not be necessary at most other 
schools.69   
                                                 
65 Interestingly, apples are believed to have originated in the Zheti-su region near modern day Almaty. Sean Adams, 
“Roots: Returning to the Apple’s Birthplace” Agricultural Research 42 no. 11 (Nov. 1994): 18-21. 
66 TsGARK f. 64, op. 1, d. 6083a, ll. 16-17. 
67 While the Virgin Lands Campaign was focused on land in Siberia and Kazakhstan, it was because it was hoped 
these lands could be turned into wheat growing regions to replace historic wheat regions in the Black Earth, which 
Khrushchev hoped would be able to specialize in growing corn for animal feed. See, McCauley, Khrushchev and the 
Development of Soviet Agriculture. 
68 TsGARK f. 64, op. 1 d. 2803, l. 48. “Preobrazovanii kirgizskii internatov sel’sko-khoziastvennyi wkol’ v oblastah 
Stepnogo general-gubernatora”, 1883-1893.  
69 TsGARK f. 64, op. 1 d. 6083a, l. 5. 
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 While Lisovskii included a surprising number of costs in his calculations such as 
machinery and livestock repayments over time and projected depreciation of irrigation works, his 
report is interesting for what it did not include. Most notably, it included no calculation for the 
cost of land which had been allocated to the school.70 The categories that Lisovskii was supposed 
to use to calculate the costs of the farm were included in standardized directives for all lower 
agricultural schools throughout the empire. Based on only the required categories, Lisovskii 
found the farm made a profit of 334 rubles, however, this did not include costs for hired labor, 
irrigation ditches, or equipment and livestock rental.71 That no one in the empire-wide 
administration nor Lisovskii saw fit to calculate the cost of land is a significant oversight. While 
across the empire, it was perhaps assumed land would be donated or secured by local zemstva 
for lower agricultural schools, Lisovskii’s oversight also indicates a devaluing of Kazakh land.72 
Wolfe pointed to the centrality of land in settler colonialism when he wrote, “Whatever settlers 
may say—and they generally have a lot to say—the primary motive for elimination is not race 
(or religion, ethnicity, grade of civilization, etc.) but access to territory. Territoriality is settler 
colonialism’s specific, irreducible element.”73 However, once the settlers had the land, they 
quickly wrote previous indigenous habitation out of history. 
 Just as glaring as the lack of the cost of land is a lack of labor costs. Lisovskii did 
recognize the need to account for hired workers who dug irrigation ditches and who often 
actually planted the fields. However, missing in his account was the value of the students 
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was not a Kazakh, it appears he acquired the land via government grant.  
71 Ibid., ll. 3-4.  
72 Zemstva were local organs of self-government that were created after the liberation of the serfs as part of the 
Great Reforms carried out under Tsar Alexander II. However, there were no zemstvo in the steppe region as they 
were under the military rule and the zemstvo regulations did not apply to these regions. 




themselves. While this was likely something no agricultural schools were valuing, in the case of 
the Zaisan school that was established especially for Kazakh boys, the assumption that their 
labor was insignificant is notable. What is more, this lack of respect for the labor of the students 
would continue to plague the school, because many Kazakh students felt that their labor was not 
valued, and they therefore refused to work on the farms. 
 Inattention to labor is significant, because officials believed that population (specifically 
labor) was one of the things most lacking in the steppe. Their conviction that underpopulation 
was a problem was connected to a belief that the land was underexploited by nomads and by 
extensive Cossack agriculture.74 Instead of focusing, as both of these groups did, on livestock, 
officials hoped to turn the steppe into a grain growing region, which required significantly more 
labor. Therefore, much of the experimentation conducted at agricultural schools, whether it was 
by fruit enthusiasts like Lisovskii or not, was focused on wheat. Lisovskii attached great 
importance and expended significant energy into test trials of wheat varieties during his first 
seasons on the farm. In 1889, he planted three varieties of wheat, two varieties (churchinskaia 
and chuchuchaksaia) that were soft, and one variety (chernokoloska) that was hard.75 He found 
that the soft varieties grew faster but were more susceptible to rust disease and had a lower yield. 
Therefore, he recommended the farm, and the entire Irtysh valley, should only grow hard wheat, 
especially the chernokoloska variety.76 However, this did not mean he believed soft varieties 
were ill-suited to the entire region. Instead, apparently because of its faster growth, he thought 
                                                 
74 On what officials believed were wasteful Kazakh grazing practices see P. Khvorostanskii, “Kirgizskii vopros 
sviazi s kolonizatsei stepi” Voprosy Kolonizatsii no. 1 (1907): 53-104. On criticism of Cossack agricultural practices 
on the steppe see, TsGARK f. 64, op.1, d. 6083a, l. 22. 
75 Soft wheat varieties grow faster, but usually have less protein and gluten, while hard varieties grow slower but 
have higher protein and gluten contents. 
76 This variety was also called arnautka and was a very popular export variety grown in South Russia in the second 
half of the nineteenth century. Yu. Ianson, Statisticheskoe izsledovanie o khlebnoi torgovl’ v Odesskom raion, vol. 2 
(St. Petersburg, Tipografia Bezobrazova, 1870), 129. 
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soft varieties were still well suited to the higher elevation mountain valleys.77 Due to the fact that 
the agronomy section had few other sources of information for how to grow wheat in Zaisan 
district, this advice from a well-trained agronomist who had lived in the region for less than two 
growing seasons became cannon for the entire region. The willingness to accept this advice 
illustrates how—in addition to undervaluing land and labor—agronomic professionals also often 
exhibited a patronizing attitude that undervalued local knowledge and overvalued their own. 
 While wheat was the main focus of Lisovskii and later school heads, it was not the only 
early experimental work carried out on school farms. In addition to the three varieties of wheat, 
he also tested spring rye, three varieties of oats, buckwheat, barley, and two varieties of millet in 
the first year. Additionally, he planted peas, flax, and hemp alongside a local variety of alfalfa 
from China, and five varieties of corn. He dutifully reported which varieties appeared to grow 
best, and all of this information was reported to officials at the Governor Generalship who 
previously had little idea what grew best, or even what average yields could be expected.78 
Lisovskii also conducted experiments on the question of whether or not irrigation was necessary 
in the Zaisan region. The necessity of irrigation was only decided firmly for Lisovskii following 
a failed experiment which attempted to grow rye at higher elevations which had cooler 
temperatures and more moisture.79 While the main difficulty Lisovskii faced was aridity, there 
were several other challenges for school heads. In addition to plant diseases that probably were 
more prevalent because plants were stressed due to lack of water or poor fertilization, lower 
agricultural school officials also faced significant pest problems.80 For example, in 1892 the head 
of the Pavlodar school reported a very bad harvest, where half the crops were lost due to drought 
                                                 
77 TsGARK f. 64., op. 1, d. 6083a, l. 5.  
78 Ibid., ll. 5-6. 
79 Ibid., ll. 73-76. 
80 Ibid., l. 5 
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and the other half were destroyed by locusts. In a foreshadowing of things to come, he believed 
that he could solve the water problem, but did not believe there was anything that could be done 
about the locusts.81 
 The new and challenging arid environment and its associated pests was not the only 
difficulty school farms faced. Farms were often located far from major transportation networks. 
The steppe in the 1880s lacked significant transportation infrastructure as the railways that 
eventually connected the region were not yet completed.82 Transportation problems were a major 
difficulty Lisovskii faced in getting high quality root stock for his growing orchard and forest 
plantations.83 Similarly, the schools’ small budgets and transportation problems meant that the 
schools were often using old farm implements. For example, several years after the school in 
Zaisan opened, it was still plowing using a traditional and primitive sokha plow.84 Additionally, 
much of the sewing of grain was done by hand, harvests were completed using hand sickles, and 
there was rarely seed sorting and cleaning equipment available.85 In spite of these difficulties, 
school heads like Lisovskii usually carried out annual crop experiments and reported on them to 
their superiors in Omsk who would later use this information to attempt to aid, influence, and 
control the steady stream of peasant settlers who began flooding into the region beginning in the 
1880s.  
 
                                                 
81 TsGARK f. 64., op. 1, d. 6084a, l. 4. “Otchet Pavlodarskoi.” 
82 On the effects of steam transport in colonial contexts see: On Barak, On Time: Technology and Temporality in 
Modern Egypt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013) and Nile Green, Bombay Islam; The Religious 
Economy of the West Indian Ocean, 1840-1915 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011). On railways in 
Central Asia in a later period see Matthew J. Payne, Stalin’s Railroad: Turksib and the Building of Socialism 
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Asia see George Dobson, Russia’s Railway Advance into Central Asia (London: W.H. Allen & Co., 1890). 
83 TsGARK f. 64, op.1, d. 6083a, l. 60. 
84 Ibid., l. 97 
85 Ibid., l. 55. 
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Adaptation and the “Birth of Extension” on the Kazakh Steppe 
While it is easy to view school administrations as hapless bureaucrats lost in a totally new 
environment with little practical farming experience, they often did make changes to adapt to 
their new surroundings. However, these changes often mimicked the nomads or the extensive 
and “wasteful” peasant and Cossack farms. What is more, as school officials grew in confidence, 
they began to see themselves as potential catalysts for science popularization and eventually 
began to play a role of a kind of agricultural extension service on the steppe in spite of the 
relatively primitive state of their own farms.  
 While as previously discussed much of the focus of school farms was on planting grain 
crops, officials did not entirely neglect livestock and pasture. Although grain was central, many 
also believed that proper farms in the region should eventually adhere to the ideal farm that was 
a mix of crops and livestock, especially dairy.86 Lisovskii was especially excited about the 
prospects for developing a cattle dairy industry in Zaisan.87 His calculations indicated that if a 
cow could produce 50 vedro88 of milk per year it could yield a profit of just over a ruble per year. 
However, he indicated that this was only possible with “Russian” varieties of cows or at least 
those crossed with a local Kazakh breed because Kazakh varieties did not yield enough milk.89 In 
spite of the fact that all steppe agricultural schools wanted to have improved livestock, even as 
late as 1907 the majority of animals on most school farms were local Kazakh breeds.90 Lisovskii 
                                                 
86 This prevalence for mixed agriculture was not limited to the steppe, but was instead a global phenomena that saw 
intensive agriculture in countries like Denmark as the highest ideal. For discussion of this trend in America and its 
global reach see, Steven Stoll, Larding the Lean Earth: Soil and Society in Nineteenth Century America (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 2003). 
87 It is important to make a distinction between cattle and horse dairy because the Kazakhs already were milking 
horses in significant numbers for household dairy. 
88 1 vedro is equal to roughly 3.25 U.S. gallons. 
89 TsGARK f. 64, op. 1, d. 6083a, ll. 10-12. 
90 TsGARK f. 64., op. 1, d. 6138, l. 21. 
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himself failed to acquire any improved dairy stock, and milk production at the Zaisan farm was 
usually between 30 and 50 vedro per cow.91  
 In addition to relying on local breeds of livestock, agricultural school farms also practiced 
methods of animal feeding and care that were similar to local practices. Although school heads 
often reported on the need for proper shelter for livestock, during the first years of operation 
several schools had no barns for their animals.92 At Zaisan, Lisovskii mentioned this problem 
frequently in his reports, but was still unable to find the time, supplies, or labor to build livestock 
barns. What is more, officials rarely planted enough pasture to feed livestock, instead they 
typically let the animals graze on the steppe and the majority of hay for winter was cut from 
unimproved pasture of steppe grasses.93 At the Vernyi (now Almaty) School of Orchardry, one 
official was frustrated to report that while the school had nice gardens and orchards, livestock 
roamed free and damaged them because the school had no fences.94 These examples of 
problematic infrastructure and laisses faire management were rather hypocritical when 
considering frequent Russian criticisms of Kazakh and Cossack “extensive” agriculture.95 
 The fact that at most schools like Zaisan, the school and farm were not located in the 
same place was a frequent concern of officials.96 The distance between the farm and classroom 
building meant that the school year was divided into two parts, summer and winter. During the 
                                                 
91 TsGARK f. 64, op. 1, d. 6083a, ll. 62-63. 
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TsGARK f. 64, op.1, d. 6183, l. 24. 
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Imperial Russia” Journal of Historical Geography 26, no. 2 (2000): 273-291. 
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winter months students lived at the school in town and attended classes that addressed the 
“theoretical” side of their education. In winter, rather than travelling between the school and 
farm every day, the entire school simply moved and lived on the farm.97 Zaisan was not alone in 
this practice. For example, at the Kopal Agricultural School’s farm, during the summer months, 
students and teachers—the majority of whom were ethnic Russians—lived in yurts on the farm 
property.98 That this transience (or perhaps even nomadism) occurred at a school that existed to 
encourage the greater adoption of intensive sedentary agriculture is an ironic and telling 
adaptation by Russian trained agricultural experts to the steppe environment. 
 However, even the association of a sedentary life with Russian agriculture, and 
nomadism with the Kazaks is too simple. Russian and Cossack peasant settlement had already 
begun to disrupt and block Kazakh migration routes, and this process only continued in severity 
as peasant settlement increased.99 Although the land taken for the school farm in Pavlodar was 
reportedly pasture, at Zaisan the farm occupied land that had previously been used by Kazakhs 
for sedentary agriculture. While he decried Kazakh nomadism in one sentence, in the next, 
Lisovskii freely admitted that the land that the school farm was located on had been farmed and 
irrigated by the previous Kazakh proprietors. However, because they did “not value” the land, 
they had given up and moved to China five years before the school acquired the property.100   
                                                 
97 TsGARK f. 64, op.1, d. 6083a, l. 99. 
98 Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv [Russian State Historical Archive] hereafter referred to as RGIA. 
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Nevertheless, admitting the land had previously been farmed was not the same as 
admitting that the school was largely copying Kazakh agricultural practices, which it appears 
Lisovskii also did. The site of the school farm was traversed by a small stream, and the school 
built a dam at one end to collect water to fill up the small gulley that the stream ran through. 
They then constructed several smaller channels off the gulley to allow for the irrigation of fields. 
However, rather than using modern dam building and irrigation methods that involved 
mathematics and blueprints, and rather than constructing the dam of concrete, the dam and the 
feeder canals were built out of brush and swales in ways that appear very similar to local 
irrigation practices.101 In fact, it seems likely that the school simply reconstructed the irrigation 
works that the Kazakhs who had farmed the land had left behind.102 However, the dam and 
irrigation channels were now part of the Russian scientific approach to agriculture even if they 
differed little in construction, conception, or application from the earlier Kazakh irrigation 
works.                               
While school officials had high hopes that they would succeed where the Kazakhs had 
failed, due to their perceived backward agricultural practices and “not valuing” the land, their 
experience was less triumphant. For the duration of the school’s existence, the farm site was 
constantly plagued by a lack of water and crops suffered. However, this was not because the site 
was ill-suited to irrigation. Instead, it appears the farm was robbed of most of its water by a 
nearby Cossack settlement that took more than its share of water from the incoming source.103 
The Kazakhs, therefore, failed in their previous attempts to farm the area not because of their 
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lack of knowledge but instead because of a colonial order that privileged Cossacks over 
Kazakhs.104  
School farms were not only sites of experimentation and adaptation, they were also one 
of the first significant attempts to disseminate knowledge and popularize modern scientific 
farming on the steppe. While students were one of the targets of schools as sites of 
demonstration, they were not the only ones. Within the first years of the founding of the school 
farm at Zaisan, Lisovskii was already planning how to develop the farm into a good example for 
the local populace. He hoped that Kazakhs would come to the farm, see how productive and rich 
it was, be amazed by the advanced machinery, and want to go home and start farming themselves 
using the newest methods.  
Lisovskii believed it was likely that Kazakhs would take up some sedentary agriculture 
even before they completely gave up nomadism. In this regard he was correct, as many nomads 
continued to practice nomadism while cutting hay for winter feed. However, Lisovskii thought 
that the change would come through the school garden, provided it could supply a healthy 
amount of vegetables to the students. The students would then learn to like these vegetables and 
share them with their parents who would also recognize their profitability. While confident in the 
power of vegetables to convert the Kazakhs to sedentary agriculture, Lisovskii was still worried 
that the Kazakhs also needed to learn about the profitability of all other types of agriculture 
besides livestock raising.105 Interestingly, these ideas were not based on the proclivities of 
Kazakhs and settlers which Lisovskii was well aware of. He himself noted that the reason fruits 
and vegetables fetched such a high price was because there was so little Russian settlement in the 
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region. It is likely that if settlement increased as Lisovskii hoped, Kazakhs would most likely be 
at a comparative advantage if they ignored his advice and focused on raising horses which they 
were already quite good at rather than raising unfamiliar vegetables, which is what most Kazakhs 
did.106  
In addition to the school garden as a demonstration and dissemination site, Lisovskii also 
hoped the school could be part of a municipal herd of improved cattle.107 This would allow the 
school to begin a breeding program where local unimproved cattle could breed with the 
improved varieties and the entire region could begin to develop a dairy industry. This idea and 
aim anticipated later attempts at developing a cattle dairy industry on the steppe by several 
decades. Similarly, Lisovskii hoped that his prized orchard plants could serve as the basis for a 
local nursery of improved rootstock to help develop the region’s fruit marketing potential.108 
 Projects like these were relatively common at agricultural schools throughout the steppe 
region and were often included as part of their work in their reports as some kind of work to 
“spread the rational methods of afforestation, horticulture, and truck farming in the local 
population.”109 However, what “local population” meant was affected by where the school was 
located. In Vernyi where there was already significant Cossack settlement, school officials 
focused on outreach that they believed would help small Cossack peasant households. This 
meant that the school should not encourage growing hops and grapes as these crops were already 
grown in abundance on large private plantations between Vernyi and Pishpek (Bishkek).110 
Similarly, in places like Pavlodar that were already seeing significant peasant settlement, 
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outreach was focused on peasants even though there were still large numbers of Kazakhs in the 
region. 
 However, at Zaisan, officials could not ignore the fact that the school was founded to 
help Kazakhs. Therefore, beyond the goals of an orchard nursery and a municipal dairy herd, the 
school also had a program to give away corn and oat seeds as well as apple root stock to the local 
Kazakh volosts in the hopes of encouraging these types of sedentary agriculture.111 This appears 
to have been in part a continuation of an earlier program to distribute mulberry trees and 
silkworms to Cossacks begun by the governor of the Semipalatinsk region.112 School reports do 
not indicate how successful most of these programs were, so it is unclear what their actual effects 
were on local agriculture. 
 However, one program of free plant distribution did include some reports after the fact. In 
the first year of the school farm, Lisovskii ordered a trial of two potato varieties, an unimproved 
white variety with no name and an English early red potato. Lisovskii reported that the school 
had good success with both varieties and was even able to get two harvests from the English 
variety. Recognizing the potatoes grew well in the region, and that Kazakhs apparently did not 
grow potatoes, he distributed some free seed potatoes to a local Kazak named Borombaev. It is 
unclear what Borombaev’s connection was to the school if any, however, he reported great 
success with the plants and had a good harvest, and Lisovskii hoped that he shared the crop with 
his neighbors.113 Once again, while the scale of these projects was small, the impulse would 
foreshadow later attempts under the Resettlement Administration which sought out partnerships 
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with local agricultural societies and progressive farmers to establish demonstration plots that 
others could visit and learn from in their local community.114 
 While in the early years of the school Lisovskii sought simply to share seeds and plants 
with locals and hope they might visit the school farm, it was often in such a poor state that a visit 
might convince a visitor the school was not to be copied. In 1896, a government inspector was 
horrified to find that the school was a site of a plague outbreak among the cattle, and that the 
school had done nothing to quarantine it.115 Similarly, the newspaper Sibirskaia Zhizin wrote a 
long expose on the Zaisan school and found that it was farming at a primitive level if at all, and 
alleged that its instructors read from books and ignored the local soil and climate.116 
 However, these reports came several years after Lisovskii had left the school in 1892. By 
1894 a new school head had taken over responsibility for the farm at Zaisan: Vasily A. Saenko. 
Saenko had graduated from the Saratov Vocational School, and then completed another course at 
the Krasnoufimsk Industrial School.117 In the years between Lisovskii and Saenko, the school 
had suffered from changes in leadership. Therefore, when Saenko arrived, he tried to return the 
school to some of its earlier mission of outreach to Kazakh boys. In pursuit of this goal, Saenko 
laid out a rather grand vision of how the school could serve as the catalyst for the transformation 
of nomads into settled farmers in the Zaisan district and beyond. Other schools had plans at least 
on paper for similar projects, but Saenko’s appears to be the most ambitious, and was also one of 
the few that was confirmed to have been implemented. 
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 Saenko’s transformational plan called for giving each graduate of the school a piece of 
land of about 20-30 acres along with improved seeds, livestock, and agricultural equipment. The 
school would also continue to instruct the graduates in what crops to plant and when to plant 
them. However, these farms were not meant to be at the site of the farm, instead the goal was to 
establish farms among the graduates’ home communities. Saenko called these homesteads 
“exemplary peasant farms” (obraztsovaia krestianskaia khoziastva).118 He believed this was 
necessary because he thought that even if Kazakhs tried to farm using scientific or Russian 
methods, they lacked community support, which he recognized as integral to their success.119  
Saenko admitted that the school was not currently doing this even though he saw it 
squarely within their mission of “spreading agricultural knowledge to the local population.” He 
believed this was in part because the school farm itself was in such poor shape. It lacked 
improved seeds and even good agricultural equipment. In spite of these shortcomings, the next 
year in 1895 two Kazakh graduates received plots of land along with tools, seeds, and livestock 
to begin the first exemplary peasant farms established with help from the Zaisan school.120 While 
a small project that only ever included a few graduates, for the time this undertaking was on the 
cutting edge of global agricultural extension work. Saenko’s plan for exemplary peasant farms 
began seven years before Seaman Knapp was given decision-making power over part of Walter 
Porter’s farm in East Texas and “cooperative extension” as it became known in the United States 
was begun.121 It is unclear how these students and their exemplary peasant farms fared, and the 
program does not have appeared to have continued for many years. However, this does not 
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necessarily mean for certain that the graduates failed. Beyond failure, the program may also have 
ended because the same year the graduates were placed on their new farms, the school changed 
its mission and began admitting Russian students alongside Kazakh boys.  
The Ambiguities of Remaking Students in the Settler Colony 
 Agricultural schools were enigmatic entities. On the one hand they were organized under 
rules for a type of school from European Russia that sought to encourage more efficient 
agriculture among peasant families. However, on the steppe, they took on new roles as sites of 
experimentation, knowledge gathering, and agronomic outreach. Eventually this meant that they 
largely focused their efforts to reform steppe agriculture on teaching peasant children and 
agronomic outreach to settlers. This was, however, not the original intent of all the schools as 
Zaisan and Semipalatinsk in particular were founded specifically for the education of Kazakh 
children.122  
While there have been significant studies of the educational work of Kazakh-Tatar and 
Kazakh-Russian schools, there has been almost no study of the Zaisan Kazkah Agricultural 
School or the Semipalatinsk Lower Agricultural School, both of which at first instructed only 
Kazakh students.123 This is understandable, because the other schools educated more students 
and often educated much more important students.124 However, these schools are also significant 
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because they come close to assimilationist educational projects found in other settler colonial 
environments. In the United States these were called Indian Boarding Schools and in Canada 
they were called Indian Residential Schools.125 Like on the steppe, the focus at these other 
schools was on manual and vocational training coupled with rudimentary schooling, the idea 
being that Kazakh, Navajo, or Sioux children required little else. Additionally, while it does not 
appear either Zaisan or Semipalatinsk graduated famous authors or politicians like the Kazakh-
Russian schools, they still tell an important part of the history of these lower level, and less well-
studied Kazakhs who were part of the colonial agronomic apparatus.126 
 In 1884, a commission of five advisors met in Omsk to make their recommendations for 
how to address the failures of an earlier project of Kazakh boarding schools, all of which had 
recently closed due to a lack of students and mismanagement. None of the committee members 
were Kazakhs, however, that did not stop them from making recommendations on how best to 
educate Kazakh children with the goal of “spreading agricultural education in the province… as 
between Russians as well as among the natives.”127 They were directed to make 
recommendations on how to open a series of boarding schools that would teach both agriculture 
and handicrafts to Kazakh students. This project eventually was merged with the project of lower 
agricultural schools. These lower agricultural schools on the steppe, like schools throughout the 
empire endured a constant stream of decrees and reorganizations from the imperial bureaucracy, 
therefore, at times who was officially in charge was not always clear, or even particularly 
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important. In the words of one historian of education in the empire “A bewildering variety of 
primary schools, which operated under a number of authorities, coexisted in Russia in the second 
half of the nineteenth century and persisted until the 1917 revolution.”128  
To the officials in the Governor Generalship who undertook the project, the work was 
driven both by a perceived economic need and by what could be interpreted as a humanitarian 
one. According to their report, “it can be said with sufficient certainty that there exists among the 
mass of the population a simple form of agriculture and that its improvement is only possible 
with a parallel economic improvement among the nomads.” They went on to point out that every 
year there were more nomads requesting help and complaining about their situation, but that 
these problems would only continue to get worse due to natural population increases among the 
Kazakhs as well as increased settlers coming to the steppe.129 They believed this would only 
change, “either through economic targets or shocks,” as “most nomads will not change over to 
economic systems requiring less cultivated land and a more secure income, i.e. agriculture and in 
conjunction with it: settlement.” 130 Although the plans would go through changes, these 
meetings laid the groundwork for what would later become lower agricultural schools. It is 
telling that officials thought the process of sedentarization among the Kazakhs was inevitable. 
However, they did not think it so inevitable that they left it to its natural processes (if the massive 
government-backed settlement project could be considered “natural”). Instead, they wanted to 
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aid the process by encouraging sedentary farming through outreach and Kazakh agricultural 
schools. 
 In spite of their sometimes unique mission, classrooms at lower agricultural schools on 
the steppe differed little from any other primary school. At Zaisan in 1890 for instance, the first 
two grades received instruction in the following subjects: Russian language, arithmetic, 
handwriting, gymnastics, and singing. Sometimes, students also received instruction in 
“explaining the important phenomena of nature” which was roughly equivalent to a general 
science course.131 However, a lack of qualified teachers often meant that even this general 
subject went untaught for periods of time at schools like Zaisan. 
The majority of time spent in the classroom at Zaisan and Semipalatinsk (just like at the 
majority Russian lower agricultural schools on the steppe) was focused on Russian language 
instruction. This can be explained in part by the fact that textbooks and other instruction most 
typically took place in the Russian language, and literacy was a focus of all primary education in 
Russia. However, beginning in 1879, the famed Kazakh pedagogue and father of formal Kazakh 
education, Ibrahim Altynsarin had already begun his project of Kazakh and Russian language 
schools in Turgai Oblast.132 Therefore, the choice of focusing on Russian was exactly that, a 
choice that was made and reflects how in the minds of officials Russian language and sedentary 
civilization were inexorably linked.  
In the first year of instruction at Zaisan, there were 22 Kazakh boys enrolled in the class. 
The school divided these students into two groups based on their age. Instruction began by using 
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a textbook written by the educational reformer Konstantin Ushinskii.133 However, this textbook 
was deemed too difficult for non-native Russian students, and the school began using a textbook 
written specifically for non-Russian speakers by Vol’per.134 The school however, chose 
Vol’per’s text over Altynsarin’s  Kirghiz krestomanty published in 1879 or even Il’minskii’s 
Samouchitel’ russkoi gramoty dlia Kirgizov published in 1861 and written using Kazakh in the 
Arabic script.135 Because instruction in classroom subjects was not the only mission of these 
schools, language was at the center of their mission. As vehicles of “civilization” they were 
similar to indigenous boarding schools in other places like the United States and Canada. The 
aim of these schools was clearly not only to teach subjects, but also to “teach nomads how to live 
a sedentary Russian life” and learning Russian was thought to be part of this process.136 
Although there is no evidence Kazakh agricultural schools banned the speaking of Kazakh as 
occurred in many American Indian Boarding Schools, it was clearly discouraged or at least 
Russian was given preference in an effort to “civilize” the Kazakhs at the expense of their native 
language.137 
Once Kazakh boys had completed and tested out of two years of mostly Russian language 
with a smattering of arithmetic, handwriting, gymnastics, singing, and when possible general 
science, they continued Russian language study but now also began the study of special 
subjects—provided there was a teacher to teach them. The special subjects consisted of two 
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classes “Basic Understanding of Agriculture” and “Livestock and Livestock Rations.” This 
division echoed the focus of the general science class that focused on the categorization of plants 
and animals. In the agriculture class, all topics were aspects of growing plants, and animals did 
not fit anywhere into the curriculum. The agriculture class covered soil formation and types as 
well as mechanical plowing and cultivation and their associated equipment. It also included 
curriculum on the murky topic of “the concept of plants in general.” There was also a focus on 
the division between perennial and annual plants. The livestock curriculum showed similar 
features to the agriculture classes. Here too, division and taxonomy were the primary focus of 
much of the instruction with students learning the division of animals between domesticated and 
wild, as well as the categories of mammals, birds, fish, and insects. However, the most surprising 
aspect of the class was that horses were one of the most important types of livestock discussed in 
depth. The class included how to properly house horses, care for their hooves, deliver young, and 
even discussed the various diseases that might befall horses.138  
Examination of the lessons from 1890 at Zaisan gives an interesting insight into the 
“hidden curriculum” of the Kazakh agricultural schools.139 In addition to a primary focus on 
Russian language that would encourage assimilation, the schools also showed a tendency 
towards taxonomy and division. This reflects a broader trend in colonial thinking that in the 
hands of colonial officials was often used to create racial hierarchies to justify colonialism.140 
That so much of the classroom instruction also centered around the division of natural 
phenomena that Kazakhs already had their own methods of understanding is significant. In his 
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work on colonial Egypt, Timothy Mitchell showed how the creation of these types of divisions 
was an important technology of power for pre-twentieth century colonial rule. The focus on 
taxonomy and hierarchy was playing a similar role to the one Mitchell ascribed to exhibitions 
and museums (both institutions which built taxonomy into their core) in that they were “not just 
reflections of this [colonial] certainty, however, but the means of its production, by their 
technique of rendering history, progress, culture and empire in ‘objective’ form.”141 It is notable, 
that in the non-colonial environment of contemporary Germany, taxonomic understandings of 
plants and animals were supplanted in science classrooms by notions like “biotic communities” 
that examined environments not individual organisms.142  
In addition to creating hierarchy and division within the school environment, the 
classroom at Kazakh agricultural schools was also doing something else that would continue to 
be practiced by agronomists throughout the era of the settler colonial state on the steppe. 
Instruction in the classroom at Zaisan allowed teachers to claim scientific authority over things 
that indigenous Kazakhs arguably had much more knowledge about than Russian scientists did. 
School officials no doubt recognized that especially among Kazakhs, knowledge of horses, their 
feeding and lifeways was immense. Therefore, to claim some authority and show their 
superiority teachers needed a way to raise their stature and reinforce the lesser status of things 
Kazakh. Much of the new knowledge proclaimed by the teachers at Zaisan was no doubt not 
very new. For example, most Kazakh boys probably knew how to deliver a foal. However, 
framing it in scientific terms as they had done with the irrigation works at the school farm, 
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teachers could reinforce their privileged status and continue to speak with authority about the 
superiority of Russian ways and sedentary agriculture. 
In spite of the fact that the hidden curriculum of the school was reinforcing notions of 
European hierarchies and of the superiority of Russian, Russia, and sedentary agriculture, 
surprisingly not all of the actors in the structure were always themselves Russian. In fact, when 
the Zaisan school opened, the main teacher—who was responsible for classroom subjects except 
for special agricultural subjects—was a Muslim Kazakh, Abul Nurzhanovich Nurbzhanov who 
was a graduate of the Omsk Teachers Seminary.143 It is unclear exactly how closely Nurbzhanov 
followed the prescribed curriculum, and it is indeed possible that he sometimes used Kazakh in 
the classroom. However, it is just as likely that he did not.144 Even if he wanted to it is most 
likely that he was unable to fully thwart the structures and textbooks that told him what to teach 
and how. This was especially true because he had a Russian, Lisovskii, overseeing him and 
teaching the special agriculture lessons. 
The position of head of the school was very important in shaping the nature of the school. 
Therefore, it is surprising that for a brief moment, the Zaisan school was actually headed by a 
Kazakh. In May of 1892 for unclear reasons Lisovskii left his post as head of the school and was 
replaced by a Kazakh, Asyn’ Khadcha (probably Khoja) Kirmanbaev who had completed a 
course at the Orsk teachers school.145 However, during Kirmanbaev’s tenure, Nurbzhanov was 
replaced as head teacher of general subjects by a Russian named Ipplolit P. Nikolaev. 
Kirmanbaev did not remain head of the school for long and was replaced in 1893 by a graduate 
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of the Cossack Cadet Corps Nikolai Pavlovich Kir’ianov.146 Kir’ianov was himself replaced in 
1894 by Ippolit Nikolaev as an interim head before finally in August of 1894 Vasili A. Saenko 
was hired as the new head of the school who was capable of teaching special agricultural 
subjects. This period of several interim and short-term heads had a detrimental effect on the 
school and Saenko would spend significant effort trying to get the school back in order.  
 Even if there were Kazakhs involved in the schools, it is clear they never had the power 
to significantly make them more sympathetic to the Kazakh boys. This is similar to what Ian 
Campbell found in his study of the Scherbina Expedition and the role played by Kazakhs.  While  
Kazakhs who were involved in the expedition were in part responsible for reports that were 
wielded to protect Kazakh interests, Campbell found that the expedition’s work was also used to 
promote settlement, and in the end, Kazakh interests were overruled in favor of settlement.147  
However, involvement in the apparatus was not the only way Kazakhs could navigate or 
even resist the agricultural schools as sites of colonial power and Kazakh disempowerment. The 
students themselves, and the way their parents navigated the schools for their own benefit, is also 
an important story of navigation and resistance on the steppe. Like all schools, the Kazakh 
agricultural schools faced the issue of discipline. However, in the colonial environment, this 
topic took on a different meaning that extended beyond just misbehavior but also included 
aspects of racism or cultural chauvinism on the part of Russian school officials. Since the 
archival record holds few Kazakh voices from these experiences, we can only guess how a 
dislike of Russian colonial practices and presence on the steppe influenced the behaviors of 
                                                 
146 TsGARK f. 64, op.1, d. 6083a, l. 121. 
147 Ian W. Campbell, “Settlement Promoted, Settlement Contested: The Scherbina Expedition of 1896-1903” 
Central Asian Review 30 no. 3-4 (2011): 423-436. 
53 
 
Kazakh boys. However, it would be surprising if colonial resentment did not factor into student 
behaviors at all. 
Part of the reason it is so difficult to untangle racism and cultural chauvinism from the 
question of behavior, discipline, and punishment in the case of Kazakh agricultural schools is 
because Russian educational systems were incredibly harsh and discipline-focused in any 
environment. Nevertheless, the same rules applied in a different context can take on different 
meanings, and they almost certainly took on different meanings for Kazakhs. In his massive 
study of Russian peasant schools Ben Eklof wrote, “Nothing in the relationship between state 
peasants and serfs, on the one hand, and gentry and local officials, on the other, suggests that 
peasant children would have been treated with kindness and consideration in the schools.”148 
This harsh treatment was in many ways driven by the othering of peasants by the Russian upper 
classes, similar to the othering officials practiced towards Kazakhs. The idea that Russian 
peasants were a lesser class apart in need of improvement had a long history. Often peasants 
were viewed as not fully part of the same society as Russian elites in part because of their 
backward ways and lack of education. One historian remarked that as late as the eve of the First 
World War, “Most peasants—even ethnic Russians—were not yet “Russians” in the sense of 
civic identity. The divide separating peasants from educated Russian society appeared as wide as 
ever.”149  As lower agricultural schools were structures that were meant to remake both Kazakhs 
and peasants into “proper” farmers, this similar attitude and othering is unsurprising.  
In spite of similar chauvinistic attitudes towards both peasants and Kazakhs, there were 
differences in the ways school officials at the Kazakh schools talked about their students’ 
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behaviors that had racial overtones. In 1890, Lisovskii reported that the, “morals of the Kazakh 
boys in the school is too low,” and he accused them of having an identity that was “far from 
European.” This identity meant that “the concepts of honesty and truthfulness were foreign.”150 
Lisovskii did not see students lying as a problem that was universal, instead it was specific to 
Kazakhs and part of their heritage as “non-Europeans.”  
Whether this was a racial category in Lisovskii’s mind is unclear, however, in practice 
such a distinction meant very little. Perhaps, he saw the possibility for Kazakh boys to overcome 
this shortcoming with proper education and punishment, so they might not be destined to act this 
way simply by virtue of their race. Lisovskii believed punishment of misdeeds should be a 
primary focus of attention of the school—followed closely by attention to cleanliness that he 
thought was also linked to improving the boys’ behavior. Lisovskii’s punishment for lying was 
to reprimand the student and then deny them either meat or tea for a period of time. If this did 
not work, or if the student continued to offend, the school was supposed to confine the child to a 
punishment cell (kartser).151 The fact that officials made taking away food and solitary 
confinement a punishment for students against whom they held chauvinistic and perhaps racist 
ideas is telling. Nevertheless, at Zaisan teachers were less inclined to use harsh punishment than 
at Semipalatinsk. Perhaps because they faced fewer discipline problems, which could be because 
the teacher at Zaisan was Nurbzhanov, a Kazakh. 
School officials at the Semipalatinsk agricultural school were constantly plagued by the 
misbehavior of Kazakh boys. In 1894, the head teacher at the Seimpalatinsk school S. 
Bryukhavich reported that three Kazakh boys—Kumanov, Dochekenov, and Kozyvdansov—in 
particular were causing frequent disturbances. As evidence of the continued existence of 
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“thievery” among the Kazakh students he reported several events that occurred just during the 
month of November. The first instance took place on November 6 when three students 
Kumanov, Dyusenskeno, and Asano stole potatoes and intended to sell them to other Kazakhs. 
This was followed by an event on November 8, when Kumanov stole footwraps from the school 
supplies. He was punished for this by having his dinner taken away.152 While we cannot be sure 
whether the boys were motivated in part by a resentment towards Russian colonizers, it is likely 
this factored somewhat into their behavior. Regarding insubordination, James C. Scott wrote: 
“The question of whether a clear act of insubordination has occurred is not a simple 
matter, for the meaning of a given action is not given but is socially constructed. At the 
extremes, there is less interpretive freedom. When a slave strikes his master in front of 
other slaves, a reasonably clear public challenge has been made. When the thief or 
poacher moves surreptitiously at night it is reasonably certain that no public challenge to 
property relations has been issued. Between these extremes there is a great deal of 
interpretive freedom.153  
 
 
While these thieves were acting in secret, and it is likely that they were not attempting to thwart 
property relations or the colonial order, their brazenness is a sign that they probably did not 
respect the school, its mission, or its employees and part of that lack of respect probably involved 
colonial resentment. Bryukhavich himself said as much. He believed that this frequent 
misbehavior was an indication that the Kazakh boys did not respect the school, and that to gain 
the boys’ respect, the school needed harsher punishments than simply reprimand and taking 
away food. He felt that there was inequality in the relationship between the school and students 
because the school needed the Kazakhs as students more than the students needed the school. 
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However, he believed that in the near future the school would “stand in an independent position 
from the Kazakhs” and they would need the school more than it needed them.154 
Bryukhavich was not entirely correct that the Kazakhs did not need the school. At the 
very least, the Kazakhs wanted to use the school, but for their own ends. Interestingly, the 
somewhat problematic method by which the school made a clear division between “practical” 
and “theoretical” education played into this. Many Kazakh parents probably sent their kids to the 
school simply to give them a chance to learn Russian. Ben Eklof argued that Russian peasant 
parents took a similar approach to schools and navigated them in order to help their children gain 
what he called the “tools of literacy and numeracy” while avoiding the “larger socialization 
involved in the process of organized, prolonged schooling.”155 The focus on Russian in the 
classroom at the expense of everything else made it in some ways easier for Kazakh parents to 
navigate the system. The schools never attracted the most prestigious families and appear to have 
been a way for lower class families to give their children an education in Russian if they could 
find some way for them to be accepted. Knowing Russian opened up a series of other jobs for 
these youth either in the imperial service, or through commerce and guiding.156 These could 
serve as important paths to social mobility. 
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Kazakh children also took this divide between the classroom and the school to heart and 
were often quite uninterested in what was being taught at the school farms during the summer 
months. This was probably in part because it was less useful to them, but also because the 
schools often did a poor job of incorporating farm work into an educational experience. Instead, 
it often seemed more like unpaid work.157 Bryukhavich recognized this feeling among the 
Kazakhs when he remarked that the reason it was difficult to get students to come to the school 
was because Kazakhs had a “hostile” attitude toward the school and believed, “At the school the 
students work more than they learn.” He went on to say how this attitude of the parents had 
infected the children. Especially at the beginning of the school year it was often necessary to 
argue with students to get them to the fields for “practical education.” When the students refused, 
he asked them why to, which they replied “I don’t want to, I am not a worker.” When students 
still refused, they were then punished, either by having tea or food taken away, or in extreme 
cases, the students were put in solitary confinement in the “bright locker” (svetlyi kartser).158 
While the idea of forcing any boys to work or have their supper taken away or put in a 
punishment cell is an uncomfortable thought, the fact that this was done to boys by people who 
held racist or chauvinistic ideas about them is a reminder of how the context of the settler colony 
changes what was a relatively widespread form of punishment across all Russian schools. 
At Semipalatinsk, in spite of Bryukhavich’s belief that the school was too soft on the 
boys, such harsh punishments were not only limited to when they refused to work. In fact, he did 
not think that a refusal to work was even the most serious offense a student might commit. 
Instead, he believed “lying, secrecy, and perhaps theft” were the biggest obstacles the school 
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faced. However, Bryukhavich was uncertain if punishments could cure a student of their 
misbehavior, and he believed the students acted this way because their parents and culture 
encouraged them to lie and steal.159 He went on to say that, “This evil [lying, secretiveness, and 
thievery] exists among almost all of the Kazakh population, at least in the surrounding volosts. 
There are exceptions, but very few.”160 These words were written by the man who was the one 
who decided whether or not the students were fed or if they were punished in solitary 
confinement, and they stand as a powerful reminder that whether the attitude was driven by 
racism or “just” cultural chauvinism, the effect on the students was the same.   
Bryukavich’s damning assessment of Kazakh culture to explain the behavior of the 
Kazakh boys is certainly not the most likely explanation behind student misbehavior and the 
general low opinion of the schools among the Kazakhs. First, it was clear that the schools sought 
to encourage sedentary agriculture, and this type of labor was considered below the station of 
most Kazakhs. Traditionally, only the poorest and ill were left behind in encampments to cut hay 
while the rest of the family nomadized.161 What is more, the schools were not successful at 
placing students on profitable farms, even after Saenko’s program. Additionally, the schools 
typically lacked adequate financial support and many of the buildings were in a poor state. In 
1897 a government inspector for example found that the health of the students at Zaisan was 
poor with half of them ill, two of them seriously with cholera.162 Similarly, in 1898, problems at 
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Zaisan became so notorious that a newspaper published a long expose on the school pointing out 
that in addition to the school being the site of a plague infestation, it resembled a home for 
juvenile delinquents more than an agricultural school, because as far as could be seen, there was 
no farming taking place.163 
For all of the above reasons, the schools like Zaisan and Semipalatinsk failed to attract 
enough Kazakh students to keep officials happy, and they were forced to look elsewhere for 
students. The resistance of Kazakh students and their parents to the ideas and ideology being 
espoused at the schools were therefore a primary reason that Zaisan and Semipalatinsk 
eventually changed their status as schools only for Kazakhs and began admitting Russian peasant 
children as well. Already in 1890, just three years after the school’s opening, officials in Zaisan 
had decided to admit some Cossack children. They argued that this was good for both groups, as 
the Kazakhs would benefit from the Russian language skills of the Cossacks, and they believed 
that the Cossacks were also in need of training in proper agriculture, because improved 
agricultural knowledge among the Cossacks was “no less necessary than for the Kazakhs.”164 
Several years after admitting the Cossack students, school officials were already discussing 
admitting Russian students as well. Eventually, the arguments in favor of admitting Russians 
won out, and at the end of the exam period in 1894, seven years after opening as the Kazakh 
Agricultural School, Zaisan began admitting Russian students. Within a few years Russian 
students outnumbered the Kazakhs significantly.165 
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While lower agricultural schools on the steppe were in many ways simply schools with 
classrooms, teachers, and students, they were also much more. In addition to being some of the 
earliest sites of agronomic knowledge creation and experimentation, they were also sites of an 
attempted remaking of Kazakhs into sedentary farmers. Therefore, categorizing these schools is 
somewhat difficult, because they were filling many roles at once. However, that does not mean 
that it is necessarily appropriate only to examine them in their separate aspects. The schools were 
all of these at once, and they need to be considered as holistic entities that advanced scientific 
knowledge about the world while simultaneously denying Kazakh boys food and locking them in 
a room when they refused to work. The one was not an unfortunate side effect of the other, but 
needs to be considered as part of the process of the history of scientific inquiry in a settler 
colonial environment. If we are to in Bruno Latour’s words, “retie the Gordian knot by 
crisscrossing, as often as we have to, the divide that separates exact knowledge and the exercise 
of power,” we must recognize that the seizure of Kazakh land and the mistreatment of Kazakh 
youth was part of the work of agriculture science just as much as crop-breeding or global 
agronomy conferences.166   
 In spite of their dark side, the school farms were also important early sites of 
experimentation and knowledge gathering about a particular steppe locale. At a time when 
agricultural scientists were still arguing about the suitability of the steppe to sedentary 
agriculture, they represented one of the few sites of government sponsored and supervised 
agriculture. As institutions of scientific practice, agricultural schools, and especially their farms, 
powerfully showcase one of the main contradictions of science on the steppe discussed 
                                                 




throughout this dissertation: scientists are supposed to be experts, but in the Kazakh steppe, they 
were not experienced experts in this particular environmental and social context. Many of the 
difficulties the schools and the scientists faced were due to this contradiction.  
 In addition, the school farms were also important first attempts at scientist-led farming on 
the steppe. As such, they would set the tone for—and showcase many of the continuing failures, 
biases, and successes—of applied agronomy on the steppe. In the plans and communications of 
agronomists and heads of steppe schools, we can see their Platonic ideal of what these 
agronomists hoped to create. Sometimes this was in keeping with what agronomists in St. 
Petersburg or Omsk hoped to see, but often it was different. As the first attempt at scientist-led 
agriculture on the steppe, the resulting hardships faced by school farms were somewhat 
predictable. However, in spite of these difficulties, agricultural scientists continued their work 
and in the course of that work gained useful knowledge about the steppe environment and its 
potential and limitations. In the process, lower agricultural schools and school farms illustrate 
another important aspect of this dissertation: agronomists and officials continued with their 
project of remaking the steppe and its people in spite of frequent failures, which rarely caused 
them to question their basic assumptions about the correctness of sedentary grain agriculture and 
increased Russian settlement on the steppe. Additionally, the knowledge they acquired would 
serve as the bedrock of the later growth of agronomic institutions under the Resettlement 
Administration and subsequent developments.  
However, this research does not seek to over-emphasize the “foreign” nature of the ideas 
and goals of steppe agronomy. It also attempts to problematize and complicate the notion that 
institutions like agricultural school farms were fully foreign structures dropped down in the 
middle of the steppe. While the ideas, plans, and assumptions often fit that description, the 
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schools and farms along with the ideas behind them developed and changed over time on the 
steppe due to environmental and social realities. Therefore, the knowledge that was created at 
these colonial sites is best understood as the product of the steppe itself, and as settler colonial 
science rather than simply colonial science. 
Nevertheless, it was not only settler colonial science because it was created in the settler 
colony, it was also deeply imbued with the assumptions of civilizational hierarchy and the 
destruction of the native that is central to settler colonial thought. That these ideas infected the 
process of science on the steppe should perhaps come as little surprise. Scott Lauria Morgensen 
pointed to just how influential settler colonialism as an ideological influence could be when he 
wrote, “Settler colonialism has conditioned not only Indigenous peoples and their lands and the 
settler societies that occupy them, but all political, economic, and cultural processes that those 
societies touch.”167 However, science is able to hide this influence in unique ways such as behind 
notions of objectivity and expertise. Therefore, it is necessary to probe at the assumptions that 
underlay the most basic questions and frameworks that school officials were working with. For 
example, Lisovskii was not tasked with figuring out what kind of sheep made the most effective 
yurts, how many horses on average could graze on a piece of land, or how many years millet 
could be grown in a single spot without damaging yields. All of these questions would have been 
useful to the vast majority of steppe inhabitants in 1889, whether they were Kazakhs or Russians. 
Instead, the questions he and his superiors as settler colonial scientists believed needed answered 
centered around wheat varieties that could support peasant settlers in the region, or how to grow 
fruit to help support settlement in Siberia.  
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In some ways these were priorities driven by the directives he received from his superiors 
in the Governor Generalship agronomic section and even from the assumptions behind the 
founding lower agricultural schools throughout the empire. However, it is also clear that in spite 
of these directives and structures, Lisovskii showed he still had significant freedom in how to run 
and organize the farm, and in what questions to ask. Nevertheless, he did not use that flexibility 
either to work in the interest of objective scientific curiosity or of helping indigenous Kazakhs. 
Instead, the settler colonial environment with its assumptions about who was deserving of help, 
and of what the steppe should look like, drove the decisions and research at these earliest sites of 
agronomic experimentation and knowledge gathering on the steppe. As this dissertation will 
continue to show, this process did not stop with lower agricultural schools whether they were 
specifically built for Kazakhs like at Zaisan, or if they accepted Russian students like in 
Pavlodar. Instead, the entire scientific apparatus, root to bud, was infected with the assumptions 
of settler colonialism, and no amount of scientific objectivity could fully undo it. 
Intertwined with this power of the schools as sites of settler colonial science was their 
role as sites of remaking. Some scholars have focused on a policy of religious toleration, and 
how a relatively weak state was easier on indigenous peoples than other settler colonial empires. 
However, the schools as sites of remaking illustrate how an interventionist Russian state had a 
deep interest in “killing the nomad to save the man” and even acted on this impulse. While many 
believed nomadism would die out, or was already dying out, agricultural schools represent a real 
attempt to speed that process along. Even after these schools were integrated, they would 
continue to educate Kazakh students and try to win them over to sedentary agriculture. This 
policy change was not an indication that officials had given up on the goal of Kazakh 
assimilation. Rather, schools brought in Russian peasant boys both to help with Kazakh 
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assimilation and to encourage peasant settlers to be more efficient and effective farmers on the 
steppe, a process that they believed would lead to the domination of sedentary agriculture in the 
region, which would further erode the possibilities of nomadism.  
 While some might see the willingness of school officials to integrate lower agricultural 
schools as an indication of the less racist or more progressive nature of Russian colonization, this 
is not entirely the case.168 In fact it is not even an indication of the uniqueness of Russian settler 
colonialism on the Kazakh Steppe. Other settler colonial empires were not always so different. 
While U.S. Indian Boarding Schools never educated white children alongside American Indians, 
the founder of these schools, Richard Pratt, made this exact suggestion and was an outspoken 
critic of segregating American Indian children from whites.169  
Nevertheless, the ease of integration, and the fact that schools meant to remake Kazakh 
children could easily fit into a framework of schools that had been in part created in European 
Russia for peasant children, is somewhat of an indication of a unique aspect of Russian settler 
colonialism. Peasants were also deemed in many ways uncivilized, and while they were not as 
uncivilized as nomads, the ambiguous nature of these peasant settlers as at once problematic and 
as bringers of culture is a particularity of the steppe. This was in keeping with Russian society’s 
ambiguous relationship with the peasantry that could see them simultaneously as paragons of 
virtue and practitioners of true socialism and orthodoxy, and also degenerate and backward 
drunks.170 This adds another layer to the insights of Scott Seregny. In addition to Seregny’s 
notion that programs like adult education went a long way towards imbuing peasants with civic 
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identity (although they fell short) through things like education, the settler context offers even 
more complexity. Beyond simply citizens, these steppe schools could turn the peasants into 
citizen-settlers who might identify with the Russian state as a grantor of largesse (in land and 
technical assistance). That was in addition to the moral support given to peasant ways of life by 
their privileging sedentary agriculture, the Russian language, and if they identified with it, 
“Russian” science. This is not to say that Kazakhs were left out of this program. Indeed, for those 
Kazakhs who adapted, they too could be offered free land as well as financial and agronomic 
support, however, the price paid for this state support (cultural suicide) was much greater than 
that which was asked of peasant settlers.   
Nevertheless, while the Russian case is clearly different in some respects, all settler 
colonies have faced a similar problem of the multifaceted nature of peasant settlers. Whether it 
was tropes about wasteful farmers in the American West, lower class white settlers in Rhodesia, 
or unsophisticated pied noir in French Algeria, the settler is often at once uncultured and 
noble.171 Therefore, while there were unique aspects to Kazakh lower agricultural schools on the 
steppe, they are also simply another example of a global phenomenon rooted in chauvinistic and 
racist ideas about the inferiority of indigenous peoples especially nomadic ones. As such, their 
example further ties the Kazakh Steppe into the global story of grain-driven settler colonialism. 
On the other hand, the ability of these schools to serve as sites of remaking for both Kazakhs and 
peasants also illustrates how they were a tool through which Russian agronomy spread cultural 
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dominance under the guise of an ill-defined idea of scientific hegemony. As such they were as 
























CHAPTER THREE: EXPERIMENTAL FIELDS 
 In the early twentieth century, the size of the agronomic bureaucracy expanded across the 
entire Russian Empire, and also across the grain settler states of the world.172 Domestically, 
Russia was attempting to industrialize and also deal with pressing land scarcity in European 
Russia. Internationally, the grain settler states were engaged in cutthroat competition to corner 
the world’s grain markets to feed rapidly expanding cities. The Kazakh steppe, previously a 
rather unimportant part of the Russian Empire, especially its northern regions, became ground 
zero for both of these stories in the early twentieth century. However, extensive peasant 
settlement in these areas was a relatively new phenomenon and the process of settlement was 
marred by significant failures because both agricultural scientists and peasant settlers still had 
much to learn about how to farm in this new arid environment.  
The development of lower agricultural schools with their experimental farms made 
significant inroads in gaining a general idea of the challenges and even some solutions to steppe 
agriculture. However, in spite of this and the vision of school heads like Saenko that reflected 
many of the eventual developments of the agricultural bureaucracy on the steppe, agricultural 
schools were replaced as the primary method of popularizing scientific approaches to agriculture 
on the steppe in the early twentieth century. The problem of lack of funds, the challenges of 
running a successful farm and a school with somewhat unclear and sometimes contradictory 
expectations coupled with the resistance of students (especially Kazakhs) to the ideas behind the 
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schools led to many shortcomings at the schools. These failings were eventually used against the 
schools by another group interested in the environmental and economic transformation of the 
steppe. Agronomists put forward a new vision for how to transform the steppe, this one relied on 
expertise and leadership that was not dispersed in the local community. Instead it was limited to 
those trained in agronomy and fully convinced of the power of science and rationality to change 
the world in ways they had envisioned. However, this expertise still required a popularization 
aspect if it was ever to be successful in transforming steppe agriculture. 
 Ironically, the expertise this new group cultivated rested in part on the very institutions 
that they hoped to replace. For over a decade, the agricultural schools were important outposts of 
information gathering and experimentation that sent reports back to the agronomists of the 
Governor Generalship. Additionally, some of those who had earlier worked in agricultural 
schools like Saenko, the one-time head of the Zaisan school, eventually worked for the 
agronomy section of the Governor Generalship or the Resettlement Administration.173  
In spite of this background, agronomists eventually recognized that the cost of the nine 
agricultural schools could perhaps be better spent on hiring local agronomists instead of 
operating the schools. Therefore, in 1907, as mentioned in chapter one, the agronomy section of 
the Governor Generalship of the Steppes ordered  N. Krishtofovich on his inspection tour. On his 
tour, he found a wide array of problems and poor infrastructure among the steppe schools. Many 
of the school buildings were in disrepair, and the farms were often overcome with weeds or lack 
of water. However, most upsetting to him was that many of the schools did not let the students 
farm, instead much of the farm work was carried out by local laborers, and the students only 
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sometimes watched or helped with simple tasks. Instead of practical experience, students 
finished their studies without knowing how to undertake all the jobs required for a farm. At one 
school, that had acquired a mower that was only six year old, the mower sat unused and students 
had to cut hay by hand. When Krishtofovich asked why, he was told the mower did not work, 
however, upon inspection he found that it did, but the school head did not know he had to 
sharpen the cutting teeth.174 Such problems were common, and the schools eventually gained a 
reputation for laziness and bad farming. Due to the poor state of some of the schools, 
Krishtofovich recommended in his report that the government withdraw funding from their 
agricultural side and only support the schools in their handicraft programs that taught students 
skilled trades like leatherwork and boot making.  
However, Krishtofovich’s criticisms apparently also might have had an ulterior motive. 
He himself commented on how the government was spending 50,000 rubles a year on the 
schools. Instead of the schools, Krishtofovich and other agronomists felt that money would be 
better spent paying two agronomist technicians per oblast, with the intention of hiring more.175 
Krishtofovich’s recommendations were largely taken up, and much (though not all the funding) 
for the agricultural schools was withdrawn. The year following Krishtofovich’s report, the 
agronomy section of the Governor Generalship had already proposed the establishment of seven 
uezd level agronomist instructors to teach locals and new arrivals about proper agricultural 
techniques and notify the oblast agronomists of problems such as famine, bad weather, or 
locusts. Additionally, it called for establishing experimental fields in the areas already populated 
by new settlers to test and showcase new crop varieties. Ironically, these were the same roles that 
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the schools were already undertaking, though with much less funding and the added burden of 
educating students.176  
The criticisms of Kristofovich and others were nothing new, however, they came at an 
opportune time for those in the agronomic bureaucracy which was growing in influence. 
Especially powerful within the Ministry of State Domains was the Resettlement Administration 
which Willard Sunderland has described as a “state within a state for the colonists and their 
settlement zones.”177 Similarly, Peter Holquist identified a particular technocratic ethos within 
the Resettlement Administration which is in line with the impulse for agronomists to seek 
funding for more agronomists.178 All of which fits neatly within Sunderland’s notion of this era 
falling under a periodization of “correct colonization.”179 These changes were not only 
bureaucratic, however, they were driven by a combination of bureaucratic ideas and 
developments as well as the reality of thousands of settlers arriving on the steppe, often ill-
prepared to meet the demands of the new environment. 
Although the agronomic bureaucracy had already learned a great deal through lower 
agricultural schools, in order to help facilitate and aid the massive waves of settlers to the steppe, 
the burgeoning agricultural bureaucracy needed to gather more information about the steppe 
environment. Some of that work was carried out during the Shcherbina Expedition of 1896-1903. 
However, this study focused on what was already there and was especially focused on 
understanding Kazakh land usage. The agronomists on the expedition were not focused on 
experimental agriculture and as such were more focused on observing rather than testing 
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agricultural methods.180 In order to supply a place where agricultural scientists could test things 
on the steppe, in 1907, the Resettlement Administration, and the Ministry of State Domains, 
established an experimental field at Temir in Aktobe oblast with the express purpose of testing 
varieties and methods of practicing agriculture in the arid steppe. However, it was not the only 
experimental field established on the steppe. Other smaller, more temporary fields were also 
planted under the supervision of agronomists in other steppe regions, mostly to test new crop 
varieties, and as a method of popularizing agricultural science in the area to settlers and 
potentially any interested Kazakhs. Therefore, Temirskii and the other experimental fields and 
plantings always had a dual purpose, they were meant both to do “hard” scientific investigation 
while also serving as sites of popularization. Just like the earlier agricultural schools that played 
a similar role, the experimental fields and plantings never fully reconciled these two purposes, 
and were often conflicted about what aspects to emphasize.  
In 1891, while the empire was in the grip of a famine that would kill hundreds of 
thousands and affect millions, a special commission of the Scientific Committee of the Ministry 
of State Domains was tasked with creating regulations to establish a central agronomic institute, 
agricultural experiment stations, and experimental fields.181 Many in educated Russian society 
including disparate figures like the Marxist G. Plekhanov, philosopher Vladimir Solov’ev, and 
the Populist statistician Nikolai Karyshev all believed the famine was not only caused by the 
weather, but also by the “backward” state or Russian agriculture. Indeed, even the American 
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ambassador believed the famine was due at least in part to “primitive” peasant agriculture.182 
This experimental and popularizing infrastructure—it was hoped—would remedy this problem.  
 The officials who worked on the project believed that Russia needed to play significant 
catch up with Europe and the United States with regard to its level of agricultural development 
both in terms of the science it was creating and in its more widespread popularization. Although 
the plan they created to try and jump start the empire’s agricultural development was hierarchical 
(it created a clear division between agricultural institutes, stations, and fields and laid out how 
the lower rungs were to serve those higher up the ladder), it also adhered to an ideology that 
believed the science being created needed to be in close conversation with peasant farmers if it 
was ever going to be effective. In the words of the report, “Hence it is necessary to establish the 
closest possible connection between science on the one hand and agricultural life on the 
other.”183   
This was only one of the many contradictions that underlay agricultural science in the 
Russian empire as a whole and on the Kazakh steppe more specifically. Just as in the earlier case 
of agricultural schools, the agronomists working on these projects on the steppe were to 
simultaneously act as experts and also information gatherers and knowledge creators about the 
new steppe environments. This contradiction contributed to a larger instability at the root of the 
technoscience being created on the steppe, because agronomists’ position as experts was always 
in need of maintaining their authority as experts. An authority that was built on rather scant 
foundation. However, their authority was not only frequently in question, what authority they did 
have was often built out of a hybrid of typical notions of authority (their status as government 
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officials and educated experts), and of their real effectiveness of their advice. This effectiveness 
was, however, often built out of a network of knowledge that was not created or deployed 
exclusively by trained experts. Instead, many of their most effective pieces of advice and 
successes relied on peasant and Kazakh knowledge, practices, and technologies.  
Experimental Plantings, Expanding the “Technopolitical Network” 
 As previously stated, experimental fields were not stand-alone entities. Instead, they were 
meant to fit into a hierarchical network of experimental fields that developed “good science” 
coupled with outreach by agronomists and technicians who could help demonstrate and 
encourage peasants to take up these new forms of agriculture. In the pursuit of these goals, 
agronomists established on the steppe experimental plantings as part of their attempts to remake 
steppe agriculture. These plantings were to serve the dual purpose of testing and gathering 
information while still showcasing proper practices. This dual purpose led to a tension in the 
work of experimental plantings as they had to balance showcasing effective growing techniques 
while not failing and thereby discrediting agronomy to the wider public.  
In the process these experimental plantings also began to show agronomists the need to 
blur the lines between hard field science and soft social sciences (what might better be termed 
the observation of peasant agricultural practices) because, agronomists were required to become 
more and more interested in the practices and pursuits of peasant agriculturalists. This further 
broke down the category of strict field crop science and allowed other influences to creep into 
the “laboratory.” It also put agronomists in an uncomfortable position where they were both 
experts and also attempting to serve as science popularizers. The need to discuss the topic of 
popularization separately from the practices of science in the field should not be misunderstood 
as an attempt to recognize these two categories as inherently separate. Instead, the experimental 
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plantings and outreach work were in constant contact and iterative conversation (and indeed 
often shared staff) with experimental fields. Therefore, these experimental plantings and 
popularization were understood then, and should be understood now, as part of the same 
impulse. 
 In order to improve peasant farming, agronomists first needed to identify what was wrong 
with peasant farming on the steppe. However, in exploring this question, opinion was sometimes 
divided on exactly what was wrong with peasant farming, or indeed if very much was wrong 
with it at all. In 1911, the Resettlement Administration ordered a review of agriculture in the 
Akmola region. The report, completed in 1913 gave the impression that resettlement had been a 
boon for peasants and for the region. In spite of the “imperfect cultivation” practiced by 
peasants, the report was rather optimistic about their agriculture. While it acknowledged 
challenges, the authors blamed them mostly on climactic conditions of frosts and droughts. 
Although it mentioned the increase in land scarcity the report stated that peasants were already 
beginning to recognize this and had begun “striving to improve their farming methods.” The 
report however, did not give peasants all the credit for this, instead they pointed to the role of 
government in meeting peasant desires for warehouses to supply seeds and farm machinery. 
However, according to the report, the most important thing the government did to improve 
peasant farming was its encouragement of individual farmsteads (otruba and khutor).184 As such, 
the authors of the report believed that finally, almost a decade after the reforms had begun, the 
Stolypin reforms were succeeding and peasants were creating independent homesteads and 
practicing more modern productive agriculture.185  
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The report was enthusiastic about how peasants arrived in the region and how they 
quickly developed the land into productive farms. It stated that in the first year the farms were 
small, but that the average farm after 2-3 years had already grown to 3.3 desiatins, in 6-7 years 
that farm had grown to 5.5 desiatins, and after 10 years, the average farm was over 10.5 
desiatins. However, the expansion of farms was not limited to acerage. The report also claimed 
that in comparison to European Russia peasant farms in Akmola averaged 3-4 draft animals, and 
8-9 non-working livestock (cows, sheep, etc.). Additionally, it claimed that on average farms in 
Akmola were technologically advanced commenting that, “sokha (wooden plows), sickles, 
scythes, which are widely used across many places in European Russia have here long been 
replaced by the newest type of agricultural implements.” The authors were also particularly 
enthusiastic about the number of credit coops (127) in the region that had issued loans of 1.8 
million rubles, and had 46,000 shareholders. They found this essential because the price of grain 
rose and fell dramatically because the grain markets were very localized, and this credit helped 
them weather the storms.186 While the report said that there was more work to be done, overall it 
painted a healthy picture of agriculture in Akmola oblast. 
However, the oblast was a large area that was just one part of an even more massive 
steppe region, and it appears that much of the progress described by the authors was limited to 
the northern edges of the oblast. Additionally, the connection between the creation of 
independent farms with prosperity without any supporting evidence indicates that the authors 
may have had a more political than scientific agenda in mind. Furthermore, the authors also 
acknowledged, that the most successful farmers and villages in the region did not necessarily 
thrive because of their independent farms and increasing acreage. Rather, they admitted that, 
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especially in the southern parts of the oblast, prosperity was driven by large cattle breeding 
operations that relied on large areas of open steppe typically rented from Kazakhs.187 Therefore, 
it was the cheap and available land of settler colonialism more than individual initiative that was 
generating capital for agriculture in at least part of the region.188  
 Other officials both in Akmola and especially in more arid regions had much less 
glowing things to say about the environment and peasant agriculture than the authors of the 1913 
report. Earlier in 1907, a similar report on the state of agronomic work in the oblast was much 
less glowing. Although the situation on the steppe changed radically year from year, the later 
more glowing report did not necessarily contradict or indicate the problems identified in this 
earlier report had been addressed. Just as the 1913 report described how cattle farming and 
extensive farming were the main methods peasants used to grow their crops, the 1907 report 
indicated a similar problem. The authors believed peasants were too focused on what they 
termed an “exaggerated grain system” (utrirovanno zernovoi sistemy) that quickly used up land, 
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Instead of successful independent farmers, the author of this report saw peasant 
agriculture in Akmola thus: 
 Thanks to the great amount of land in Siberia, peasants are engaged in an exceptionally  
 predatory system of farming: peasants sow spring grains like wheat, oats, barley, and  
 some millet year after year in the same field until it is exhausted. Such a practice usually  
 lasts 5-6 years and on the best soils 12. When the harvest at that site ceases to cover the  
 costs, it is dispensed with and a new site is plowed up. The above-mentioned agriculture 
 practiced by Siberian peasants is doomed to failure, due to strong colonization and 
 population growth, it is doomed to complete failure in the near future and one can  
 confidently say that if Akmola oblast does not move to crop rotations in a timely  
 manner, then there will be agricultural crises worse than those observed in European 
 Russia…190       
 
This “predatory” system was observed by most agronomists who blamed it largely on the easy 
availability of cheap land nearby that could be rented from Kazakhs, and on the challenges of 
growing grain in a very arid region, and helped convince officials that experimental fields were 
necessary in the steppe region. The peasants faced a challenge of an unfamiliar environment 
coupled with cheap and easy excess land, and if nothing else was done, settlement would 
continue and eventually the system would break due to drought or some other environmental 
challenge. 
 Agronomists believed part of the problem was that there were few good examples that 
even well-meaning peasants could turn to. For example in 1906, officials in the Resettlement 
Administration in an effort to explain why experimental fields were needed commented on how 
“old settlers” practiced a “low state” of agriculture and the nomads practiced almost no 
agriculture, so they believed there was no one to teach new settlers how to properly farm. This 
meant, the agronomists needed to take it upon themselves. Having failed to create a mass of 
educated Kazakhs and peasants through the earlier work of lower agricultural schools, the 
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agronomists of the quickly developing Resettlement Administration took on the task. However, 
experimental fields were not necessarily the primary method officials hoped to use to teach 
peasants to farm. 
While experimental fields played an important role in this work, much of the outreach 
that agronomists conducted fell under a category they called, “cultural-agronomic” work. 
Although agronomists often felt this work was under-funded, it was in fact one of the larger 
expenses in an oblast budget for agronomy. For example in 1907 cultural-agronomic work 
accounted for 1,660 rubles of the 11,816 rubles spent on agronomy that year. While personnel 
was a larger category as a whole at 4,848 rubles, this included 1,990 rubles of staffing for 
technicians who were the ones primarily responsible for this work. Combined technicians 
accounted for the highest salary outlay coming in ahead of laboratory soil scientists who were 
budgeted only 1,024 rubles.191   
 In 1907 in Akmola oblast, the head agronomist described the duties of the work of the 
technician working on cultural agronomy: 
 The role of the technician can be boiled down thus, present orally in an understandable 
 form on the [agronomic] brochures with additional commentary on this or that action, and 
 then to direct the debate that arises among the peasants which is usually very lively. 
 Usually there were opponents and defenders of a proposed action among the discussants. 
 In the first settlement I visited, I was convinced that such discussions arouse a great 
 interest among the peasants. However, upon further travel, both myself and the  
 technicians became convinced that not all topics were as interesting to settlers in every 
 village to the same degree, in one village they are particularly interested in cover crops, 
 in another they are interested in vegetable farming.192  
  
This is one of the few descriptions of what it was actually like for technicians and agronomists to 
carry out agronomic popularization work in the steppe region. Most descriptions simply stated 
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how many villages were visited, what topics were discussed, and how many brochures were 
distributed. Sometimes they would even describe how sympathetic or averse peasants were to the 
message. This particular description is interesting because it indicates that the topics were often 
of great interest to peasants and quite contentious. Simply painting settler peasants as either stuck 
in their old ways or as passive actors waiting to be “saved” by information from agronomists is 
too simple. Instead, it seems peasant opinion about agronomists was diverse with some agreeing 
and others uncertain of the usefulness of the message.  
However, peasant interest indicates that many peasants were interested in good 
production methods. Exactly why some peasants were opposed to the agronomists could have 
many meanings. They might be suspect because they were outsiders, they might also have seen 
other experiments go awry, or they might simply be rather conservative in their outlook. 
However, it appears that the fact that peasants showed up to these discussions, whatever their 
feelings on the advice given, means that they were thinking about how to farm in a new 
environment. This description indicates that peasants were not at all passive or thoughtless in 
these questions, instead (given the heated nature of the debates) they no doubt thought and 
worried about them just as would be expected for people trying to survive in a new difficult 
environment who had spent their lives up to this point farming and already had a wealth of 
experience to draw on.  
What is more, it is significant that in a non-democratic state like the tsarist empire, 
discussion and even arguing with a government official was something that government officials 
were encouraging. While in many ways the expertise that was developing on the steppe in this 
period often shut out voices, and closed down the public sphere and a diversity of opinions and 
ways of doing things, cultural agronomic work was in fact creating a public sphere of sorts 
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where everyone was given a chance to speak and bring their own experience and expertise to the 
table.193  
Upon first impression, experts encouraging public discussion and debate about farming 
practices is in some ways surprising. However, it gets to the root of one of the major 
contradictions of technopolitics broadly and specifically of agronomy on the steppe. In order to 
expand the technopolitical network, new actors need to be included. Arunas Juska and Lawrence 
Busch described how in the process of creating a technoscience of rapeseed oil production in the 
twentieth century that could engage farmers, as well as industry and science, the power dynamics 
that made up expertise would shift and power could be allocated in different ways.194 As part of 
this process steppe agronomists were attempting a similar project. They were giving some power 
to peasants, which was meant to secure their inclusion in the technoscience of steppe agronomy. 
While the agronomists no doubt hoped to keep their position of power in this technoscience, 
popularization does lead to a kind of instability that is found in technopolitics.195  
 Brochures and debates were not the only method by which agronomists and technicians 
carried out their cultural agronomic work, and the creation of a kind of “public sphere” on the 
steppe. Agronomists relied on other technology to popularize agronomic science like magic 
lanterns which could project images of healthy plants, fields, and improved livestock as part of 
their work. These machines were not only used in the areas closest to railways or the best 
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agricultural land, but as relatively portable equipment, they were also used in less fertile regions 
like near the Temirskii field and in Seimipalatinsk oblast.196  
 This type of cultural-agronomic work meant that agronomists and agronomist technicians 
were very frequently on the move and were forced to work on a wide array of projects that might 
lie outside of their specialization. While these technicians often had less training than 
agronomists, they required no less knowledge, and since they were often in the field away from 
museums and libraries unlike oblast agronomists, they had to have a working knowledge of an 
array of topics. A good example of the work of a technician was the technician Shinarenko who 
arrived in Turgai oblast in March 1910. His ostensible duty was to assist in the work at the 
Temirskii and L’vovskii experimental fields (themselves hundreds of miles apart), he was 
dispatched a month later to Kostanay uezd to supervise the planting of alfalfa fields among 
settlers. After his return to his post in Adamovskii district about half way between Kostanay and 
Orenburg, he was sent at the end of April to the far west of Aktobe region to help combat 
groundhogs using poison. Only after his return from Aktobe was he able to return to his post and 
“provide agronomic help” to settlers in the area.197  
 Most cultural-agronomic work, especially in regions like Akmola that had better 
farmland and some water, focused on three main topics: encouraging peasants to sow cover 
crops, pest problems, and vegetable plants. Cover crops were viewed by agronomists as a key 
feature of improving peasant agriculture by 1906. While this did not mean they had entirely 
given up on growing wheat, the fact that they still had not solved the challenges of wheat 
growing, and the fact that peasants needed almost no encouragement to grow more wheat, meant 
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that very little outreach was undertaken to encouraging grain growing. However, cover crops 
were believed to offer a solution to the problem of increasing peasant settlement and growing 
land scarcity. They also fit within a general cultural dislike of the waste agronomists associated 
with the extensive grain farming peasant practices.  
Peasant agriculture usually relied on monocropping grains on the same field year after 
year until the land was tired out and then the peasant moved to a different spot or field. 
Additionally, the hay that peasants needed to feed their livestock (whether dairy, meat, or draft 
animal) was often the last priority of peasants who could rent land on the open steppe from 
Kazakhs and cut hay on it. This was also notably the practice of many agricultural schools as was 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
 Cover crops, especially nitrogen fixing cover crops like alfalfa, became a favored 
technology of agronomists and technicians, and this interest eventually led to large scale 
cooperatives, experimental plantings, and other work to encourage their planting. One of the 
main reasons beyond land scarcity and nitrogen fixation that agronomists wanted more pasture 
and cover crops was because they were often trying to encourage a mixed farm that included 
livestock, field crops and vegetable gardens, which agronomists believed was found in places 
like Denmark, Belgium, or Iowa. Therefore, it was in keeping with notions about a yeoman 
peasantry of the Stolypin dream, but it was also in keeping with other strains of agronomic 
thought in Russia.  
 In addition to pasture, agronomists also sought to encourage settlers to create diversified 
farms by helping them grow vegetables. This was required both from a health perspective that 
sought to make sure settlers got enough vitamins, but also was driven by the realities of a steppe 
with wide distances. What is noteworthy, however, is the environmental challenges of growing 
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vegetables were at times even greater than grains. Peasants struggled to get enough water and 
often faced pests like locusts and others they had not faced before. In order to strengthen peasant 
abilities to stay in the steppe, agronomists cultural work spent a great deal of time discussing and 
answering questions about vegetable growing. While sometimes this was driven by a desire on 
the part of peasants to grow vegetables for sale on the market, it was also often viewed as a 
means of survival.198 For example in 1907, the head of resettlement in Semipalatinsk oblast, 
Shtein requested funds to buy garden seeds for settlers because so many had gardens that failed 
the previous year and had no seeds to plant the following year. He also remarked that a lack of 
gardens made it difficult for peasants to even buy quality garden seeds.199 
 While improved pasture and gardens might appear to be contradictions to the agrarian 
ethos that sought to make the steppe into a bulwark of grain farming for the empire, the other 
primary concern of cultural agronomic work—pests—fit firmly within the grain farming ethos. 
In addition to locusts (which are the subject of a later chapter of this dissertation), the main pest 
problems technicians faced were weeds, smut, and groundhogs. Weeds were typically blamed on 
poor soil preparation by peasants.200 Groundhogs were another pest problem that took up 
significant amount of agronomists time, and like locusts, agronomists did not have a good 
solution to the problem. Groundhogs ate crops, dug holes that tripped up livestock and as such 
were real pests, in both regions where grain growing was planned and in livestock regions. The 
main defense against groundhogs was to try and exterminate them with poison: carbon disulfide 
being the most popular. However, even according to agronomists themselves, the spreading of 
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poison was not welcomed by settlers or Kazakhs because of fears livestock would fall victim to 
it. However, this did not stop agronomists and technicians from spreading this poison across the 
steppe.201 
 The other major pest problem agronomists faced was smut, which is the broad name for a 
large group of pathogenic fungi that damage crops and lower yields. They are especially 
prevalent among grain crops and forage grasses. In 1907 in Akmola oblast alone, agronomists 
estimated that smut cost over 127,000 rubles in lost grain productivity. Smut was identified in 
grain crops in 85% of settlements and affected 15-30% of the wheat crops in those regions. In 
fact, agronomists reported that the dual problems of smut and weeds especially wild foxtail 
millet (setaria virdis), field milk thistle (sonchus arvensis), and spurge (euphorbia) caused losses 
that would easily pay for 100 agronomic instructors for the oblast.202 This challenge caused the 
agronomy section to distribute 2,000 copies of a brochure on smut and also distribute low cost 
seeds to offset losses. This was in addition to meetings and discussions in the villages as 
described above. The most common advice for dealing with smut however was the use of 
expensive copper sprays that many peasants could not afford.203 Nevertheless, it continued to be 
a problem throughout the late imperial period. Although cultural-agronomic work represented 
significant outlays of labor and money being spent on outreach to peasants it was not without its 
share of failures. Agronomists were forced to cover huge swathes of territory, face a wide array 
of challenges to agriculture, and had to be aware of environmental differences in different 
territories. Nevertheless, agronomists and technicians like Shinarenko did accomplish quite a lot.  
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However, they did so with the constant knowledge that they did not always have exactly 
the information they needed since they—and the entire agronomic apparatus—was still learning 
about the region and how to grow crops in it. There was also the challenge that peasants did not 
always trust agronomists as illustrated by rowdy meetings. Some agronomists were well aware of 
their precarious position and how hard they would have to work to gain the trust of peasants if 
they were ever to get them to take up new practices. Officials in the Resettlement Administration 
were very weary of this challenge, and they openly worried that failures of agronomy could 
“discredit both science and its agents in the eyes of the population.” They went on to say that 
efforts should be focused on supporting their “authority in improving the improvement of 
peasant specifically settler agriculture.”204 This concern with “authority” reflects how 
agronomists understood their role as experts as being precarious which is not a unique 
experience for the steppe. However, what made the steppe experience unique was the fact that 
the agronomists were actually creating the knowledge they sought to popularize simultaneous to 
its popularization, because they still had so many unanswered questions about growing the 
steppe environment. 
Public Experimental-Demonstration Fields 
 Worry about failure was a major force driving the establishment of “public experimental-
demonstration fields.” These were included in the original ideas of the Ministry of Agriculture; 
however, on the steppe, they became especially important as they allowed agronomists to gather 
information about a wider array of environments spread across their massive areas of 
responsibility. Ultimately, they were also simultaneously creating more more sites of 
demonstration which meant peasants had to travel shorter distances to see scientific agriculture at 
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work. Finally, they also played an important part in continuing to expand the technopolitical 
network by including some members of the peasant community who were the hosts of the 
experimental plantings. 
 By 1910 in the Turgai-Uralsk Resettlement district, in addition to demonstration fields at 
Temir and L’vov, agronomists and technicians had established another five public experimental-
demonstration fields in the villages of Novorossiskii, Troitsk, Dzhusalinski, and Kherson totaling 
nearly 50 desiatins. These fields were housed on land owned by peasants who pooled their land 
to assist in the planting and care of certain crops under the direction of an agronomist or 
technician. In Novorossiskii, the 8 desiatin field was owned by two peasants, Grigorii and Peter 
Marchenko. In Troitsk, the 6 desiatin field was owned by five peasants: Shevchuk, 
Kolontaveskii, Kovalev, Golovchanski, and Yudin. In addition to serving as places where 
peasants could farm under the direction of agronomists and technicians on their own land, the 
farms also played an important role in producing seed crops to help distribute improved seeds to 
other interested farmers.205   
 While by 1910 there were plenty of peasants in the region who wanted to be part of the 
public experimental-demonstration fields, just a few years earlier this was not the case. The 
establishment of a similar project was attempted in the summer of 1904 with the expressed goal 
of determining if the area was appropriate for colonization, the agronomist Skaiov sought out 
areas for what were termed “experimental sowings.” After examining an area of over 3.5 million 
desiatins in the northern part of Aktobe uezd, he was forced to settle on four sites that had 
appropriate oversight. The fact that no peasants were entrusted with the supervision of these 
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plantings speaks both to the low settler population and also represents a different approach to 
agronomy on the steppe, one that focused entirely on research instead of popularization. Skaiov 
eventually established plantings at a Russian-Kazakh school headed by I. Shabanov, a second 
site was under the supervision of the Temir uezd forester V. Kiyuts, and two other spots were 
located at the railroad station near Dzhurin. The final location of Skaiov’s experimental sowing 
was under the supervision of the policeman F. Grechushkin.206 The total reliance on government 
entities is a significant difference from the later public experimental-demonstration fields. Even 
the name indicates a modification of purpose, although the goal of experimentation and 
knowledge gathering was not lost, it was now coupled with a popularization goal as well. 
 The popularization approach of public experimental-demonstration fields was much more 
successful in engaging peasants even in regions other than Turgai. Similar programs were 
underway in Akmola and Semipalatinsk.207 In Akmola work had begun even earlier, no doubt 
driven in part by the fact that the region faced the problem of settlement density earlier. In 
keeping with the focus of agronomists in Akmola who were concerned with soil depletion, 
public experimental fields were focused on sowing grasses for pasture. In Akmola, the 
agronomists created a sample agreement that they sent out to the villages in Omsk uezd to be 
signed by those farmers who wanted to take part in the program. In the agreement (written by the 
agronomist) the peasants claimed that they recognized they did not have enough fodder for 
livestock, that the meadows were of poor quality, and the hay cut in the steppe was of low 
quality. They were also supposed to agree that it was getting more and more difficult to lease 
land for hay from the Kazakhs. The peasants themselves never said any of this, but it clearly 
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includes the major criticisms by agronomists about peasant agriculture. This tendency to “speak” 
for the peasants unabashedly indicates a potential ambiguity in the popularization approach. The 
project still put the growing of the crops in the hands of peasants for demonstration and seed 
sharing, but the agronomists were still at times patronizing and didactic in their attitude towards 
those peasants. 
 The agreement went on to say that to address these problems, “we decided to start fodder 
grass cultivation, but recognizing that this is a new business in our locality, we want to test it 
first. Therefore, we asked the Akmola Resettlement Administration to send us a technician.” 
They pledged to select a suitable piece of land one desiatin in area and sow the area under the 
advice of the technician. They would then harvest the hay and give all information about the size 
of the harvest to the Resettlement Administration. In exchange, they would be given the seeds 
without cost, however, they would pay the Resettlement Administration 15 rubles. In spite of the 
odd nature of the agreement, that was both an agreement and a kind of didactic tool apparently 
directed at the peasants, agronomists were able to collect 29 signed agreements. Of these about 
half had a successful crop, however many did not because the seed arrived late; and while the 
technicians were waiting for the seeds, the peasants began prepping the fields, but did so poorly. 
Of the plantings, alfalfa was the most successful crop.208 Popularity in spite of setbacks was not 
limited to Akmola, in Kostanay uezd after beginning demonstration planting in 1910 over 400 
households requested alfalfa seed. This was in spite of the fact that many plantings did quite 
poorly, which was blamed mostly on a lack of proper machinery and too little water. Similar 
demonstration plantings were organized in a dozen villages in Turgai-Uralsk in 1909, but in 
1910, the funding was cut and the program was stopped.209  
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 In spite of the preference among both settlers and certain segments of the agronomy 
bureaucracy for grain, pasture grasses, especially alfalfa, were often the crops that appeared to 
hold the most promise to many agronomists in the steppe, and especially for public experimental 
fields. This was in part because the fields were meant to be demonstration sites to encourage new 
crops. While agronomists were enthusiastic about pasture planting, they were not alone, and 
many peasants shared their aims. Even in the Akmola experiments where half the alfalfa crop 
failed in 1907, agronomists could not keep up with the demand for seed and assistance. 
Similarly, in Turgai-Uralsk, agronomists stopped all cultural-agronomic work that was not 
related to pasture in 1910 due to high settler demand for agronomic aid. Whether peasant 
involvement in this program was genuine is difficult to tell. Peasants may genuinely have wanted 
to be involved, or, just as likely, they may simply have wanted free assistance from the Russian 
government. 
Although this only represented a small percentage of settlers engaged in cooperative 
extension type work (around 70 families in Kostanay uezd for example in 1910 were part of 
cooperative sowings), it still fit within agronomists ideas about technology transfer.210 They 
believed that if they could get a segment of “progressive elements” on their side to adopt the new 
technologies, other peasants would see their success and also adopt those practices.211 This was 
an interesting parallel to the project of Saenko (at the Zaisan Kazakh agricultural school) who 
sought to give graduates farms in their home communities to spread sedentary farming among 
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the Kazakhs and indicates again the similarities of the tactics of remaking peasants and colonized 
peoples.  
 In spite of the growing popularity and success of the demonstration plantings, they only 
reached a small segment of the population. Therefore, some agronomists in Akmola felt that they 
perhaps needed to be supplemented with other work to more quickly address the wastefulness of 
peasant farming. In 1907 after studying the program of experimental sowings by travelling to 
several villages, one agronomist remarked that “In a word, experience with settler agriculture 
during my visits to settlements last summer, even more than last year, has totally convinced me 
of the need for agronomic assistance to the population.” This was in spite of the fact that the 
experimental plantings were already taking place.   
However, implementing programs for agronomic aid was difficult considering 
agronomists sometimes knew relatively little about the peasants in the region and how they 
farmed given the vast distances in the steppe. Therefore, the Akmola administration 
recommended studying them via a survey of peasant households to be conducted with the aim of 
developing a system of crop rotation that could replace the peasants’ “exaggerated grain system.” 
The proposal called for a statistical study of two villages in Omsk uezd and another in a 
“southern uezd.” 212 It is unclear if any such study actually occurred, or if this was simply a 
forgotten proposal. However, once again, there was a powerful parallel to the need to study 
peasants with the need to remake them similar to the imperial impulse to “know” colonized 
people to better control and change them.213 In the technoscience of the settler colony, peasants 
could be invited to play a role in creation of the new steppe, they could play a role as part of the 
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creation and popularization of steppe agricultural technoscience, but to do so required sometimes 
viewing them similarly to a colonized people. 
 However much agronomists tried to make public experimental-demonstration fields play 
a dual role as sites of information gathering and popularization, they frequently fell short of this 
ideal because the steppe did not have enough technicians to oversee all plantings thoroughly 
enough.214 This led to several failures and threatened the authority of agronomy. However, this 
was not the only problem these failures caused. The lack of control and consistency in planting 
practices and cultivation meant that the fields lacked a base line of information. In order to 
address this challenge in Akmola oblast, agronomists established a kind of control experimental 
planting near Omsk which could be supervised and cared for by trained agronomists and 
technicians who were tasked with gathering correct data. By 1905 there was already an 
experimental farm near Omsk called the Omsk Experimental Field. However, it was actually 
located in Tobolsk oblast in an environment quite atypical for the rest of the steppe because it 
was situated in a forest glade protected on all sides by trees. While this field had good plantings 
of alfalfa in its first years, agronomists felt it could not serve as a control to test what was a 
reasonable productivity for steppe agriculture. Therefore, the agronomy section secured land 
from Cossack lands and established a field (No. 120) on land on the Irtysh plateau in 1907. This 
land had average soil, a mix of chernozem and sandy loam with some saltpans.215 It also had a 
vegetative cover of “forest steppe” type with the typical grasses making it rather characteristic of 
the northern Akmola region.216 
                                                 
214 TsGARK, f. 64, op.4, d. 6133, l. 11.  
215 Chernozem, though now a universal classification of soil types due to the pioneering work of Vasily Dokuchaev, 
is a Russian term that literally means “black earth.” This soil type is identified by its black color which is due high 
percentage of humus (organic material) and very high fertility as well as superior water storage capacity. Loam is 
another soil type that still contains significant organic matter (though less than chernozem) and its sandy quality 
allows for good drainage, but less water carrying capacity than chernozem. 
216 Ibid., ll.11-12.  
92 
 
 A similar need for a field that could serve as a kind of control to test the limits of what 
scientific agriculture could do was located in Kostanay uezd starting in 1908. The L’vov 
experimental field began as a single plot of winter rye sown in an area where agronomists were 
undertaking a large scale soil survey. The following year alfalfa was planted and that spring 
experiments were begun on growing spring grains and on fallow.217 By 1911, the area under 
study had grown to 752 desiatins of which 109 was cultivated in field crops, pasture, and 
orchards, and following hydrotechnical investigation, a source of potable water from a well.218 
By this time, the field was taking shape and it had a work plan and a head N. I. Kurbatov.  
 The establishment of the L’vovskii field did not arise simply out of an expansion of a few 
test plots, instead, just like the establishment of experimental institutes across the empire in 
1891, the L’vovskii field was established in response to widespread crop failures across the 
southern part of Kostanay uezd, which agronomists blamed primarily on weather. However, the 
establishment of the field in this location was apparently requested by peasants in the region who 
in 1907 volunteered to give 286 desiatins to establish the field. The primary focus of the field 
was therefore tied to ideas about the irrationality of peasant agriculture that lacked “scientifically 
educated farmers” which meant the region had not “worked out any rational methods of 
agriculture for these [environmental] conditions.” Yet, it was apparently the peasants who 
requested the establishment of the field and gave the land from their own holdings for its 
creation.219  
This role of the field as something requested by the peasants, who agronomists thought 
were irrational and averse to scientific farming, is a further illustration of the ambiguous views of 
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agricultural scientists toward peasants. However, it is also a clear illustration of the instability of 
creating technoscience. As the scientists sought to work with progressive elements, and expand 
the actors involved in the creation and maintenance of technoscience on the steppe, their motives 
at times could appear contradictory. On the one hand they treated the peasants as a project in 
need of remaking, and yet they also needed the peasantry if they were to engage them in order to 
popularize their science. 
 In spite of this contradiction, the L’vovskii field became a huge and rather important site 
of information gathering and science popularization among a largely illiterate population. 
Nevertheless, the goals of the L’vovskii field relect both an interest in settlement and reflect its 
history as a place founded in part out of a crisis of crop failure. The goals as laid out in the 
workplan by Kurbatov were as follows: 1) study the meteorology of the region especially with a 
focus on soil moisture and its connection to the growth of wild and cultivated plants; 2) studying 
the methods of soil cultivation that preserve water, especially ones that involve different 
fallowing practices; 3) examine the possibility of growing grain in the region; 4) study different 
crop varieties and test their success under different planting times; 5) ascertain the meaning and 
economic suitability of crop rotation by testing different types; 6) ascertain the best approach to 
fertility improvement testing whether it is artificial fertilizers or sowing cover crops.220 These 
focuses of the L’vovskii field indicate how settlement and previous crop failures were driving the 
research agenda of the field. Additionally, they show that the focus on water, fallow, and variety 
trials were not only the focus of the experimental field at Temir as is described below. 
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The Temirskii Experimental Field and Sokrat’ Chaianov’s “Settler Ecology” 
 While the archival material documenting the L’vovskii experimental field is enough to 
give an idea of what was going on at the field, the experimental field at Temir is much better 
documented both in archival and in published sources. The Temirskii field is also a unique 
example of experimental fields in the steppe. This is due to the fact that it was first established 
under the supervision of the Temir Temporary Commission earlier in 1906 as a direct response 
to study the “agricultural conditions” of the region because increasing settlement made it a 
matter of the “upmost urgency.”221 However, the reports of the field themselves indicate that in 
fact at the time of settlement, there were only around 2,000 Russian settlers in the Turgai region 
(roughly 300 families). In fact, most of the population of the region was made up of Kazakhs 
who officials said accounted for over 146,000 persons.222 Therefore, the field was explicitly 
established with a goal not of understanding the current agricultural conditions. Instead, the 
purpose was first and foremost to aid in settling peasant farmers in the region. 
The first complete plan of work for the field was created by a commission of agronomists 
working for the Turgai-Ural’sk district in March 1907 with the understanding that future 
directives would be handled by a commission made up of the agronomists: Tsavelya, Skalov, 
Bogdan, and Chaianov who was also appointed head of the field.223 Sokrat Chaianov was in 
many ways well-suited to the job, although at this point he was just beginning his career. 
However, eventually he would become known as one of the founders of Russian experimental 
agriculture.224 Chaianov had completed his education at the Moscow Agricultural Institute as an 
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agronomist in the first category. He then worked as a local zemstvo agent in Starobelsky in 
Kharvkov gubernia. Previous to his appointment as head of the Temir field he was working for 
the Turgai-Uralsk Interim Party.225 Chaianov was to be assisted at the field by Koloskov who had 
finished the Kon’-Kolodezskii lower agricultural school in Voronezh gubernia and then worked 
at the Kostycheshsky experimental station.226 While Chaianov did have some experience 
working in the steppe prior to his appointment, neither had spent a large amount of time in the 
region before their appointments. 
Although the land and plans had been made by the temporary commission to establish a 
field, they still had to wait on confirmation from the local administration, which was held up by 
Kazakh resistance to the idea. Although the temporary commission had approved the 
establishment of the site in February of 1907, local Kazakhs appealed the decision. Meanwhile, 
Chaianov and his team continued to work at the site completing soil and botanical surveys that 
spring. They also demarcated the land into test plots. All of this work continued in spite of the 
fact that the Kazakhs were appealing the decision to the Ural oblast administration who 
eventually approved the plan and overruled the Kazakhs in June.227 Even though settlers 
accounted for around 2,000 of the nearly 150,000 population of the region, and although the vast 
majority of Kazakhs probably opposed the idea, several hundred acres of land was taken from 
the Kazakhs and handed over to government scientists whose studies were aimed at helping 
increase the number of peasant settlers into the region and put further land pressure on the 
Kazakhs. This colonization and land expropriation was the material basis of the settler colonial 
science that was about to be created at Temirskii. 
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With work delayed until summer, the first experimental sowings at Temirskii did not 
occur until the fall during which about 64 desiatins were plowed and planted.228 In addition to 
the plantings, several buildings were completed during the first year: a laboratory, museum, ice 
house, a canopy for agricultural equipment and a temporary barracks for workers. Additionally, a 
house for the director along with a banya was also completed in addition to a stable and a 
warehouse.229 By the following autumn several more buildings were completed including a 
house for the field manager with rooms for the lab assistant and museum, an apartment for the 
assistant, a workers hut, a kitchen and shed, and a machine barn.230 
 However, Chaianov was not present at the field for much of the first year, as he had been 
directed to travel to other experimental fields and stations in Odessa, Samara, Kherson, Poltava,  
and the Don Region to speak with field heads and see their work first hand. Therefore, for nearly 
two months during the summer of 1907, Chaianov was absent. He was also often away from the 
field supervising experimental plantings in other places in Turgai oblast. Although most of the 
seed trial sites (like Temirskii itself) were close to the rail line Chaianov was often away visiting 
plantings at Jurun, Izembat, Emba, Akdar, Aman sai, and Ashe sai. This was a frequent source of 
worry for Chaianov, and it only got worse when his assistant Koloskov who was had primary 
responsibility for collecting meteorological data fell ill the following winter, and his replacement 
F.T. Yakovenko was late in arriving.231  
In spite of these problems, Chaianov was overall optimistic about the first seasons at 
Temirskii. The weather station was established with new instruments, and experiments had 
begun on the effects of weather on grain varieties. Additionally, the mapping of soils and other 
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soil work along with experiments to test different cultivation techniques that preserved moisture 
were underway.232 However, these first years of research were about more than simply gathering 
information on the steppe and helping locals with their agricultural questions. Chaianov himself 
had this to say about his purpose at Temirskii: “The study of soil and vegetation is especially 
important for the Resettlement Administration. Soil scientists cannot so thoroughly and 
systematically carry out observations of the soil moisture of virgin soil with its many detours as 
can be done by a permanent experimental station.”233 From the outset, Chaianov’s scientific 
inquiry was imbued with the goal of settlement. 
 One of the primary ways Chaianov’s work was innately linked to settlement was in his 
focus and study of grains. However, as was typically the case elsewhere with grains, not all 
grains were considered equal. The one grain that grew quite well in the environment of Temirskii 
was millet. Chaianov himself called it “the only crop of real importance” in the region. However, 
it was also a crop that was grown by Kazakhs. He believed that millet was the only crop that 
could “endure” the poor cultivation practices of the Kazakhs. He commented on how they sowed 
it too late, plowed the fields poorly and do little cultivation to control weeds. He also complained 
that they stored the harvest in pits in the ground. Even with this primitive cultivation practice, he 
reported that Kazakhs averaged 23 puds of millet per desiatin yield, compared with 16 of wheat 
or 15 of oats. Even still, he reported that with the railroad coming into the region it had already 
changed the market and millet was one of the crops being exported. Nevertheless, Chaianov 
recognized that millet was a plant that had an advantage of being “acclimatized” to the region 
and he even decided to carry out some experiments on local varieties.234 
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  Chaianov and the others who made the plans for the field did not have much hope that 
the region could produce much wheat. However, they still spent a lot of time researching the 
possibility and trying to discover ways of making at least some grain crops grow. By way of 
explanation he wrote, “the compliers of the organizational plan [of the field] nevertheless had to 
take into account the agriculture of the settler” which did not include millet and it was the job of 
the field to anticipate future concerns, i.e. settler concerns.235 After several failed attempts, 
Chaianov was still uncertain if wheat would grow in the region, but still felt it needed to be 
grown not only because peasants wanted it, but also because it helped create a “balanced 
agriculture.”236 However, it was becoming clear to Chaianov that spring wheat would not grow 
well and he focused his attention on winter wheat and rye because of their earlier harvest time, 
believing they allowed time to harvest the crops before summer drought. Nevertheless, winter 
wheat and rye still required variety trials and  Chaianov wrote that it was not enough to assume 
that wheat varieties like Poltava or Ekaterininsky would grow here even though these regions 
often suffered from similar dry climatic conditions.237 After several frustrating seasons of 
experiments, Chainov’s intuition was largely proved correct. However, instead of focusing only 
on varietal trials, he believed the problem of aridity could only be answered if it was coupled 
with work on fallowing and cultivation techniques that could preserve moisture. Therefore, 
Chaianov’s work began to focus much more on attempts of fallowing that could preserve 
moisture.  
 Chaianov believed if grain agriculture were to take root in the region it would be 
necessary for settlers to engage in some type of fallowing that would preserve moisture and soil 
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fertility. In many ways this was the same conclusion agronomists were coming to in other 
regions like Akmola, but in the area near Turgai, the aridity and soil fertility questions were more 
severe. Chaianov also made an important contribution in that he understood this project as trying 
to solve two different problems with a single solution. He hoped to develop a system of fallow 
that would solve both the aridity problem, and improve soil fertility not only on marginal lands 
but on nearly totally infertile lands too. 
 Chaianov recognized that the need to solve the fertility issue was driven by the demands 
of settler agriculture that he was there to fix writing, “lands in this region with the inclination of 
settlers to expand the tilled grain lands, and sow grain year after year in one place, will exhaust 
the soil relatively quickly.” The only fix he saw to this was either through a long fallow period or 
sowing grasses.238 He believed it was not possible to solve the fertility problem with artificial 
fertilizer or manure—and even refused to do experiments using either—because low moisture 
meant the chances of crop losses due to drought made it too costly to risk expensive chemical 
fertilizer and a lack of moisture might even make it impossible for plants to utilize the 
phosphorus. Manure was deemed out of the question because with so few trees on the steppe, 
manure was too valuable as a source of fuel.239 Therefore, Chaianov focused on crop rotation and 
cover crops as a means of improving soil fertility. However, he also recognized that he could use 
his investigations into soil fertility to address the water issue. Therefore, in his work that was 
focused on crop rotation, the three areas of investigation the farm focused on were plowing, 
influence of fallow on depleted soils, and the comparisons of natural fallow with planting grasses 
and legumes.240 
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 Chaianov believed that fallow and sowing nitrogen fixing crops and grasses could serve 
as a way of solving both problems which he believed would be an even bigger challenge than 
what he had observed in Ukraine which also faced soil depletion and lack of moisture, albeit less 
extremely than in Turgai.241 However, he was not only attracted to this solution because it would 
address the two most pressing issues. He also believed like nearly all other agronomists in the 
region that peasants were missing an opportunity by not planting more pasture. Like others, the 
fact that peasants were renting land from the Kazakhs to cut hay on rankled Chaianov. Rather 
than view this relationship as symbiotic, or as a way for Kazakhs to continue to survive in the 
face of increased peasant settlement, Chaianov like others found this practice to run counter to 
how he imagined settler agriculture should be practiced. The fact that Kazakhs were never 
addressed, except in this problematic light, in almost all of Chaianov’s writings raises the 
unanswered question of what he thought the Kazakhs were supposed to do to survive. In true 
settler colonial fashion, when Kazakhs were not a problem, they were ignored with the hope that 
they would simply disappear. 
 In his vision for addressing moisture through fallow and planting, Chaianov began 
experiments on different types of fallowing April, Kherson, and black.242 In Russian agriculture, 
there were two different types of fallow one, “par,” meant plowing the land at the end of a 
harvest and then leaving it for less than a year without crops. If it was left for over a year it was 
called “zalezhi.” One advantage of par was that it could sometimes be used as pasture in the 
early spring when small green plants began to grow on it, and if done properly only required a 
light harrow rather than a deep plowing in spring to remove the surface weeds and prepare the 
seed bed. Some farmers would even plant short term cover crops to feed livestock or to improve 
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the soil, either nitrogen fixing legumes or deep root crops like turnips to break up the soil. 
However, other versions included methods that continuously kept the field weed free through 
frequent cultivation. This process is called black fallow or “black par.”243 Chaianov carried out a 
number of tests on black par but he found it to be less effective at maintaining soil moisture. 
Instead, similar to experiment farms in Ukraine, he believed that a single harrowing in spring 
before planting (so-called April par) was the preferred method, which was less familiar than the 
later June par that he also tested for settlers to the region from places like Poltava and Kharkov.  
However, Chaianov wanted settlers to go further and practice active fallow, which would involve 
sowing cover crops of nitrogen fixing legumes and grasses writing, “good par and grass sowing 
it seems are the only foundations on which it is possible to build a good and lasting agriculture in 
this region.”244  
After his first years at Temirskii, Chaianov had developed a particularly suitable regimen. 
This involved using early par and combined it with expanding improved pasture not only on 
those lands that were fallow, but also to sowing pasture lands that would be kept for several 
seasons and upon which hay could be cut and animals pastured. However, he recognized that this 
would require significant increase in the amount of machinery available to peasants. 
Nevertheless, he believed he had a viable system for the new environment that involved par and 
a four plant seed mix for pastures that included two legumes sainfoin and alfalfa and two cereal 
grains wheat grass (zhitiak) and brome grass (koster).245 However, these plants were not plants 
that Chaianov had imported and improved upon, they were plants that were available growing 
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right in the middle of the steppe. While Chaianov believed these grasses should be planted on 
prepared ground, the actual plant combination he was recommending differed little from the 
open steppe that the Kazakhs were renting to peasants for the cutting of hay. While these 
pastures were maximized for nutrition and based on what crops he observed growing best in the 
region, they were in many ways a difference in degree not in fundamental quality. However, with 
Chaianov’s seal of approval, these plants were now part of the agronomic technoscience that was 
being deployed to help settle the steppe.  
However, the idea that Chaianov was modifying and perfecting a new system does not 
fully hold up to scrutiny. Instead, Chaianov and other agronomists themselves acknowledged that 
peasant settlers in the region already had a fallow system. This involved a first sowing of 
valuable spring grain a hard wheat and usually a millet, then they sowed soft wheat and less 
valuable grains until the land gave out. They moved onto a new field and left the old one until 
they noticed that feather grasses grew on the field and then plowed it again. The feather grasses 
were a sign that fertility had returned to such an extent that the field could again support a 
valuable spring grain.246 In many ways, this mirrored Chaianov’s own observational approach of 
the ecology of the region. 
However, Chaianov did not only believe his best practices could solve the dual 
challenges of too little rainfall and protect against exploitative peasant agriculture destroying soil 
fertility. He also believed that his work could help rehabilitate lands that were unsuitable for 
agriculture, specifically those lands that had very high levels of salts due to a lack of rainfall. 
These soils are called solonchaks and make up a large percentage of the world’s surface 
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especially around the equatorial regions.247 Solonchaks are created when there is poor drainage 
and salts that come to the surface cannot be washed away, leaving the soils inundated with salt 
and unsuitable for agriculture. Chaianov believed that Russia faced a crisis of solonchaks and 
that large areas were impacted by them.248  
 Chaianov was interested in studying how to ameliorate solonchaks which were quite 
prevalent at Temirskii. He found this to be another aspect of his study of the plants and soils 
holistically, a process described later in this chapter. He believed that nature naturally dealt with 
solonchaks, and he sought to mimick those methods by developing artificial methods to combat 
solonchaks, “which could be called a continuation of natural processes improved by the 
intervention of man.”249 Therefore, Chaianov connected his study of local plants to rehabilitating 
solonchaks by planting more salt-loving vegetation that would collect and preserve snow cover 
and help flush out the soils. Specifically, he hoped that tamarisk which grew well in salt areas 
could serve such an end.250 Here we can see one of the several aspects of what could be termed 
Chaianov’s settler ecology. He was not thinking and working in a kind of “high modernist” 
mindset that sought to ignore nature and control the environment in clunky, overpowering ways 
that viewed things as a battle between man and nature.251 He was still seeking a longer term 
domination of the landscape, and by extension of the people—Kazakhs—who had lived there 
previously. While his ecology could be viewed by some today as a kind of answer to dominating 
modes of thinking, the values embedded in his assumptions and the goals of his work make the 
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picture more complicated and implicated in a project of settler colonialism which in many ways 
is simply domination by another means.  
 The fullest example of Chaianov’s settler ecology is perhaps his work on soil 
classification. Chaianov developed a simple yet incisive method for evaluating soils and their 
suitability that looked toward connecting plant cover with the underlying soil type. The 
implications of this were obvious. Now even untrained surveyors, who would not have to send a 
sample back to a laboratory and wait on results, could simply look at the types of plant 
ecosystems present and know how suitable the land was for agriculture. Even simple methods 
like morphology, that could be completed in the field without a laboratory, still required 
specialized training. In the very notion of this research there was an implied support for the 
settlement project that reveals how even an ecological perspective, if imbued with the values of 
settler colonialism, can well serve the aims of empire. 
 Chaianov’s method was not only meant to replace established soil classifications, instead 
it was meant to complement them and give clearer subtypes of soil. However, the method he 
developed was not without its precursors. Chaianov wrote that science had long recognized a 
connection between plants and soil, and he cited the earlier work of Dima and Keller who 
worked on a similar question. He believed that previous investigations did not go far enough 
because they were too focused on pure science rather than researching it for “practical 
purposes.”252 In taking up this focus, Chaianov was both associating himself with the field of 
experimental agriculture that was developing under him and other scientists, and also is aligning 
himself with the goals of settlement by addressing this question in the steppe. 
 
                                                 




In investigating this connection Chaianov phrased his main research question thus: 
The mutual dependence between soil and flora, the dependence of flora and soil on the 
relief (topography) is so clearly expressed, that for the correct understanding of the 
processes taking place in soils and vegetation, it is necessary to track this relationship. 
This is not only necessary for studying this locality [Turgai] in regards to agriculture, but 
also for purely practical aims since, depending on the direction of activity of the natural 
foces, it is necessary to combine not only plowing, but also the composition of 
agricultural plants, for example in obtaining new types of grasses from wild ones, the 
acclimatization of imported grasses, etc.253  
 
Here we see that Chaianov was still somewhat skeptical about whether or not grains could be 
grown here, but he fully believed that the region had something to offer the empire. Either the 
region could serve as a source of new plant material or itself it could become a region of 
improved pastures and increased livestock production, ideally perhaps both. 
 In pursuit of these aims, Chaianov set out to create a soil map of the region. As many 
other scholars of colonialism have commented, maps were key aspects of making a landscape 
“legible” to colonizers and also an important way of reordering things.254 However, Chaianov’s 
map went further. It was also meant to serve as a way of making other landscapes—that is those 
that had not yet been mapped—more legible even to an untrained eye. This new technology of 
soil classification could serve as a powerful tool in the hands even of those with little training. It 
was therefore even more powerful than a regular soil map. It was also, however, a source of 
potential instability; as the new way of looking at the steppe focused on plants as a way of 
knowing what lay beneath them, could potentially undercut the power of experts. Whereas 
previously identifying soil types required laboratory testing and training in slight variations of 
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particle size and color, now anyone with a rudimentary understanding of plants could identify 
plant clusters and have a good guess as to what type of soil supported those plants. 
Chaianov’s soil mapping differed from a regular soil map in a relatively simple way. He 
simply overlaid it with a second map of plant families. This plant mapping project was also 
serving a dual purpose as he had been collecting plant varieties both to collect and put in the 
Temirskii museum, but also to field test them in his pasture and fallow work. This plant or 
“geobotanic” work consisted of him collecting over 130 varieties of forage grasses and other 
crops.255 Chaianov noticed a clear connection in soil morphology in the field with changes in 
plant families. However, he recognized that this observation was not enough commenting that 
anyone who has seen a virgin steppe will immediately see the connection between changes in 
plants and soils. Therefore, Chaianov simply laid his two maps on top of one another and made a 
single map that illustrated how complexes of flora and soil types overlapped.256 
 Chaianov drew three rules from his map: 1) each soil of virgin type has its own complex 
of flora; 2) each complex of flora can be almost as variable as soil is; 3) if this is so, one can 
classify (bonitize) the soils of these complexes of flora. He then established several rules for how 
to create these new classifications.257 This framework gave Chaianov the confidence to spread 
the word about his work to a wider circle. Eventually, it led him to being invited to the All 
Russian Congress of Soil Scientists in January of 1908 to present his research.258 While in his 
formal presentations he made some slight modifications and equivocations, his fundamental 
point stood.  
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Chaianov said he was not attempting to determine the value of land based solely on plant 
groups, however, it is unclear how much he believed this and how much of this opinion was due 
to an attitude of scientific specificity. Just after stating that plants alone could not determine the 
value of land he wrote, “It must be remembered that in this region there is an economic break 
coming (the transition from animal husbandry to agriculture) and one plant mass doesn’t only 
have meaning for fodder but can also serve as an indication of its suitability for crops. It is not 
for nothing settlers, when speaking about this or that area, ask first of all “and what is growing 
there?”259 Therefore, while he did not believe that plant communities told everything there was 
to be known about a region, he himself admitted that in many ways they were a more useful way 
of knowing the landscape than having a scientifically organized system of soil classification and 
land valuation.260 In many ways Chaianov’s work on soil classification that recognized the 
relationship between soil and plants represented a kind of progressive scientific idea that avoided 
the pitfalls of atomistic approaches that science is often accused of in general. Chaianov was 
practicing a kind of ecology, similar to other Russian sciences like forestry and soil science 
described by Stephen Brain and David Moon.261 However, even this science was created and 
deployed in the service of settler colonialism and the destruction and displacement of Kazakh 
lifeways and ecologies on the steppe. 
Conclusion: Steppe Agronomy Across the 1917 Divide 
 Following several years at the Temirskii field, Chaianov left his position in 1911 to 
establish a new experimental field in Voronezh until 1924 where he would also serve on the 
faculty of the Voronezh Agricultural Institute. In 1924, he served as the head of the Department 
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of Experimental Work for the People’s Commissariat for Agriculture until 1930 when he was 
arrested, though not convicted for involvement in the “Labor Peasants Party” show trial.262 By 
1935, he had again found work as head of the Ivano-Voznesensky Agricultural Institute along 
with other academic posts.263 During this time he was treated as an expert in experimental fields 
publishing a short book for peasants and party activists in 1927 titled, What Do Experimental 
Stations in the Central Black Earth Regions Offer Peasants?.264 He also wrote another work 
which was translated into English for a global scientific and policy audience titled, Experimental 
Farming of the People’s Commissariat for Agriculture of the RSFSR.265 However, most 
significantly, Chaianov also literally “wrote the book” on the Virgin Lands Campaign. In 1958, 
though long past retirement, he published a book explaining what challenges and possibilities lay 
ahead for the campaign.266 His only experience living and working in the area of Virgin Lands 
activity were the five years he spent at Temirskii. 
In addition to Chaianov, his assistant Koloskov went on to do important scientific work 
moving in the Far East Amur region, where he worked for the Resettlement Administration and 
was put in charge of his own experimental field at Pikanskii, and later headed the Amur 
Meteorological Bureau and other agronomic and meteorological bureaus after the revolution. In 
1936, he earned his doctorate and worked at academic institutes in Vladivostok. During the war, 
                                                 
262 The main target of this show trial was Sokrat’s cousin the more famous Alexander Chaianov who was a 
proponent of small-scale peasant agriculture and cooperatives and therefore a critic of large collective farming. No 
one was convicted as all participants maintained their innocence and the trial fell apart, however Alexander 
Chaianov was later secretly tried and shot in 1932, although he was later rehabilitated and his work was of major 
interest and influence during Perestroika. Sergei S. Demidov and Boris V. Levshin, The Case of the Academician 
Nikolai Nikolaevich Luzin, trans. Roger Cooke (Providence: American Mathematical Society, 2016), 360. Alexander 
Chaianov’s work on cooperatives also figures prominently in Kotsonis, Making Peasants Backward. 
263 Official website of the Voronezh State Agricultural University. http://people.vsau.ru/vydayushhiesya-uchenye-
sxi-vgau/chayanov-sokrat-konstantinovich/. 
264 S.K. Chaianov, Chto dayut krest’ianam?. 
265 S.K. Chaianov, Experimental Farming of the People’s Commissariat for Agriculture of the RSFSR (Moscow: 
Novaia Drevnia, 1929). 
266 S. K. Chaianov, Osvoenie tseliny v polpustinye (Alma-Ata: KazGosIzdat, 1958). 
109 
 
he was evacuated to Alma-ata where he taught at the Kazakh Agricultural Institute, and led 
expeditions as part of the geographic institute which eventually led to his publication of 
Agroclimatic Regions of Kazakhstan in 1947. He then retired to Moscow where he consulted 
with agronomic institutes there and helped develop new ways of growing grain in arid regions.267  
However, the individuals involved were not the only infrastructure that continued to have 
a lasting impact on Russian and later Soviet science. The Temirskii field itself continued in 
operation as an experimental field and is in operation even today as the Aktobe Agricultural 
Experimental Station. It still conducts research on many of the same questions such as moisture 
preserving cultivation, developing new seed varieites, and experimenting with new crops like its 
current trials of safflower, as a saffron substitute.268   
 The popularization work and the establishment of experimental fields like Temirskii were 
an integral part of the aid the tsarist government gave to settlers to help them survive in the new 
steppe environment. This work, however, required agronomists simultaneously researching the 
steppe and popularizing their new found knowledge. What is more, the work of popularization 
was not simply a passive process. It involved debates, pamphlets, and even involving peasants in 
the planting, care, and recording of harvests. This multi-faceted work meant that agronomists and 
technicians were never fully simply agricultural scientists, although that was central to their work 
and role. They were forced to wear many different hats including popularizers, social scientists, 
and facilitators.  
Therefore, it is difficult to put them into simple categories or view them simply as agents 
of science and progress who sought to conquer both the steppe and the ignorance of peasants. 
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Instead, they were forced to navigate both the steppe environment and the peasants, and even the 
nomads who lived there. As such, although the agronomists like Chaianov came to the steppe 
having been trained in agricultural science in European Russia, they were forced to adapt and 
were not simply brining a new way of agriculture to a new environment and transplanting it.  
What is more, they were not the only creators of this new knowledge. Chainov’s ideal cropping 
regimen was a mix of things he had learned in his schooling, visits to Ukraine, observations of 
peasant farming practices, and the plants available and thriving on the steppe around Temirskii. 
This complicates the picture of what makes this science “imperial” or even who is an actor and 
participant in its creation. Just as the work of popularization involved increasing the participants 
in creating the steppe agricultural technoscience that potentially destabilized the authority of 
experts like Chaianov, the creation of that technoscience obscures some of the realities of its 
creation. Given the role of agronomists as both scientists and administrators, and their mission as 
creators and aides to settler colonialism which is a political project, it is also possible to say that 
they were not only creating technoscience, but also technopolitics. The experience of steppe 
agronomy therefore fits neatly within Mitchell’s idea that: 
Techno-politics is always a technical body, an alloy that must emerge from a process of 
manufacture whose ingredients are both human and nonhuman, both intentional and not, 
and in which the intentional or the human is always somewhat overrun by the unintended. 
But it is a particular form of manufacturing, a certain way of organizing the amalgam of 
human and nonhuman, things and ideas, so that the human, the intellectual, the realm of 
intentions and ideas seems to come first and the control and organize the nonhuman.269  
  
It is possible and useful to think of the large human and institutional agronomic 
infrastructure that developed on the steppe in the late imperial period as a kind of large-scale 
high modernism that was a precursor to Stalinist Collectivization and the Virgin Lands 
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Campaign. Indeed, as illustrated by the staying power of these individuals, their ideas, and 
physical institutions the two are clearly connected. However, if these imperial projects have at 
their root not only an ideology of settler colonialism, but also of a kind of “settler ecology” that 
is less about the domination of nature than about understanding it and using it towards human 
ends, this also should affect our notions of the nature of high modernism. For not only is it, as 
Mitchell states not always under human control, but it is also not only about an ideology of the 
domination of nature. While domination is a liking thread between these two periods, the 
domination is less about the domination of nature and more about the domination of humans, in 

















CHAPTER FOUR: GRAZING THE STEPPE 
 In his memoir recounting the massive changes that occurred in Kazakh society under the 
Bolsheviks, Mukhamet Shayakhmetov recalled how as a boy before Collectivization, one of his 
greatest joys was being put in charge of caring for his family’s flock of sheep. He wrote, 
 To begin with, I was really happy to do this work as it seemed so important and made me 
 feel grown up: I used to stride boldly out into the steppe on my own with the 700 sheep in 
 the flock and drive them back to the aul in good time, proud of myself for managing an  
 adult’s job. But as I grew older, the only thing I enjoyed about grazing the sheep was  
 that I could spend the whole day on horseback in the steppe. Pretending you were riding 
 round the flock, you could gallop about as much as you liked.270 
 
Shayakhmetov was born after the Bolsheviks came to power. He never knew a steppe without 
Soviet rule, and yet his description of nomadic life in the 1920s is an important reminder that 
while Kazakh society was changing, for many Kazakhs, life went on in ways that would be 
recognizable, though not identical, to the way it had before the conquest. In addition to a large 
herd of sheep that belonged to his family, that Shayakhmetov could “gallop all day” does not 
reflect a hemmed in, fully sedentary way of life. During the late imperial period, encroaching 
settlement did significantly change Kazakh livestock practices by shortening the length of 
migration routes, changing the makeup of herds, and increasing the amount of fodder Kazakhs 
cut.  
Nevertheless, these were often changes of degree, for most Kazakhs their lives continued 
to revolve around livestock. However, the way nearly all Kazakhs kept livestock would change. 
Not only were migration routes significantly shorter for nearly all Kazakhs, the animals they 
took with them also changed. Instead of mostly sheep and horses, during the late imperial period, 
Kazakh herds began to contain significant numbers of cattle. What is more, while before this 
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period very few Kazakhs led a sedentary life, more and more Kazakhs were forced (often 
through economic hardship) to give up nomadism. Even those Kazakhs who still nomadized now 
also often spent a significant part of their time and labor cutting hay which they stored for winter 
forage, a practice unheard of before this period. The intensity of these changes was not universal, 
and was especially dramatic for those Kazakhs in areas of more dense settlement where 
migration routes were blocked by farms and where traditional water and pasture sites were often 
taken from Kazakhs and allocated to peasant villages. While there are many reasons Kazakh 
animal husbandry changed less than it did for peasants, one of the main reasons was because 
Kazakhs were often excluded from the policies and programs implemented by the agronomic 
bureaucracy and Resettlement Administration who focused their efforts more and more on 
peasant settlers and less and less on Kazakhs regardless of the degree they were practicing 
nomadism. 
On the other hand, the changes to peasant settler animal husbandry were much more 
significant. Overall, settler livestock numbers exploded. Between 1906 and 1916, livestock in the 
steppe oblasts increased by almost 80%, and while some of this growth was in Kazakh herds, the 
majority of it came from peasant settlers. In every steppe uezd in 1906, Kazakhs owned more 
livestock than peasants. By 1916, in a quarter of the uezds, Russian livestock outnumbered 
Kazakh livestock.271 Additionally, rather than keeping small herds of animals close on communal 
lands like most peasants in European Russia, peasant settlers rented out large tracts of land to 
feed and house their burgeoning herds. In some ways many peasant settlers came quite close to 
adopting a kind of extensive livestock agriculture that was in many ways more similar to Kazakh 
semi-nomadism than the peasant commune. 
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 Imperial officials and agronomists always believed that livestock would play some role in 
the agricultural economy of peasant settlers. However, they did not want peasants to focus 
exclusively on animal husbandry. This aim met with the environmental realities of the steppe 
especially in southern regions where aridity made grain agriculture totally or nearly impossible. 
Indeed, by the eve of the First World War, imperial officials had recognized this situation, and 
instead of creating peasant allotments that conformed to their notions of an ideal peasant farm 
based on raising grains, they began creating larger settlement plots specifically for settlers to 
engage exclusively in livestock raising. By 1915, they had created nearly 200 of these plots over 
an area that encompassed 687,000 desiatin of land.272 
 In many ways agricultural scientists and officials were reacting to peasant, Kazakh, and 
environmental demands when they took on the work of trying to make the steppe produce more 
livestock for settlers. However, these actors and forces were not alone in encouraging this focus, 
it was also driven by the growing importance of livestock and butter exports from the steppe and 
Siberia to feed a rapidly expanding urban population in European Russia. In spite of their initial 
reluctance to focus on livestock and pasture, as they began to see the “wasteful” ways peasants 
were using the land, they changed tactics. Therefore, the agronomic bureaucracy on the steppe 
soon took on the project of improving the steppe along with its livestock and the husbandry 
practices of steppe residents with the same zeal and technocratic mindset—influenced by cultural 
ideals about “proper” agriculture—that they had with other aspects of steppe agriculture. 
Steppeland to Rangeland 
 Writing about the American West, the geographer Nathan Sayre has pointed out that 
while rangeland existed before scientific range science, it was still necessary for scientists to 
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“produce the range” through fences and the extermination of pests. This work, coupled with 
private property relations meant that in the American West, “range science would be a science of 
ranching, not of pastoralism.”273 On the Kazakh Steppe, in spite of the general lack of fences, 
there was a similar process. Agricultural scientists attempted to create and know the steppe as a 
site of livestock production in order to make their aspirations a reality.  
New market relations were part of turning the steppe into a range, but also the 
extermination of pests was a central aim. The primary “pest” that needed to be destroyed were 
nomads. Nearly all agricultural scientists were waiting for an end of pastoral nomadism, 
although they might not actively seek the extermination of the nomad in the same way as other 
pests, they did seek the extermination of nomadic lifeways. As Willard Sunderland pointed out, 
this mindset was connected to it being, “an age permeated by the presumptions of social 
Darwinism,” where, “numerous educated Russians fully expected that nomads would “die out” 
(vymirat’), the regrettably necessary victims of a universal struggle for existence between higher 
and lower cultures.”274 The lack of racialized frameworks that existed in other settler colonies for 
this hope meant little in the end.   
 Additionally, there was another project of extermination that agronomists focused on that 
was especially germane to livestock: the extermination of groundhogs and wolves. These pests 
represented a threat to the aims of agronomists because the groundhogs were suspected carriers 
of disease that could harm animals and settlers. In the disease-paranoid environment of the late 
Russian empire, groundhogs as vectors of disease made them easy targets, and government 
sponsored campaigns of their extermination predated even the most intensive periods of 
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settlement.275 Wolves represented a much more familiar foe to Russians. Wolves played an 
important role in Russian folklore and rural life as they did in the folklore of most Northern 
European cultures.276 On the steppe, wolves continued to be a major concern and problem. In just 
one year, 1905, in Turgai oblast, wolves reportedly killed over 62,000 head of livestock. This 
number included over 6,000 cattle and more than 11,000 horses, which represented a significant 
loss of wealth for the region.277 In spite of attempts to hunt wolves by settlers, Kazakhs, and 
officials, the losses were so great that the government eventually began resorting to poison to 
deal with wolves like they had with groundhogs.278 Both of these campaigns would continue and 
are important precursors to later anti-locust campaigns which are discussed in Chapter 6 of this 
dissertation. The aim of extermination, whether of locusts, wolves, and groundhogs, as well as 
nomadic culture, fit into a “logic of extermination” that underpinned settler colonialism because 
it required a tabula rasa for the settler colonial project to thrive and create a new, better 
agriculture and civilization.279 
 Part of the reason the extermination of groundhogs was an important issue was because 
they were viewed as carriers of diseases, especially plague. For a growing state apparatus 
worried about disease, the extermination of groundhogs fit easily within this ideology of clearing 
the steppe of its previous problematic inhabitants. However, in addition to turning the steppe into 
range by extermination, there were other less clearly physical aspects to this transformation. The 
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land itself had to be incorporated into the economic and intellectual structures of the settler 
colony. In addition to making it legible through mapping and administrative division, it also 
needed to be given new monetary value.280 
 Previous to Russian colonization, land was valued on the steppe, but not in the same 
capitalist ways that came with colonization. Instead, pre-conquest Kazakh land use was 
determined communally via kinship groups. Sarah Cameron described the interconnection 
between land use and kinship thus:  
Kinship, Kazakhs’ allegiances to particular clans, was an important source of identity, in 
addition to governing crucial economic aspects of pastoral nomadic life. In a practice 
known as ata qonïs, individual clans claimed grazing rights over particular pastures, and 
these privileges were then passed down along genealogical lines. When nomads’ 
migration routes were disrupted or pressure on pastures increased, such as during the 
Zunghar invasion of the steppe in the eighteenth century, the leaders of a various clans 
would meet to reallocate the usage of pastures.281 
 
In such a system, there was little room for an economy that included monetary exchange for land 
purchase or renting.  
However, this did not mean that there was not competition in such a society. As Virginia Martin 
pointed out,  
The degree to which migration routes, destinations, land allocation and grazing rights 
among auls of a certain clan or region had to be coordinated by its leaders depended on 
the relative stability or instability of her sizes and clan relations in a particular year. 
Competition was fiercest in periods of instability, when nomads were displaced from 
pastures because of war or disease’ at these times, clan leaders would gather in the spring 
to coordinate migrations to summer pastures.282  
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However, with the coming first of Cossacks, and later peasant settlers, this situation changed. 
Not only were Kazakh migration routes disrupted, which forced many to give up long 
migrations, but now lands held by the Cossacks or Kazakhs began to be rented out to land 
hungry peasants. 
 In theory, before the 1906 Stolypin reforms, all land in the steppe belonged to the state 
with the exception of Cossack officer land grants. Peasant settlers only had the right to land use 
in perpetuity. However, this only applied to official peasant plots. Probably the majority of 
settlement lands were at one time occupied by illegal settlers, especially in the early days of 
settlement. George Demko described the early days of settlement as being marked by 
“freeholding” or “squatting in the American sense.” In this context, “a settler family simply used 
as much land as they needed or could work. As the number of settlers increased and pressure on 
the land became more acute, land holdings were usually equalized” a process which, “bore a 
resemblance to the process of repartition in the Mirs of European Russia.” However, in the 
steppe and Siberia, once households were given land, it was usually theirs in “hereditary-
household tenure” with only pasture land remaining in communal use.283 
 After 1906, while in the rest of the empire peasants had the right to own land, the same 
was not true in the steppe, in spite of the fact that those parts of the Stolypin Reforms that 
allowed peasants to leave the commune did apply. This led to a situation where officials 
recognized that “the sale and purchase of land occurred, although not sanctioned by law.”284 The 
1906 reforms also led to the Resettlement Administration changing the ways it created settlement 
plots. Instead of organizing all settlement plots as communes as they had previously, they now 
created three different types of settlement plots: communes, otrub (where settlers had a house 
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and small plot in the village and consolidated land outside the village), and khutor (which 
approximated individual farmsteads). New settlers could now choose what kind of farm they 
wanted.285 Simultaneously, like the reforms in European Russia, older communes organized 
before 1906 could now petition the government to have their land turned into either otrub or 
khutor. According to Demko, otrub and khutor accounted for the majority of new peasant 
settlements (84%) in most of the steppe by 1911, with khutor accounting for only a small 
percentage of this number. However, by 1914, the numbers of both had decreased to 41%.286 
 Although peasant settlers theoretically had communal and individual pasture lands, both 
were quickly felt to be inadequate by many peasants. There were two different reasons for this. 
In those regions to the north of the steppe that received adequate rainfall, peasant settlers often 
did very well economically. If they found themselves on good chernozem or even chestnut soils 
with adequate rainfall, peasants could achieve bountiful harvests. While recognizing the 
difficulties peasant settlers faced in Akmola oblast, especially in starting out, one official 
remarked how after 2-3 years a typical peasant sowed an average of 3 1/3 desiatin of grain, after 
6-7 that area had increased to 5.5 and after 14 years to 10.5 desiatins of sown land. 
Accompanying those increases, their livestock also increased to an average of 3-4 head of draft 
animals (horses or bulls) and 8-9 head of cows, sheep, or calves.287 This meant that farms could 
quickly outgrow their initial allotment.  
While this growth was common (although not universal) in areas with good soils and 
adequate rainfall, areas less suitable for growing crops also faced land pressure. In 1914, a 
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commission on livestock raising in Turgai oblast reported how especially in southern regions, 
peasant allotments were too small because to survive settlers had to rely on animal husbandry 
nearly to the exclusion of other forms of agriculture. For example, they found that in one village 
that was home to 50 families 7 households each had 100 or more cattle, 20 families each had 30-
50 cattle, and the remaining families each had at least 20 cattle (meaning the village altogether 
had around 2,000 cattle).288  
Given that regions in the south provided less fodder per acre than lands that received 
more rainfall it is easy to see how these levels of livestock holding would require large amounts 
of land. In order to address this, many peasants cut hay in the steppe for additional fodder. 
Interestingly, while we might imagine these farmers on marginal lands to be scraping by without 
much capital or machinery, officials reported that most peasants used mechanized mowers and 
reapers for their hay harvest. This was apparently because the steppe had such low yields. For 
example, in one area of Akmola that was considered typical, peasants harvested an average of no 
more than 45 pood of hay per desiatin (about 600 pounds per acre).289 
   This situation of expanding numbers of livestock and settlers meant that renting land to 
cut hay became more and more significant. The largest landholders in the region, Cossacks and 
Kazakhs, were the main rentiers. This could be quite lucrative, and as more settlers came to the 
region, rental prices continued to increase. In 1908 rental prices in good agricultural areas of the 
northern steppe ranged from 25 to 35 kopeks per desiatin, by 1916 this number had climbed to 6 
rubles.290 While some Kazakhs benefited from this situation, the overwhelming beneficiaries 
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were usually Cossacks. This was in part because while legislation in 1891 affirmed the right of 
Kazakhs to rent out their land, they were limited to 15 desiatins under their personal control.291 
Given the widespread growth of renting land, officials recognized that peasants needed 
the ability to rent or buy land if they were going to prosper whether on good agricultural lands or 
poor ones. They therefore decided to create plots of land that peasants could rent from the 
government to help them keep more livestock in the southern parts of the oblast. However, they 
were concerned with just how much land peasants might need. The 1913 survey in Turgai was 
conducted in part to answer this question, which required answering the question of stocking 
rates. The author of the report, P.A. Khvorostanskii, was the head of statistical work for Turgai-
Uralsk Resettlement district. His report recognized the poor hay yields in most regions of the 
steppe and noted that while in western Europe pasture can yield between 300-400 pood per 
desiatin, the same was not true in the steppe (for comparison, as noted above in Akmola 45 pood 
was considered typical). He went on to say that on average if a herd is kept near a village in 
pasture for 7 months it would require 5 desiatin per head of cattle (or its equivalent). The 
committee decided that they should organize plots to support the equivalent of 100 head of 
cattle.292   
  However, determining stocking rates is always difficult. When scientists were attempting 
to answer this same question in the Untied States decades later, there was still no easy answer to 
determining them scientifically. Sayre’s comments about the situation in the US were just as true 
for the Kazakh steppe, “In principle, all that was needed was accurate measurements, but the 
scale and diversity of the lands in question made this a daunting task both scientifically and 
                                                 
291 Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs, 2nd ed. (Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1995), 88.  
292 TsGARK f. 30, op. 1, d. 59, ll. 27-28. 
122 
 
logistically. What exactly should be measured, and how?”293 The case of Turgai was no 
different. While Khvorostanskii might recommend plots of a particular size, even he recognized 
that the plots might need to be bigger because in addition to pasture, livestock require water and 
the plots needed to be within 3-5 versts of water sources.294  
In addition to distance to drinking water, vegetation growth in arid regions like the steppe 
is quite variable depending on rainfall. While imperial scientists were working from an idea of 
equilibrium environments common to temperate areas, the steppe is a nonequilibrium 
environment. Diana Davis has argued that,  
Taking environmental variability into account is especially important for the vast 
majority of the drylands that are rangelands because it has serious implications for their 
use and the livelihoods of millions of people. In less variable, higher rainfall pastoral 
environments, grazing pressure is frequently the major determinant for ecosystem 
dynamics, and overgrazing can occur if grazing is not well managed. In nonequilibrium 
environments, though, abiotic drivers like rainfall are much more important than grazing 
pressure in determining vegetation cover.295 
 
The officials in Turgai themselves had information that would have supported variability if they 
had seen it as such. Their own report included evidence that one spot, Semiozernoe should not be 
pursued as a site for peasant pasture rental because while its pastures of 36,000 desiatin had 
supported 5,000 sheep and 3,500 cattle, it could only do so in years of good rainfall.296  
 However, the environment was not the only factor that was affecting the size of herds and 
the need to demarcate more steppe land into the intellectual and administrative frameworks of 
officials and scientists. Fluctuations in the price of cattle and hay also played an important role in 
determining herd size and the need for pasture. For example, in 1913, depending on local prices 
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of hay, the price for a workhorse could vary between 40-60 rubles, a cow 35-50 rubles and a pair 
of oxen from 125-150 rubles.297 This meant the price of horses could nearly double (or decrease 
by half) within a single year depending on the price of hay.  
The price of hay in a local area itself was in turn determined by environmental factors 
like rainfall as well as the availability of land. Therefore, there was neither a straight line of 
increasing herd size for every settler nor was the size of herds determined only by economic 
factors or the desire of peasants to raise more animals. Interestingly, while many peasants were 
increasing the size of their herds, nomads were in some ways were tending more towards the 
aims of agronomists and officials. With old migration routes cut, those Kazakhs who still 
migrated often did so across shorter distances. This meant that cattle, who are ill-suited to long 
migrations grew in importance in Kazakh herds, whereas before settlement sheep and horses 
were more significant. This was coupled with a general reduction in herd size among individual 
Kazakh auls, because single groups could no longer support huge herds without long migrations 
as well.298 At the time officials recognized this state of affairs and applauded it because it 
appeared to them that the Kazakhs were beginning to transition to sedentary agriculture.299 
However, the forces driving this change were connected to the inverse process among peasant 
settlers, which they opposed. Ironically, the Kazakhs were conducting more intensive animal 
husbandry than they had been before the conquest, although this was in large part because 
peasant settlers were involved in more extensive animal husbandry than previously. 
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Perfecting Pasture and Exploiting the Steppe 
 While creating range out of the steppe through extermination, scientifically measured 
stocking rates, and the penetration of capitalist values to land was important, it was one part of 
the process of exploiting the steppe economically. The main products of this improved, rational, 
and legible environment were live animals, skins, meat, and dairy products. The focus on these 
products gave an important role for scientists in rationalizing and building scientific authority 
and ownership over the steppe. However, getting these products out of the steppe was more 
complicated than simply creating them on a rationalized steppe. It required the creation of 
interlocking physical, scientific, and socio-economic infrastructures that were also connected to 
the process of transforming the environment from steppe to range. 
 Most of the steppe throughout the imperial period was a region with very little 
transportation infrastructure. Roads were poor and sparse, river travel limited, and railways only 
crossed the edges of the steppe. Officials were aware of this, and in spite of plans to build 
railways across settlement areas, transportation infrastructure remained limited.300 The northern 
and eastern parts of the steppe fared somewhat better due to the Trans-Siberian railway and the 
Irtysh River.301 However, one of the main concerns of this poor infrastructure was because the 
dreams of officials rested on the region becoming a major exporter of grain which is a bulky 
transport good. While those regions nearer the railway were deeply tied into imperial trade 
networks and supplied cities in far off European Russia, even those regions that received enough 
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rainfall further to the south of the Irtysh or railway lines suffered a disadvantage.302 Therefore, it 
was not only environmental factors that encouraged areas to the south to focus on livestock, there 
were also infrastructure causes. 
 While grain was bulky and difficult to transport to railheads, livestock was much more 
mobile, and could walk itself to railways where it could be transported anywhere in the empire. 
This meant that a few places where the railway touched the steppe could become the connection 
point for a much larger area.303 One such site was the small railway station at Shalkar. This 
station is in the middle of a very dry part of the steppe several hundred miles north of the Aral 
Sea, but its location along the Orenburg to Tashkent Railway made it significant. The station 
location was probably chosen because there is a large lake also called Shalkar nearby. In the arid 
steppe, the lake could serve as a source of water for the steam engines passing through.304 Given 
the lack of infrastructure, it was probably not meant to be a major loading station for livestock 
from across a large section of Irghiz uezd although that is what it became. It is difficult to 
estimate the growth in livestock exports in this region, but one telling number is that in 1882, 
officials counted a total of 136, 559 sheep in the entire Irghiz uezd.305 By 1905, Irghiz reportedly 
sold 30,000 sheep and 41,300 animal skins (the majority of which were probably sheep).306 
Many of these sheep alongside thousands of cattle, goats, and horses were no doubt transported 
through Shalkar. 
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 In spite of the lack of plans for markets or a slaughterhouse at Shalkar, by 1906 officials 
reported that there were 15 different slaughterhouses or meat dealers trading at the station.307 
Evidently, these businesses were making huge amounts of unsanitary waste and had no access to 
water to clean it up. A commission was assigned to investigate and recommended that these 
businesses no longer be allowed to process livestock during the heat of midday near the station 
or near the lake (which they may have been using as a dumping ground for animal waste).308 
This situation led the uezd nachalnik to write to the oblast authorities requesting urgent funds for 
a slaughterhouse.309 However, it soon became clear that the project required not only permission 
and funds from the oblast, it also needed permission from the Tashkent to Orenburg Railway in 
order to get a water pipe from the lake to the proposed site.310 While it is unclear if the 
slaughterhouse was built, sanitation and infrastructure continued to be a problem at Shalkar. In 
1912 the local veterinary inspector was still reporting problems due to a lack of loading 
infrastructure and apparently unsanitary conditions. In 1912, which was noted as a low year for 
these totals, 305 head of cattle, 166 horses, and 11,200 sheep were loaded onto trains at 
Shalkar.311 Given that there appears to have been little forethought put into Shalkar serving as a 
transport hub for livestock and meat, it should perhaps not be surprising that it frequently had 
trouble with sanitation when hundreds of animals were being slaughtered there daily. However, 
the railway made this kind of density possible, and indeed necessary. 
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 It is not surprising that railways were major engines of western capitalist penetration of 
the steppe, and that they made it easier for products from the steppe to enter onto the global 
market. However, this process had arguably already been underway for millennia. The steppe 
was at the center of the Silk Road and livestock had been an important part of trade networks 
connecting the steppe long before the railroads arrived.312 What is more, even after Russian 
control of the steppe, but before the major penetration of railroads, livestock was entering into 
Russian markets at places like Orenburg which was a critical early site of livestock markets and 
export of steppe livestock to cities in European Russia.313  
Nevertheless, the railway did change the scale and scope of livestock raising on the 
steppe. However, it was not the railway alone, and this was not an instance of technological 
determinism. While the railway offered new opportunities, the haphazard nature by which at 
least 15 different local entrepreneurs set up business at Shalkar, apparently without any direction 
or planning from officials, is also an important part of this story. What is more, while officials 
were creating plans to increase the amount of livestock being raised on the steppe, and 
attempting to improve pasture, they were not the only ones who showed interest in developing a 
stronger, more specialized livestock industry on the steppe. Kazakh nomads had long been 
trading with Russians in places like Orenburg and Uralsk, even before the conquest.314 After the 
conquest, this process continued. However, as it became more and more clear that in many 
regions peasants could not survive on planted crops alone, they became important livestock 
                                                 
312 For an excellent summary of how the steppe was not just a place of transit for the Silk Road but its ecology and 
peoples were central to it see, David Christian, “Silk Roads or Steppe Roads?: The Silk Roads in World History” 
Journal of World History 11 no. 1 (Spring 2000): 1-26. 
313 For example, in 1898 self-described “livestock industrialists” were already organizing to better market and export 
their products to Moscow and St. Petersburg, see TsGARK f. 25, op.1, d. 4260, l.17 Communication from Orenburg 
businessmen to the Turgai Oblast Administration, 30 March 1898. 
314 For just one example of the role of Orenburg as an exporter of steppe produce see, “Yarmarki ikh 
yekonomicheskie znachenie” Turgaiskaia Gazeta (Orenburg) 7 February 1896. 
128 
 
producers as well. In fact, many peasants appear to have been very interested and indeed active 
in expanding livestock production, and in spite of their reputation for laziness and backwardness, 
they showed an entrepreneurial spirit that officials sometimes recognized and praised.  
For example, in Akmola one official reported that, “Currently, under the pressure of 
increasing settlement and the associated decrease in available land, peasants are trying to 
improve their farming methods.”315 He went on to indicate that such improvements included 
peasant work to create healthy pastures and reported that in many places, peasants would build 
small temporary dams in ravines just in time for spring rains. After a few days of rain they would 
release the water. He said that even in soils badly impacted by salts, if they can be watered for 5-
10 days peasants could harvest around 400 pood of hay per desiatin (10 times the 40 pood of hay 
they could harvest from unimproved steppe).316 While a sign of peasant ingenuity, this 
technology also relied in part on what makes dry environments unique. As Davis has argued, 
while they are often perceived as barren, arid regions in fact have a large amount of biomass 
“below ground” in the form of seeds, roots, and bulbs that are “invisible to the casual observer 
for the great majority of the time except following adequate rainfall events which may be years 
apart.”317 Much like nomadic Kazakhs who migrated to areas where fodder was more plentiful 
depending on the season, this peasant innovation relied on working with the environment as it 
was rather than as people imagined it to be. 
In addition to their role as livestock exporters and steppe innovators, peasant settlers also 
showed a great deal of initiative in their attempts at creating dairy cooperatives. Cooperatives 
were not unique to the steppe, nor were they particularly new. The first cooperative in Russia 
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was founded in 1866 by the nobleman Vladimir Luginin who started a savings and loan 
cooperative in Kaluga province.318 However, within a few decades cooperatives had grown to 
become the “largest voluntary movement in late Imperial Russia. In 1914, about 17,000 
institutions had a membership of some 8 to 9 million, including between one-quarter and one-
third of all peasant households.”319  
The mass character of agricultural cooperatives, and their inclusion of members that cut 
across all orders of society, meant that they represented to some, like the agronomist Alexander 
Chaianov, a democratic way forward that could offer economic justice and power to the mass of 
Russia’s population.320 However, on the steppe, the significance of dairy cooperatives in 
particular is important for a  different reason. They represented a concrete example of some 
settlers embracing the vision of agronomists and officials, and also the apparent exclusion of 
Kazakhs from this vision. 
Dairy cooperatives (named artel after the “informal associations that united producers 
and laborers on a temporary, usually seasonal basis” in sectors like hunting, trade, and crafts), 
were first tried in European Russia to “unite households into a larger whole for the joint output 
and sale of their goods.321 The first attempt at dairy cooperatives was by a nobleman Nikolai 
Vereschagin who was himself inspired by cooperative dairy creameries he encountered on a trip 
to Switzerland.322 Between 1868 and 1879 working with zemstvos, Vereschagin helped establish 
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52 dairy cooperatives in the provinces of northern Russia. These worked under a simple process 
where “peasants were invited to take out loans to buy new mechanical churns, contribute milk to 
the artel’ to be processed into cheese, and divide the proceeds from their sale in proportion to the 
milk contributed.” Only one of Verschagin’s cooperatives survived into the 1890s due to a lack 
of continued peasant interest and of trained individuals to operate the equipment.323 
While dairy cooperatives had risen and fallen in European Russia already in the 
nineteenth century, on the steppe and in Siberia, they were just beginning to catch on around 
1910. In that year, there were already five artels organized in Kostanay, each serving several 
villages and hoping to open their own small butter factory. The formation of these cooperatives 
had first been encouraged by the Resettlement Administration, but with shifts in administrative 
responsibilities they were all applying to the Department of Land (within the Ministry of State 
Domains) for a loan.324 However, these organizations were not created by peasants on their own. 
They all sought the aid of officials, who in turn looked to similar cooperatives already forming in 
Siberia for a framework of how these organizations should operate.325  
In Kostanay, the guidelines and contracts that the peasants signed onto were created from 
forms produced by officials to found butter artels. In these documents, the peasants who signed 
agreed to create a butter cooperative whose loans were secured by the property of the signatory 
participants (usually cattle). Requirements meant that any peasant with one cow could join, and 
those who joined after the cooperative was founded needed to also pay a small fee. The rights to 
the cooperative were not inheritable, and members could not sell milk outside the artel. Finally, 
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they agreed to have their milking monitored if it was suspected they were either unsanitary in 
their milking practices or if they were diluting their milk.326  
However, simply getting an official to write out a contract and have peasants sign it did 
not guarantee peasants would get a government loan. Officials also sent their own letters of 
support or caution along with the loan applications and contracts. For example, although he had 
forwarded a loan request, the oblast agronomist did not support the 1913 petition of villagers in 
Kharkhiv for a 5-year loan of 850 rubles to build an ice house and well at their butter factory. He 
said it was because the village was too small with only 36 households and 85 cows. Based on his 
experience with similar cooperatives in Siberia, he believed this was too small for the 
cooperative to succeed and that the lack of local capital made the cooperative risky. However, 
this was not a recommendation made only out of hard-nosed business sense. The official was 
concerned that if the cooperative failed, and was liquidated this would ultimately hurt the 
peasants (presumably because their cattle would be taken as collateral).327 
 In another instance, the oblast agronomist relied on the support of other agronomic 
specialists to recommend backing the loan for a butter cooperative. He supported the request of a 
5-year loan for the artel in the village of Troitsk. However, he said they should only be given 
903 rubles, not the 950 rubles they requested because loans were only supposed to be granted at 
75% and the 53 households with 150 milk cows had each contributed 17 rubles. The total cost of 
the factory in Troitsk was projected to be 1,204 rubles, with the majority of costs again going 
toward a well and ice house. The agronomist said he did not doubt the productivity and promise 
of this artel because he had received a report from the junior dairy instructor Baltkaul. Baltkaul 
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said that the location was well suited to a butter cooperative in spite of the fact that they had yet 
to produce anything, and that the butter that was produced locally was of poor quality and made 
by individual peasant households. However, there was good pasture both in the open steppe and 
in a river valley, which would provide fodder even in winter.328  
 The fact that some butter artels and not others received government aid is telling. In the 
case where the Troitsk application was supported, it was because the peasant village was large 
and already rich at the time of application. Furthermore, they benefitted from a relationship and 
access to a local technician employed by the Resettlement Administration. Therefore, the butter 
artels could not make poor peasants rich, they could only help those already well-off peasants be 
more secure. This was a similar problem that Yanni Kotsonis recognized across cooperatives, but 
especially with regard to dairy cooperatives started by Vereshchagin when he wrote, “Once 
again, the contradiction intrinsic to the cooperative movement—at least as cooperative activists 
understood it—became apparent. If the cooperative was to be egalitarian, it was unlikely to be 
economically viable, and in the extreme it could be harmful. If the cooperative was to succeed 
economically, then it would benefit only a few, well-off households.”329 Given that butter was 
big business in the steppe, this uneven distribution of resources is significant. Already by 1900 
Akmola oblast alone was exporting 900 tons of butter. By 1913, that had grown to 30,000 tons, 
and across the steppe there were 81 butter factories in operation (many of them cooperatives).330  
There is another story hiding in the butter artel story. In other another settler colonial 
context in the United States, butter cooperatives were a means of empowering white women. In 
her famous work on the Pennsylvania “butter belt” Joan Jensen showed how butter making 
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began as work that was outside the bounds of the patriarchy and capitalism. Nevertheless, 
enterprising women took up this work and made it economically viable and in doing so—
inspired in part by radical Quaker ideas—took steps towards their own liberation.331 The archival 
record is frustratingly silent on the role of women in butter making (and in general) on the 
steppe.332 We can only hazard to guess that given the dominant nature of patriarchal values in 
Russian peasant society, there was no similar process to the one Jensen described in 
Pennsylvania.  
However, recognizing the role of government loans and technical outreach to try and 
support settler butter making also points to another way to complicate Jensen’s contribution. 
While butter was a means of liberation for women in the United States, in all settler colonial 
contexts, the deeper penetration of capitalist economic relations was contingent, complicated, 
and multivalient. Butter could mean liberation for some, either women in the Mid-Atlantic 
United States, or (male) peasants who were given autonomy, respect, and authority for their 
“enterprising” attitudes. However, it also could mean subjugation for others, in Kostanay it 
probably meant further drudgery for settler women in milking and tending to dairy cattle, and the 
expansion of settler herds and pastures meant further disempowerment and dispossession for 
Kazakh nomads.   
Livestock Improvement 
 In addition to creating an environment which they believed was better than the steppe as 
it was before settlement, agronomists and officials also worked to try and “improve” the 
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livestock that was meant to live on the steppe. Much of this early work had begun by attempts 
(often through lower agricultural schools) to encourage the cross-breeding of local cattle 
varieties with pedigreed varieties imported into the steppe. However, later the work became 
much more systematic and standardized. Nevertheless, this standardization was often not as 
standard or scientific as agronomists would have hoped as other factors intervened. The goal of 
livestock improvers was simply to add “better” genes to steppe livestock; however, this work 
was complicated by things like disease, peasant desires, bureaucratic complexity, distance, and 
the animals themselves who were not always ready to submit to the whims and wishes of 
agronomists. 
 In February 1911, the Turgai Oblast Agronomic Committee met to discuss the 
improvement of livestock in the region. While there were many different approaches suggested, 
the committee settled on the “mass improvement of local cattle” by cross-breeding them with 
Kalmyk Red cattle.333 However, rather than simply import a handful of improved bulls and tell 
locals that they could and should breed their cattle with them, this project involved much more. 
This attempt also involved livestock exhibitions, local nurseries to breed pure-blooded cattle, as 
well as hiring livestock specialists, veterinarians, dairy instructors, and a program of wolf 
eradication.334 
 By 1913 the program had some tangible successes. In addition to “mating points” it had 
created a “nursery” for breeding Kalmyk cattle and pedigreed pigs. This nursery included 2 
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Kalmyk bulls, 36 Kalmyk cows, and one Yorkshire hog and 5 sows.335 These differed from 
mating points in that they were meant as places to locally raise pure-bred animals, which could 
expand the work and decrease the cost of livestock improvement. Previous to the nurseries, pure-
bred livestock had to be purchased in other regions of the empire and brought to the steppe. This 
could be done in part on train, however, many of the newer mating points were located far from 
railway lines and as such made it difficult and time consuming to bring the pure-bred animals to 
the sanctioned sites. In at least one instance, this transportation problem led to a delay of a year 
as it was considered ill-advised to bring a pure-bred Swiss bull from Troitsk where it had been 
purchased to Turgai during winter.336  
 In March 1913, the committee met again and while members were pleased with the 
results they wanted to continue and expand their work, which they recognized would require 
more money and labor. In the words of their report, livestock improvement in Turgai was, 
“rather extensive and to continue to do it will require strength, special knowledge, and a serious 
thoughtful attitude.” It would additionally require significantly more money than the roughly 
30,000 rubles that had been spent by the Department of Agriculture and local administration. 
Much of this went to the purchase of pedigreed livestock and also to technicians like the two 
dairy instructors and livestock specialist the project hired. However, continuing the work would 
also require a new commission whose responsibility was focused specifically on livestock 
improvement. In the interests of keeping the new bureaucracy small and agile it was 
recommended that it include only the oblast agronomist, the veterinary inspector, the advisor to 
the oblast administration and the senior specialist for livestock. The board also asked the 
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Department of Agriculture if they were interested in sending a representative, to which they 
never got a reply and assumed there was no interest.337  
 The center piece of this new project, however, was not the bureaucracy that oversaw 
livestock improvement work, instead it was the mating points. These were already established by 
the time the committee met in 1913. After the 1911 meeting they had organized 13 mating points 
where 29 Kalmyk bulls and 3 Swiss bulls were available for mating with local cows.338 The 
Kalmyk’s were intended to be used for cattle raised for meat and the Swiss were meant to 
improve local cattle’s dairy potential.  
 The idea of a mating point was not a new idea. In addition to earlier projects at lower 
agricultural schools it was an obvious cheap way to at least improve local breeds by getting the 
traits that agronomists believed were preferred into the bloodlines of local cattle and other 
livestock. Additionally, there was a much longer history of this kind of attempt at improving 
bloodlines focused on horses that had a much longer history in the steppe.339 However, by 1911 
in Turgai oblast and other regions, officials were organizing mating points to cheaply and 
quickly improve livestock bloodlines. By 1913, the oblast already had 16 breeding bulls and 
spent 6,000 rubles on their upkeep annually (this was beyond the cost of purchasing the 
animals).340  
 In Turgai oblast, mating points were set up in several places. As previously stated, the 
push for livestock improvement was driven in part because much of the oblast was too dry for 
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grain agriculture. However, the majority of the mating points were not established in the 
southern parts of the oblast where cattle raising was most widespread. Instead, officials and 
agronomists still focused their efforts on those regions of adequate rainfall further north. This 
was because denser settlement in these regions meant that agronomists hoped peasant settlers 
would keep fewer head of better cattle and take more attentive care of them. In the central and 
southern parts of the oblast, fodder and browse was so scarce it actually made sense for peasants 
to keep less valuable cattle or even goats and sheep that could survive on less nutritious and 
plentiful forage. Also, if some of the animals died, it was a less difficult blow economically. 
Interestingly, this was part of the rationale behind Kazakh nomadic practices where cheaper 
sheep instead of cattle were the most important animals.341  
In far northern Turgai one of the larger mating points was at the village of Fedorovka 
where there were four bulls, one Swiss and three Kalmyk, although the reports indicated that two 
of the Kalmyk bulls were not pure-bred. Apparently, however, the Swiss bull was unpopular 
with locals. The Fedorovka point also illustrates how central plans could often go awry. The 
local veterinarian, who was in charge of overseeing the point, believed the bull was only to be 
used by those cows belonging to villagers who lived in the village itself. He did not understand 
that his instructions simply meant the bull needed to remain in the village.342 Other breeding 
points also had trouble with their effectiveness. In another village, there were two Kalmyk bulls 
but none of the peasants used them, because they were interested in producing milk not meat.343  
 In spite of occasional setbacks, in the minds of agronomists, mating points were meant to 
be more than simply a place where locals could bring their cows to have them mate with pure-
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bred bulls. They also represented an opportunity to practice the kind of exacting scientific 
agriculture that they espoused. They hoped not only that this would serve as a model for local 
agriculturalists, but also they believed that such practices were essential to the health and well-
being of these important animals. Therefore, officials created rules and regulations to instruct 
those in charge of the mating points how to take care of the bulls in their care scientifically. In 
1913 the Turgai agronomic organization published its “Temporary Rules for Mating Points and 
Conditions of Their Use.” The rules focused on three main areas. First, they reaffirmed that the 
bulls were the property of the state. Second, it clarified that they were to be under the direction of 
a veterinarian, raion agronomist, or another person designated by the zootechnical committee.344 
These rules were concerned with creating clear hierarchy and lines of authority in part because in 
their rush to create mating points, officials had not always been clear in their rules. As examples 
like Federovka illustrate, there was significant variation in how the mating points were being 
administered. Like many other instances of the agricultural-scientific infrastructure on the 
steppe, while the intention was for top-down ordered and rational practices exercised by the 
appropriate authorities, distance, space, new environments, and a rapidly expanding bureaucracy 
meant that the reality did not always reflect the planned ideal. 
 However, the Temporary Rules were not only creating administrative structures, they 
also instructed workers in how to care for the bulls. Caregivers were directed to keep the bulls in 
separate accommodations indoors and were to be given liberty to walk outside in a “bright and 
warm” fenced paddock, and their bedding was to be changed every day. In addition, the bulls 
were to be kept “absolutely clean” and brushed daily.345 This focus on clean airy 
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accommodations was in keeping with a particular view of health and medicine connected to the 
zemstvo ethos of sanitation.346  
 In addition to cleanliness, the instructions were specific on feeding practices. The bulls 
were to be fed 2-3 times a day. Their diet was to consist of 15-30 funt of hay, 5-10 funt of straw 
and 2-3 funt of oats plus salt.347 These dietary instructions are notable, because at first they 
appear to be very specific and yet in fact offer the caregivers a huge amount of leeway. The 
amounts of hay and straw could be doubled. And they do not indicate exactly what caregivers 
were supposed to base their feeding judgements on. This is surprising, because in most instances 
a veterinarian or raion agronomist had many other concerns and the work of caring for the 
animals would have been left to a caregiver who might not have any scientific agricultural 
training. Feeding instructions also included specific directions for feeding extra grain during 
“strengthening periods” and rough ratios of how fodder could be replaced by pasture in summer. 
While feeding instructions were sometimes surprisingly vague, another main area of concern was 
disease. The rules were emphatic that if any bull got sick a veterinarian was to be called 
immediately, and under no circumstances was a sick bull to be allowed to mate with cows. 
Additionally, if any bulls was found to have bovine tuberculosis it was to be immediately 
euthanized, and bulls that were too fat, infertile, or injured were to be “discarded.”  
Finally, the instructions gave strict directions that bulls were only supposed to mate once, 
or at most two times a day. These mating sessions were to be conducted “by hand” (ruchnaia) 
and made on the premises or else under the supervision of the head of the mating point, or an 
appointed person.348 Once again, the shift between exacting instructions and others that involved 
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judgement are interesting given the stated desire of agronomists and officials to introduce 
“scientific” animal breeding to the steppe.349 However, most telling is the allowance for the bulls 
to be allowed off the property if they were supervised by someone designated by the station 
head. This appears to allow for a significant lack of control on the part of officials and could 
potentially put the very valuable bulls in vulnerable positions.   
 While the bulls were present across much of the steppe, and the existence of their 
offspring was meant to be a kind of advertising for the wonders of scientific breeding and 
improved livestock, officials also sought to encourage new breeding practices through other 
means like lectures, pamphlets, one on one agronomic advice, and also exhibitions. Exhibitions 
had been part of the aims of agronomists even before committees on livestock improvement were 
created. However, with the new push for improved livestock there was money dedicated to 
organizing them. In Turgai in 1913, the oblast agricultural meeting decided to hold two livestock 
exhibitions and allocated 2,000 rubles to their organization. The first would be in Aktobe in 
September and the second in Kostanay in October. The timing was meant to coincide with the 
local fall agricultural fairs.350 While it made sense from an attendance perspective to hold the 
exhibitions in conjunction with the fairs, it also illustrates how markets and capitalism were 
intertwined within the work of livestock improvement and its popularization. 
 Although the livestock exhibitions were focused on local markets, the goal of livestock 
improvement was to create a surplus that could be exported from the steppe. Just as with the 
railways and other infrastructure created to facilitate the export of meat, live animals, and hides 
from the steppe, the exhibitions were a in part a manifestation of a similar market force. The 
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importance of markets and the deeper penetration of capitalism onto the steppe also worked in 
conjunction with one of the main concerns of agronomists regarding livestock: disease.351 In 
addition to the concern shown for preventing, controlling, and eradicating disease found in the 
instructions for mating points, the spread of livestock diseases more broadly was a major concern 
of agronomic work on the steppe.  
 Veterinary work was one of the earliest types of agricultural science and agronomy on the 
steppe. Even before the most intense periods of peasant settlement, government veterinarians had 
been assigned to the region and one of their primary focuses was addressing animal disease. The 
main concerns were two diseases that were endemic to the steppe: plague and anthrax. It appears 
likely that officials were often unsure of whether or not a disease was plague, but the fears of the 
disease, perhaps driven in part by its “foreign” nature meant that officials were sometimes 
misnaming disease outbreaks of plague that were not actually plague.352 Anthrax was another 
disease that was not common in northern European Russia, but lives in the soil of the steppe. 
However, like plague, officials had some familiarity with it because they had already been 
dealing with it in the South Russian and Ukrainian Steppes.353  
The focus on epidemic diseases was in part because livestock were one of the first things 
exported from the steppe in large numbers, and in large livestock herds it could spread 
quickly.354 For example, in 1886 plague was first reported in January in Uralsk oblast. This 
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caused the Turgai Governor to send out word to all his uezd nachalniks to notify them and 
instruct them to take measures to control and stop its spread.355 In spite of these warnings, by 
February fourteen cattle had fallen ill in Kostanay. In response, the governor ordered the 
veterinarian Aktonov to travel to the area and begin to take “active measures.” While the 
outbreak was spreading in Kostanay, in Aktobe there was an even larger outbreak where 65 
animals had fallen ill. The plague spread so quickly that by June Kostanay alone had 104 cases 
and 97 animals had died. 356 
 In addition to sending veterinarians to the site of outbreaks, fairs and bazaars became 
important choke points where government veterinarians and inspectors could focus their efforts, 
and further illustrates the connection between markets and the deployment of livestock science. 
In the 1886 plague outbreak in Turgai, this was exactly the approach the governor urged 
Aktonov to take.357 As products from the steppe began to be exported further and further away, 
the intertwining of disease and markets could even take on global implications. In 1912, the 
American Consular General in Moscow wrote to the Governor General of Turgai asking for a 
report on the state of medical and veterinary care in the oblast, and specifically asked about the 
presence of plague and anthrax.358 If products were going to be exported to the United States, 
they needed to know what measures were in place to protect American consumer and supply 
chains. Therefore, in spite of the steppe’s reputation as a place of “foreign” diseases like “Asiatic 
Plague” and anthrax, through the development of global agricultural markets, it became more 
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closely bound to exactly those regions and people who were most likely to view it as a dangerous 
“other.” 
Conclusion 
 While agricultural scientists and officials had not always foreseen the potential of the 
steppe in raising livestock, and livestock products like butter, as they recognized this potential 
(and reality), they quickly sought to give their own advice and create their own structures to try 
and make the livestock economy of the steppe fit their vision. This included a need to 
exterminate animals, diseases, and nomadic lifeways, but also to attempt to stop the slide of 
peasants into a wasteful extensive exclusively livestock economy. It also involved the 
construction of administrative, scientific, and transportation infrastructure to make sure that the 
products of this economy could get to far away markets.  
 In their attempt to produce a range out of the steppe, agricultural scientists and officials 
turned to the age-old practices of extermination, legibility, and expertise that was imbued with 
not only the cultural chauvinism of settler colonialism, but also the ideology of global markets 
and an export-based economy. In this intertwining of the extermination of animals, cultures, and 
indigenous property rights, we can see how settler colonial science in the steppe was not a 
singular force or ideology. The ideas underpinning it had many strands that simultaneously 
created both the overarching ideology of settler colonialism, and also the science, markets, and 
“logic of elimination” that drove change on the steppe. The determination of stocking rates, 
based on an improper idea of a static steppe, was both changed by and was also part of what 
drove the need to exterminate wolves and groundhogs. These extermination campaigns began 
not only because of a capitalist market desire to raise the maximum number of livestock, but also 
because of their cultural reputation in folklore (in the case of wolves) and their perceived role as 
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carriers of foreign disease (in the case of groundhogs). All of these forces and ideas were acting 
both in concert and to create one another on the steppe, and as such represent a technopolitical 
structure. At the same time, all of these aspects were creating and were in service of the 
fundamental idea of domination inherent in settler colonialism. Settler science was built on the 
idea of dominating the steppe and because it viewed its science, culture, and people as superior it 
had all the justification it needed to do so. 
 In addition to the need to produce range out of the steppe, livestock and grazing science 
was also preoccupied with notions of bloodline and pedigree. There is an eerie parallel to the 
views of officials who believed nomadic lifeways were dying out due to their unsuitability to the 
environment of the modern world and the hopes of agricultural scientists in “improving” the 
bloodlines of livestock. While this was a goal of nearly all Western agricultural science at the 
time (and today), the context in which this work was undertaken makes the two ideas seem to 
mutually reassure one another. Certainly, the Kazakh Steppe was not the site of a full-blown 
eugenicist project, but the similarities of impulse are a reminder that the same scientific evidence 
and certainty that animal breeding provides can also be turned to darker ends. Even more 
significant, the connection between these two impulses also helps reveal that an argument for a 
“better” human is just as subjective as a “better” cow. Officials were attempting to create ideal 
livestock for their vision of the steppe as they wanted it to become, not as it was. In fact, given 
the very small percentage of cattle in most Kazakh herds before settlement and their inability to 
travel great distances, there is a good argument that for the most part all cattle are unsuitable for 
the steppe. However, the ideology of settler colonialism and of scientific certainty obscured this 




CHAPTER FIVE: PLANTING THE STEPPE 
 In the summer of 1913, the Main Directorate for Land Use and Cultivation (GUZiZ) 
wrote to the government agronomist for Turgai Oblast, I. M. Pakhov requesting that he forward 
the names and stories of exemplary peasant farmers who would be eligible for prizes to mark the 
300th anniversary of the reign of the Romanov dynasty. To Pakhov, it was clear that the most 
successful farmer was Timofei Panchenko, a peasant in the village of Novo-Nikolaevskii in 
Aktobe uezd. Panchenko farmed nearly 100 desiatin of land, practiced crop rotation, grew 
several acres of alfalfa for high quality forage, all of which improved his farm’s soil. In fact, 
probably to all officials, he seemed the most obvious candidate for an award given to those who 
advanced the local agricultural economy, and served as a positive role model to other farmers.  
However, Pakhov agreed Panchenko was an unsuitable candidate for the award in spite of 
his diversified farming operation. Instead, the award went to two peasants with extensive 
orchards; however, given the climate, the orchards were not economically viable and probably 
lost their owners money. The problem was that Panchenko, in spite of utilizing the most up-to-
date practices, had a significant shortcoming, he did not own most of the land that he farmed, and 
his farm was so large, it required hired laborers and thus did not fit the definition of a family 
farm for the award.359 This contradiction, where the person that scientists believed was the “best” 
farmer in the region was kept from receiving an award, hints at some of the contradictions at 
work in the project of growing grain on the steppe. While on the one hand, officials wanted to 
bring to bear the most up to date machinery and scientifically proven growing practices, on the 
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other hand, the realities of the steppe environment, imperial bureaucracy, and global agricultural 
markets made such a program much more difficult to achieve than previously hoped.  
Instead of a simple story of foreign, supposedly superior, knowledge and technology 
transforming the steppe, the changes in grain farming, while great, were much more contingent 
on other factors like climate, the realities of distance, and regional and local knowledge of non-
Russian cultivators than on the dreams of officials. Although infrastructure like grain silos, 
windmills, and government-funded agricultural machinery dealerships were part of the 
significant changes to the steppe, they themselves were not simple determinants of the course of 
history. Instead of acting on their own, these technologies interacted with a diverse array of 
human, bureaucratic, and non-human factors to create a steppe that was at once more developed, 
sedentary, and Russian than it had been half a century before, and yet these changes also had 
many so-called primitive, mobile, and non-Russian characteristics.  
It is difficult to overstate the challenge of intensively growing grain in much of the steppe 
region. What is more, the area is vast, and its size means a great deal of environmental diversity. 
While in general rainfall declines further to the south, some areas that typically received enough 
rainfall sometimes did not. Therefore, it is difficult to predict and ensure a steady harvest of 
grain. One of the best examples of this is the wildly varying harvests experienced during the 
Virgin Lands Campaign under Khrushchev. For the first six years of the campaign, harvests 
alternated between bumper crops during good years of plentiful rainfall, and bad harvests during 
years of near drought.360 Given this variability, imperial era agronomists, officials, and peasant 
settlers were all in a constant search for grains and ways of cultivating grains that would ensure a 
good steady harvest. Though they never found the silver bullet, the search for the perfect grain 
                                                 




reveals much about the methods and mindset of scientists, officials, and peasants. Additionally, 
much like the aid and subsidies (beyond land) given to peasants to help them with livestock, the 
agronomic aid supplied by imperial authorities was not equally distributed between Kazakhs and 
settlers. Instead, true to the settler colonial nature of this undertaking, the vast majority of 
agronomic aid to support growing crops like wheat went to peasant settlers, and Kazakhs were 
often kept out of aid programs, especially those created and overseen by the Resettlement 
Administration. 
Perfecting Grain 
 One of the main hopes for officials was that they could find a wheat variety already 
suitable for the arid steppe environment. While many believed there might be more than one for 
different subregions, their hope that they might find a grain that was suitable for particular 
environments was compelling. It is easy to understand this impulse. If there were such a plant, it 
would be a cheap and easily dispersible technology that could quickly ensure a steady supply of 
wheat from the steppe. In other settler colonies at the same time, numerous plant explorers were 
engaged in a similar project.361 However, rather than sending plant explorers elsewhere, imperial 
officials across the Russian Empire spent most of their energy attempting to collect plants 
(especially wheat varieties) within the empire itself. This is not surprising since the Russian 
Empire was one of the main destinations of plant explorers, especially those in search of 
wheat.362 
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 While imperial agronomists had been collecting and cataloging wheat and plant samples 
for a long time, their work on the Kazakh steppe coincided with the period of most intense 
settlement after the 1904 Revolution.363 By 1910, as the agronomic apparatus had spread across 
the steppe and as the best settlement areas were being filled up forcing peasants onto more and 
more marginal land, the administrative apparatus became involved in attempts to identify and 
disseminate the most appropriate grains for the steppe with a special focus on wheat. This work 
was undertaken under the direction of the head agronomist of the Governor Generalship of the 
Steppe, V. Khristianovich. Khristianovich’s work consisted both of collecting information on 
local wheat varieties and hosting an exhibition in Omsk in 1911.364  At the exhibition, it was 
hoped that people could see the new or unfamiliar varieties and be encouraged to begin planting 
these seeds themselves.   
 By focusing on the varieties of wheat that were currently being grown in the region, 
Khristianovich was touching on recent scientific debates around the question of acclimatization 
or adaptation. The difference between the two was that acclimatizers believed plants and animals 
could, within their lifetimes, adapt to a new environment, while those who argued for adaptation, 
believed the changes that allowed plants to live in new places was gradual and occurred through 
generational evolution.365 Those who believed in acclimatization combined a mix of faith in 
science and also an internalized notion of settler colonialism. In fact, in several settler colonies, 
most notably the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, the desire to remake the 
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environment in the image of the home country led to the founding of acclimatization societies 
that actively sponsored the introduction of species (mostly birds and mammals) from Europe into 
the settler colony.366 The fact that these new species were meant to replace indigenous species is 
a further reminder of the ways settler colonial assumptions were reflected in broader scientific 
and political undertakings.  
 Similar to the acclimatization societies, officials like Khristianovich hoped that if they 
could collect a sample of wheat from areas nearby the steppe that grew well in the steppe region, 
they could encourage its broader planting and it would replace not only other varieties of wheat, 
but also pastoral nomadism. This search for plants to match the environment was part of why 
Khristianovich wanted correspondents to send him information not only on the plant itself but on 
cultivation, climate, yields, and resistance to diseases. 367 The fact remained, however, that most 
settlers came from steppe regions that were not totally dissimilar from the Kazakh steppe such as 
South Russia and Ukraine, so in fact, many of their varieties were already theoretically well-
suited to the steppe.368  
Nevertheless, officials were still interested in mapping what imports or varieties from 
Central Asia might be best suited to particular regions. Luckily for Khristianovich, there were 
several sources he could draw on to give him local reports on wheat varieties that grew well in 
their particular climate. In addition to local officials, he could also rely on the network of lower 
agricultural schools that were still in operation, and even some experimental fields that werre 
recently established on the steppe. Khristianovich contacted all of these and requested they send 
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him samples of wheat grown in the area and information on yields and where it was believed 
they came from. 
 For example, in 1910 Kristianovich was very interested in a rumor that a wheat variety 
grew in the area near the Kopal Lower Agricultural School, and asked school officials to send 
them a sample.369 In response to a similar request, the Pavlodar lower agricultural school 
reported that in the region around the school there were six different varieties of wheat being 
grown: argautka, belo turk, chernokoloska, sinuska, kitaika, almatinska, krasnen’skaia, bezuska, 
and kitaiskaia yaritska.370 Given the names, it appears that several of the varieties may have 
come from China (sinuska, kitaika, and kitaiskaia yaritska), and Turk may have come from 
Turkey.371 Most interesting is almatinska which appears to at one point have come from the 
Semirechye region, perhaps from nearby modern day Almaty. However, none of these varieties 
had to originate in these places, names of varieties might simply indicate where the seed came 
from most recently. For example, a sample that Khristianovich sent to the Bureau of Applied 
Botany in St. Petersburg that locals had called kitaika (Chinese) was identified in fact as a 
variety of English wheat: Triticum Turgidum Var. Lustanicum.372  
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 In addition to agricultural schools, Khristianovich also relied on local officials like uezd 
nachalniks to gather samples and information.373 One uezd Nachalnik in Kokshetau sent a very 
rare sample of wheat that locals called Polskii (Polish); although, according to Khristianovich 
this variety had nothing to do with Poland. Instead, Khristianovich claimed that it “obviously” 
came from China and had been exported to Germany, although he did not explain how he knew 
this. He did say that peasants in Tomsk oblast in Siberia and Semipalatinsk had gotten the wheat 
from Siberia, however, apparently, they already knew about the original source because they 
called it “Chinese rye.”374 Nevertheless, as the example of English wheat indicates, 
Khristianovich could himself sometimes be wrong about the source of wheat, and his lack of 
explanation as to how he knew this information makes it conjecture at best. 
 In spite of the mystery of the provenance of wheat varieties, what is most interesting 
about Khristianovich’s search is that large numbers of the varieties were not clearly known and 
almost none appear to have been varieties created by professional breeders. This was in spite of 
the fact that since the 1880s, agronomists on the steppe had been concerned with the need for 
“improved” varieties. However, their notion of improved varieties did not mean they had to be 
developed by professional breeders or agronomists. This is another point at which the very 
scientific nature and idea of scientists interested in controlling and perfecting nature fails to hold 
up. What seemed to be driving steppe agronomists the most with regard to wheat was a hope that 
somewhere there existed an appropriate variety, and their work seemed to focus on gathering 
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varieties rather than crossing and breeding new varieties to perfect them. This was a difference 
between steppe agronomy and other agronomists in other regions.375 
 Furthermore, steppe agronomists were happy to recognize the work of some seed 
improvers. Although, those who they were willing to acknowledge in seed propagation work 
illustrates their blind spots. For example, no effort was made to explain which person or village 
in China developed the kitaiskii variety. However, there was significant interest in the 
propagators of other wheat varieties. For example, among Khristianovich’s records there was a 
newspaper clipping from an unknown newspaper that described “Afrikanki” or “African” wheat. 
According to the article, a village priest named Poletaem in Atbasar uezd sowed the wheat 
extensively. Scientists later identified the variety as Africanum Congum. However, the priest had 
gotten the wheat in Samara in European Russia in 1891. He then took the wheat to the Kazakh 
Steppe when he moved there and disseminated the wheat. According to reports, it did very well 
in poor harvest years.376 While it is unclear how popular the variety was, it was popular enough 
that at the exhibition in Omsk in the summer of 1911, the American plant explorer Frank Meyer 
had heard about it, and was able to get a sample of it which was later tested in the “semiarid 
Northwest” of the United States.377 
 While Khristianovich was busy working on an exhibition of wheat varieties grown in the 
Steppe Governor-Generalship, the Bureau of Applied Botany, which was part of the Scientific 
Committee of the GUZiZ in St. Petersburg, was continuing its work on an empire-wide scale. 
However, the Bureau itself recognized in 1911 that it was behind in this work and saw the 
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unfamiliarity with individual plants as a “significant gap” in agronomic knowledge, which the 
United States had already been working on for nine years. Therefore, the Bureau proposed to 
collect samples and test the varieties, but because they were behind, they would focus on “local” 
wheat varieties as Khristianovich had done.378 
 Already by 1912, the Bureau could report some success, having collected 2,800 varieties 
of wheat, 2,500 of barley, and 700 of oats in addition to pasture plants. While this was an 
empire-wide project, the Baltic and steppe regions were their main focus.379 Although the Bureau 
could rely on local sources like those Khristianovich had, they also had funds to send their own 
plant explorer to Central Asia to gather varieties. Therefore, they sent Vasily Benzin to focus 
especially on the region of Semirechye. However, although this region of Central Asia had 
significant irrigated settled agriculture, in addition to nomadic pastoralism, he was directed to 
focus on non-irrigated wheat varieties. This was because the committee was interested in 
transplanting these varieties to other regions of the steppe without irrigation such as those further 
to the north. What is more, he was not only directed to collect the plants, but also asked to 
compile a list of those individuals who grew them, ostensibly so they could be contacted for 
advice on cultivation and also for future seed collection.380 
 Benzin sent many varieties back to the Bureau, but one of the most interesting varieties 
was a sample of 20 pood of rye that he acquired from the area near modern day Taraz in 
Southern Kazakhstan. The sample came from a Kazakh farmer named Bazaraev who cultivated it 
with a “Kazakh” plow and irrigated the crop three times. While this was outside of Benzin’s 
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directions that he should seek out solely un-irrigated crops, the low rainfall in Taraz meant that 
irrigating it only three times made it very drought tolerant. Furthermore, the nature of this 
sample, one that came from a Kazakh farmer, is interesting especially since Kazakhs were not 
supposed to be farmers in the eyes of many imperial officials. In spite of its source, it made it 
into the collection of the empire-wide Bureau of Applied Botany for dissemination to other 
regions as a unique and valuable variety. This clearly muddies the picture of what imperial 
agronomy looked like in practice. While the center was collecting and naming, it was also 
constantly collecting and appropriating local knowledge without much sign of worry that this 
might undermine their authority. In fact, the question probably never occurred to officials at the 
Bureau. To complicate this picture further, the actual source of the rye remains unclear. Bazaraev 
reportedly simply purchased the seed from a local peasant at the market.381 Was this peasant 
Russian? Or perhaps a Sart, Uzbek, or Tatar? To Bazaraev it did not matter. And in fact, given 
the complicated histories of seed genetics, what would a family tree of this variety even look 
like? As Courtney Fullilove has shown, the stories of where seeds come from is always very 
muddy and rarely gives us answers with certainty.382  
 The story of this variety of rye is also interesting for what it tells us about the global 
exchange of agronomic expertise in the early twentieth century. While the search for grains that 
could survive in arid environments was driven in part by the needs of agronomists and settlers on 
the Kazakh steppe, the story of Benzin’s work does not end there. After the expedition, he 
published his study on rye in arid regions, and after the revolution in 1917 emigrated first to 
Czechoslovakia where he continued his academic work on grains, and later to the United States. 
                                                 
381 RGIA f. 382, op.9, d. 161, l. 40 Communication from the Aulieatinsk Uezd Nachalnik to the Bureau of Applied 
Botany, 30 September, 1912.  
382 Courtney Fullilove, The Profit of the Earth: The Global Seeds of American Agriculture (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2017). 
155 
 
In the US, he became involved in a “Slavic American Colonization Company” in Texas and 
Mexico.383 Later, due to his close association with the Orthodox Church in the United States, he 
worked on similar plant research in Alaska as well.384 Benzin, though a minor, and rather 
unknown figure, stands out as an agronomist who worked on at least three different settler 
colonial projects across several decades.  
However, his work as a person on advancing settler colonialism in Central Asia, Siberia, 
Texas, Alaska, and Mexico was not his only contribution. Viewed this way could mask the way 
settler colonialism in this period operated as a global system that was simultaneously about 
competition between settler colonial states, while it also encouraged scientific cooperation across 
imperial boundaries. Benzin’s work was translated into a number of different languages, and his 
command of several different languages allowed him to work in a variety of these contexts and 
pull resources and knowledge from many different sources. He not only worked on arid ryes, he 
also wrote a doctoral dissertation on corn, and conducted research on cold weather plants in 
Alaska. This reminds us of the need to rethink the geographic scope of settler colonial science; 
while the settler colonies were in competition with one another for economic dominance, they 
easily relied on one another and shared knowledge across porous borders. What is more, the 
knowledge need not stop at classically recognized settler colonies. For example, the Bureau who 
employed Benzin was in contact with the Russian Consul in Damascus asking for wheat varieties 
that grew in that arid region. While Ottoman Syria was not exactly a settler colony, it certainly 
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was part of an imperial project and is a reminder of the frequent overlap between settler colonial 
and colonial science.385 
 In addition to professional scientists like Benzin, the Bureau was not above including 
work by local improvers. In fact, they gladly accepted from Khristianovich a sample of wheat 
grown in Omsk by the “self-taught acclimatizer” Pavel Komisarov.386 The record is scant on who 
local improvers like Komisarov were, or how prevalent they were, but they clearly played a role 
in the imaginations of steppe agronomists and officials who were frequently in search of 
“advanced” segments of the peasantry. In spite of the fact that agronomists and scientists were 
happy to accept the improvement work of non-specialists, they still believed that the peasants 
needed to be shown what to do. This was in part the reasoning behind Khristianovich’s 
exhibition in 1911. However, it was not enough to expect the peasants to come to them, officials 
quickly began to recognize they would need to go to the people. Therefore, the Resettlement 
Administration began working on hiring agronomic instructors to showcase seed varieties 
especially in experimental plantings. These were the plantings discussed in chapter two, which 
were often undertaken by local farmers or cooperatives under the guidance and support of 
agronomist technicians to showcase new crops and seed varieties in an effort to both test and 
popularize new crops.387 
 However, planting the correct seed was not enough. One of the main frustrations of 
agronomists was that they believed peasants were planting “dirty” seed that included too much 
weed seed which could adversely affect yields. Therefore, in order to make sure that peasants 
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were replanting clean seed, they need to clean it first to get weed seeds out. This task was 
laborious if done by hand, but could be greatly speeded up by utilizing seed cleaning 
machines.388 However, this machinery was expensive, and the vast distances of the steppe made 
it unlikely peasants would transport their seed to sites to have it cleaned. In order to address this 
difficulty officials began to push for the creation of mobile seed cleaning units. Officials hoped 
peasants would join together in an artel (a cooperative association that typically used shared 
equipment) and rent the machinery to have their seed cleaned. The goal was that through 
cooperative financing, peasants could pull their resources and have better yields. Agronomists 
tried to inform peasants about this process, achieving varying degrees of success.389  
While yields were foremost in the minds of most agronomists, they also recognized that 
if the steppe was going to export seed and grain, most large markets would require cleaned seed 
that was pure and ready for milling or could fetch the price of high grade seed on the market. 
However, this was not simply a case of a further penetration of “foreign” forces like markets 
onto the steppe. In fact, the mobile nature of the seed cleaning equipment is an important aspect, 
which illustrates how even external equipment and ideas interacted with the steppe environment 
in ways that were reminiscent of nomadic adaptation. The seed cleaners were mobile and 
community-based just like Kazakh nomads who nomadized in small community-based groups 
who shared pastures while still maintaining their own household economies. Both these 
adaptations grew out of the vast distances on the steppe, although the nomads were adapting to 
take advantage of distance (as a means of resiliency in a variable steppe environment), while the 
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mobile seed cleaning artels were created to accommodate the problem of getting seed to central 
seed-cleaning stations.   
Disaster Markets 
 In spite of the best efforts of officials and peasants to use clean seeds and appropriate 
varieties, growing grain—especially wheat—on the steppe was often a challenging undertaking 
that frequently resulted in failure. For example, in 1900-1901 much of the steppe experienced 
famine-like conditions that caused many settlers to join the nearly 22 percent of settlers who 
gave up and returned to European Russia. Similarly, 1911 was a year of very low wheat 
yields.390   
 In the face of the challenging grain-growing environment, the imperial government was 
frequently giving food and seed aid to settlers whose crops had failed, or who simply came to the 
steppe so destitute they could not afford seed, especially after poor harvests. Supplying large 
amounts of seed aid on top of the large-scale agronomic aid and land given to settlers, was just 
one of the many subsidies given to the settler colonial project that allowed settler colonial 
agriculture to compete with Kazakh nomadism or agriculture on an uneven playing field. 
 However, the seed aid was meant to be only a loan, and because there were large 
numbers of peasants who did not repay their loans, officials tried to address this problem. 
Nevertheless, even those settlers who intended to repay their loans had a difficult time. This was 
because repayment in cash was a moving target. Grain and flour prices fluctuated wildly on the 
steppe. This was because in dryland farming, harvests could fluctuate greatly. This would 
become manifest much later during the Virgin Lands Campaign in the 1950s and 60s where 
bumper crops were followed by abysmal yields. These kinds of yearly fluctuations, rather than 
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being abnormal, should in fact be seen as a normal and healthy part of arid ecosystems as Diana 
Davis has shown.391 In spite of this environmental reality, it was a constant challenge to steppe 
settlement, and also was part of why long range pastoral nomadism is so well suited to the 
environment, because nomads could move to areas with more rainfall and pasture. 
 Due to the possibility of large swings in the grain harvest from year to year, the price of 
grain and flour on the steppe also changed dramatically. When a poor harvest was widespread 
grain prices rose significantly, and peasants often could not afford the price of flour or seed. 
However, if the next harvest was good across the region, this could drive down the price of grain, 
and make it difficult or impossible for peasants to repay their loans in spite of having an 
excellent harvest. This situation appears to have occurred when the poor harvest in 1901 was 
followed by a better harvest in 1902.392 However, large climatic swings were not the only thing 
that affected the price of grain and flour on the steppe, people could too. Many Kazakhs tended 
to purchase flour or grain twice a year, once after selling cattle and wool at summer markets, and 
again in the fall after selling leather, suet, and other animal products.393 
 Given the unstable price of grain, officials began in the early twentieth century to adopt a 
new practice. In 1900-1901, both Siberia and the Kazakh steppe saw poor harvests. Therefore, 
officials set up a system by which settlers in those regions could repay their seed and feed loans 
in kind at a rate of two pood per one pood of grain they had received. Later, similar programs 
offered in-kind repayment at a rate of five to one.394 Not all officials were happy with this 
program, some thought that the peasants were taking advantage of the government and did not 
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need the grain as much as they said they did.395 In spite of the opposition of some, several 
regions in Siberia and the steppe developed large-scale programs of grain aid and in-kind 
repayment of loans. While this solved the problem of peasant debt defaults, it led to another 
challenge: what to do with all the grain the peasants paid to the government. This was not a small 
challenge, because peasants were paying back five times as much grain as they borrowed. For 
example, in 1911 peasants in Turgai and Akmola oblasts took out over two million pood of grain 
each, while in Tomsk in Siberia peasants took out loans of nearly 8.5 million pood of grain.396 
Therefore, the government needed some way of collecting and storing at least 10 million pood of 
grain for Turgai and Akmola.  
In Akmola, where the program of in-kind loan repayments had been already underway, 
officials had constructed 22 grain storage silos to hold repayment grain by 1904.397 However, not 
everyone believed that the storage facilities should be government projects. Glinka, a noted 
colonial enthusiast supported a project to encourage private grain storage facilities.398 Although 
he noted generally that such facilities were essential to supporting colonization, he did not 
believe they should be government projects.399 It was difficult to find private support for the 
granaries, and so it appears it was left to the government to construct them. Nevertheless, many 
officials began to see there were other values to the granaries than simply addressing peasant 
crop failure. Krivoshein, as head of the GUZiZ noted that beyond simply helping starving 
peasants, the grain storage facilities could help stabilize grain prices, putting an end to the wild 
                                                 
395 RGIA f. 391, op. 3, d. 1052, l. 12 Zhurnal yekstrennago zasedaniia Atbasar uezd s’ezda krestianskikh 
nachalnikov, 29 March 1908.  
396 RGIA f. 391, op. 4, d. 1823, l. 2.  
397 RGIA f. 391, op. 4, d. 1823, l. 2 obo.  
398 Glinka famously picked up where his predecessor Krivoshein left off, defending colonization and the 
Resettlement Administration which both headed. Ian W. Campbell, Knowledge and the Ends of Empire, 149. 
399 RGIA f. 391, op. 3, d. 1052, l. 7.  
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fluctuations that were endemic to dryland farming on the steppe.400 While recognizing that these 
facilities were especially important in isolated places, they could have effects beyond their 
immediate locales. What is more, he believed that grain storage silos should also be built in other 
regions far from the immediate steppe settlement provinces or Siberia. He specifically mentioned 
how building grain silos in Ufa, Orenburg, and Samara could stabilize prices and limit hunger.401 
However, in order to have these effects, the government silos needed to become a large-
scale infrastructure project. The silos were large, complex structures that required significant 
material be transported to the steppe along with engineering expertise. For example, the most 
common type of silos were built to hold 50,000 pood of grain, and cost on average a little less 
than 10,000 rubles each.402 While the several dozen large silos constructed in the first decade of 
the project appear to have been sufficient at stabilizing prices and staving off the worst starvation 
on the steppe, by 1915, they came to be seen as insufficient. This was due in part to the stresses 
put on the agricultural economy by the First World War. For example, in Akmola oblast, the 
roughly 40 government granaries were insufficient to hold the 2.7 million pood of grain officials 
expected and hoped for in the upcoming harvest. Therefore, they began to allocate funds to 
construct another 23 massive silos that would hold nearly 400,000 pood of grain. This was not 
meant to hold all the grain; however, it would store about half the grain in government granaries 
and allow the rest to either be stored locally or shipped off to markets across the empire.403  
 The role of government grain silos at first appears to be a simple infrastructure project to 
address widespread crop failure in a region of variable harvests. However, closer inspection 
                                                 
400 At this time, Krivoshein was serving as head of the GUZiZ where he used his position to push a pro-colonization 
agenda, Campbell, Knowledge and the Ends of Empire, 161. 
401 RGIA f. 391, op. 4, d. 1823, l. 4 Letter from Krivoshein to the Ministry of Finance 20 June 1912.  
402 RGIA f. 391, op. 6, d. 146, l. 1 O postroike 23-kh zernokhranilisch v Akmolinskoi oblasti 1916.  
403 Ibid., l. 1.  
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reveals that while they were created to address a problem that was driven by the intersection of 
the particularities of the steppe climate and a government intent on supporting settlers with a mix 
of subsidy and credit, eventually they developed into something more complex. They came to 
serve as a kind of market stabilizer, that grew out of a strictly humanitarian concern for peasant 
health. Finally, during wartime, they were turned into important aspects of national defense that 
stabilized food supplies at a critical time for the empire. Therefore, they were neither purely 
humanitarian, nor were they solely a project of capitalist expansion, instead they represent in a 
material form the ways the environment, settler colonialism, the logic of capitalist expansion, 
and engineering intersected on the environment to create new physical, economic, and social 
structures on the steppe. 
Infrastructure 
 Although grain silos were a vital part of grain-producing infrastructure on the steppe, 
they were not the only important aid to settlers that both facilitated and protected the growing of 
grain on the steppe. While silos stored grain, there were other steps along the process of getting 
the grain to markets or turning the grain into wheat. None of these were crucial components of a 
nomadic economy, because the primary export product—livestock—was itself mobile. While 
this seems like a rather obvious observation, it is important, because it was not only that 
increased settlement was hurting nomadism and causing its decline. In addition, the large 
infrastructure projects were also giving further subsidies both to encourage more settlement, and 
to encourage particular types of agriculture that centered grain produced on sedentary farms.  
 While there was no railway line directly through the most important areas of peasant 
settlement, the railway did provide an important connection that allowed both more peasant 
settlement and also the export of agricultural products. Furthermore, the recognition of the 
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importance of the railways in this regard was not lost on officials.404 Therefore, officials 
frequently discussed and began preparatory work on expanding railways on the steppe. While 
their broadest visions were not achieved until the Soviet period, the continuity in thinking about 
railways across the 1917 divide is another important aspect of agricultural change on the 
steppe.405  
One railway that was built in part was a line cutting across the northern part of Kostanay 
oblast in some of the most fertile grain producing regions. At least one study was completed on 
the project, and while it was a difficult engineering project, it seems likely that had not the First 
World War and the revolutions of 1917 intervened, it would probably have been completed in its 
totality.406 While there were significant business interests who wanted a railway linking this 
fertile region to the rest of the empire, it was not driven solely by an economic concern. For 
example, a government report on the proposed line focused on the “great colonization value” of 
the line. It went on to mention how this would not only allow for the export of agricultural 
products, but also develop new agricultural lands and increase the “sown area.” However, this 
was meant not only to help settlers, it was clear to officials that the railway and expanded 
settlement were inimical to nomadism, which they believed was a good thing. They hoped this 
expansion of agriculture would “facilitate the transition to agriculture of the semi-nomaidc mass 
of the Kazakhs” while also opening up new regions for peasant settlement.407  
                                                 
404 In fact, Steven Marks illustrated that officials were well aware of the impact railway projects, like the Trans-
Siberian Railway could, and did, have on settlement and economic development. Steven G. Marks, The Road to 
Power: The Trans-Siberian Railway and the Colonization of Asian Russia, 1850-1917 (New York: I.B. Taurus, 
1991). 
405 On the railway in Kazakhstan during the Soviet period see, Payne, Stalin’s Railroad. 
406 “Istoriia kostanaiskoi zheleznoi dorogi” (article written by staff at the Kostanay Oblast History Museum) 
http://kostanay1879.ru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=416&Itemid=51. 
407 RGIA f. 391, op. 4, d. 2888, l. 13 Materialy o sooruzhenii dorogii Kustanai-Troitskii, 1909-1912. 
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What is notable about this is not only that officials were clear in the connection between 
railways, settlement, and the decrease in nomadism. It is also important that officials already 
recognized that most Kazakhs in these regions were already only “semi-nomadic.” This was 
because these regions had seen large amounts of peasant settlement which made full nomadism 
almost impossible. However, in spite of this state of transition for Kazakhs, officials were not 
interested in funneling the huge amount of resources to Kazakhs that they had been giving to 
peasant settlers. Furthermore, the railroad was one more expensive and difficult project that 
simultaneously harmed nomads and helped sedentary agriculturalists. While officials frequently 
mentioned how they believed the Kazakhs would “naturally” change to sedentary agriculture, the 
projects and money that facilitated sedentary grain agriculture and actively hurt nomadism, made 
this change far from natural in any real sense of the word. Additionally, while less significant, 
and less well documented, there were also smaller projects to attempt to build roads in the steppe 
regions as well, which had similar effects on trade and settlement.408 
 In addition to railways and silos, sedentary peasant agriculture also received a further 
subsidy in the form of discounted agricultural machinery that officials helped bring to the steppe. 
Officials quickly realized that distances on the steppe and lack of capital by peasants created the 
same challenges with most agricultural equipment that they did for seed cleaning machinery 
discussed earlier. While on the one hand, the Russian peasantry was notorious for its “low-level” 
of agricultural machinery usage, it is unclear if this was even the primary difficulty peasants 
faced. In fact, David Moon has argued that peasants did adapt new machinery when it suited 
them, and in fact grew more grain for the market when markets were within easy reach.409 
                                                 
408 TsGARK f. 29, op.1, d. 301. Delo o postroike kolodtsev i dorozhnikh sooruzhenii v Turgiaskoi Ural’skom 
raione.  
409 David Moon, “Russia’s Rural Economy, 1800-1930” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 1 
no. 4 (Fall 2000), 688. 
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Furthermore, the reality was that most peasant settlers to the Kazakh steppe came from regions 
with some of the highest usages of agricultural machinery and market- oriented farming in South 
Russia and Ukraine. However, getting to the actual sites of settlement, was a long and arduous 
journey that typically—especially in later years of settlement—ended in settlement far from 
railway lines or even roads. The reality is that hauling large amounts of heavy agricultural 
equipment first on the train to an embarkation point and then via wagon across the steppe was 
simply impractical. Therefore, to address what officials and many peasants felt was a low-level 
of agricultural machinery usage across the steppe, officials created a system of government-run 
agricultural machinery dealers (called skladi) across the steppe settlement regions. 
 In spite of the original impulse being driven in part by government initiative, the creation 
of skladi did not begin entirely as a top-down government-driven project. The first skladi were 
created in 1896 in Siberia as private businesses. Although these skladi were private enterprises, 
they were financed at least in part by a fund of 10,000 rubles created by the Siberian Railway 
Committee who was at the time still in charge of settlement. However, these enterprises quickly 
ran into difficulties as they had little oversight on how the money was spent, and the directors of 
the companies often had little commercial experience.410 
 By 1898, as government officials became more involved in oversight and in providing 
capital to the skladi, they began to expand into the steppe oblasts. Already by that year, there 
were 15 in Omsk and Petropavlsk oblasts each with 19,050 and 14,862 rubles in sales 
respectively.411 One year later, in 1899, all the skladi under the Resettlement Administration, 
which included those in Siberia and the steppe oblasts, were selling 275,975 rubles worth of 
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agricultural machinery. Of which, only 30% was sold on credit.412 This incredibly rapid growth 
is an indication not only of how quickly settlement was expanding, it also shows how popular 
agricultural equipment was, and how much settlers wanted it, and could afford it.  
However, the growth in the value of machinery sold only tells part of the story. The 
machinery for sale was not exactly the most modern and advanced agricultural machinery 
available. Instead, peasant settlers for the most part purchased relatively simple and common 
agricultural machinery (an indication perhaps that they simply did not want to transport 
machinery a vast distance). For example, the most popular piece of equipment were sickles, 
which the skladi sold 8,901 of in the first 8 months of 1899. However, even more interesting is 
that the skladi sold nearly twice as many (8,197) wooden plows (saban) as regular plows (4,121) 
in the same period. This reliance on rather simple and popular agricultural equipment meant the 
skladi were not exactly kulturtrager of new technologies into the steppe. Even the most 
“advanced” equipment that was widely sold, such as hay rakes, indicate that peasant farmers 
were not all exactly adapting to the kind of European-style intensive agriculture from the 
imagination of officials.413 Instead, it indicates that settlers were interested in cutting more hay 
and practicing a more extensive animal-husbandry system of agriculture. What is more, rather 
than them each purchasing their own hay-making equipment, officials on the steppe mentioned 
that it was quite common for farmers to share or rent hay-making equipment which was still not 
exactly reflecting the archetype of the independent Stolypin peasant.414 
Not only were more advanced types of machinery less popular among peasants than 
might be hoped by some officials, even if peasants had wanted it, it was still difficult for them to 
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find that machinery to purchase. While agricultural machinery was an important sector in 
industrialization in other settler colonies like the US, Russia failed to copy that model.415 In fact, 
even as late at 1908, officials in the Resettlement Administration were still struggling with 
getting more advanced machinery into the warehouses. While, officials across the government 
hoped that the government warehouses would purchase Russian-built machinery, they 
complained that there was not enough quality machinery being produced. In fact, the government 
warehouses were stocked largely with machinery from the United States, especially Deering.416 
 While they hoped the government could eventually get licenses to build particular 
Deering machinery in Russia, this was a longer term project and the Resettlement Administration 
instead spent nearly one million rubles on importing machines from the United States, which was 
half of what they had asked for funds to purchase. However, the types of machines the 
Resettlement Administration wanted to purchase were not all types of machinery, instead it was 
largely machines to facilitate hay-making. In 1907, they requested funds to purchase over 6,000 
mowers, nearly 7,000 horse rakes, 3,348 “mowing harvesters” and about 5,000 reapers in 
addition to 100,000 rubles worth of spare parts and 16,000 pood of twine. The rest of the 
proposal was filled out with 120 disk harrows and nine portable steam engines.417 Once again, 
while officials and agricultural scientists were interested in developing wheat on the steppe, the 
realities of the steppe made it more suitable to animal husbandry, and fodder production, which 
were tacitly admitted in the purchase orders by the Resettlement Administration for machines 
from the United States.  
                                                 
415 This led to a deep involvement of agricultural machinery companies from Europe and the US being involved in 
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 In addition to plowing, harvesting, cleaning seed, and finally transporting grain there was 
another stage in the process of making wheat into a usable commodity: milling. Although wheat 
is more stable as a seed during transport and storage, selling flour was also big business on the 
steppe. What is more, it required the harnessing of the steppe’s natural environment. Rather than 
steam or water-powered milling, most grain on the steppe was processed into flour in windmills. 
These structures therefore served several roles at once. In addition to serving simply as places to 
make flour, they also had symbolic significance, as they represented to many settlers the 
establishment of civilization on the steppe and came to hold particular cultural meaning. 
However, they also represent a hybrid of technical machinery and the environment since they 
relied on the copious amount of wind on the steppe to operate. The symbolism of windmills is 
still strong, especially among ethnic Russians in places like Kostanay. When the city of Kostanay 
decided on a new city crest after the fall of the USSR, it was decided to include a windmill in the 
center of the emblem.418   
 Therefore, like most other infrastructure on the steppe, windmills were not simply 
technical machinery, or symbolic architecture divorced form the cultural milieu of settler 
colonialism; they were also government subsidized projects. Early in the process of heavy 
peasant settlement, just after the turn of the twentieth century, officials became involved in 
helping to construct windmills. A closer inspection of what made some projects worthwhile in 
the eyes of officials tells an important story of contingency and ideology. 
 In March of 1901, peasants from the village of Pavlogradskoe in Omsk uezd petitioned 
the Akmola oblast government for a loan to build a mill. The mill was to be overseen by the 
peasant Teslenko, and he convinced the oblast government to support the petition to the 
                                                 
418 “Kostanai” https://silkadv.com/ru/node/501. 
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Governor Generalship of the Steppe which had final say on the loan.419 In this instance it is 
unclear how he was able to convince them to support it, however, other records show the types 
of things that mattered to officials when supporting loans for windmills. 
 For example, in 1902, the Steppe General Governorship supported the petition of the 
peasant Vasily Vologdin of the village of Uspenskii in Petropavlsk uezd. They stated the reason 
for this was that Volodin had “technical knowledge” of how to operate the mill and offered as 
proof the fact that he had already built several parts of the future windmill out of wood. 
However, Vologdin was not only a handicraftsman. He appears to have been able to make the 
calculation and argument that constructing the mill would allow villagers to have their grain 
milled for 1 kopek less per pood than if they had to take them to other villages. With this mix of 
technical and economic knowledge, officials supported the petition of 300 rubles to build the 
mill.420 Another petition seems to have indicated technical knowledge might have been involved 
because the petitioner for a mill in the village of Kreshenko, Petropavlsk uezd had the last name 
Melnikov (Miller). Nevertheless, the loan still needed to be guaranteed by the village 
obshestvo.421 
 While technical knowledge and the promise of profit were important considerations in 
distributing loans, there were further considerations as well. For example, in the village of 
Taganskoe in Akmola Oblast, Alexis Buravlev requested a 200 ruble loan to construct a mill. In 
this instance, he appears to have appealed to the fact that the distance the peasants had to 
transport the grain was too great (40 versts each way). However, the petition recognized that the 
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village (who would guarantee the loan) and Buravlev had significant debt (5,100 rubles and 100 
rubles respectively).  
Perhaps because the village was guaranteeing the loan the price of grinding grain was to 
be set at 5 kopeks per pood and the mill had to serve any village resident first. This indicates that 
there was a kind of communal attitude in the village, in spite of the fact that the villagers had 
significant debt which indicates they probably had significant market ties. However, this kind of 
civic attitude was not limited to the “small-mindedness” of the peasant commune. It could just as 
easily exist in the person of peasant settlers establishing a new community. While some villages 
were transplanted colonies to the steppe, most were new creations, and given that the petition 
mentioned the Buravlev himself was from the Cossack lands in Troitsk volost, in the steppe of 
European Russia, it seems unlikely that this settlement was a colony. Instead, over the years of 
living together, they had created a new community that saw the need for a mill. That this 
community had a mix of communal and market ideologies operating side by side was probably 
not unique, and in fact indicates the ease at which peasant settlers were constructing a new settler 
colonial society and values.422 
Conclusion 
 While wheat figured prominently in the schemes of agronomists and the dreams of 
peasants, it was a difficult crop to grow in the arid steppe environment. However, in spite of the 
challenges, officials, scientists, and peasants did not give up on the crop. This was in part due to 
the nature of dryland farming, where if one could wait out the bad years, in the good years, the 
payoff could be quite large. Therefore, like so many truisms in the steppe, it cannot be fully said 
that wheat is unsuitable for the steppe. Rather, given the realities of agriculture in Kazakhstan for 
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more than the past century, and Kazakhstan’s current status as a global leader in wheat 
production, it is perhaps better to say that growing wheat in the steppe is very difficult. It was 
perhaps its variability that made it so difficult for peasants and agronomists to simply give up on 
wheat and try other crops in spite of the frequent frustrations and setbacks. 
 In their quest to grow wheat on the steppe, agricultural scientists and officials illustrated 
the variety of ways that the agrotechnical infrastructure that supported wheat growing was 
constructed from a variety of sources and knowledge bases. For example, wheat varieties relied 
not only on centuries of peasant knowledge from China, the steppe, or Europe, but also the 
growing agronomic bureaucracy both on the steppe and in St. Petersburg. It also included plant 
explorers like Vasily Benzin who operated in a global world of agricultural science and whose 
work advanced not only settlement in the steppe, but also in other settler colonies like the United 
States. Therefore, the quest for improved wheat varieties does not neatly fit into any box of top-
down or center-periphery much less a notion of a modernizing scientific bureaucracy intent on 
implementing a totally alien way of agriculture, even if that reflects part of the story. 
 Similarly, while the massive infrastructure project of grain silos that held millions of tons 
of wheat on the steppe can and should in some ways be understood as a technological and 
engineering feat that required significant state power and technical know-how, that is not the 
entire story. As this chapter illustrated, the history of the silos was instead rooted in a 
humanitarian effort to feed starving peasant settlers. However, even this humanitarian impulse 
was in pursuit of the aim of indigenous displacement. Nevertheless, what began as a relief effort 
grew into a loan repayment project that was required due to the unique character of the steppe 
environment that caused massive fluctuations in grain yields and therefore prices. In short, no 
single aspect be it humanitarian, economic, technological, or even environmental fully 
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encapsulated the forces behind the construction of large grain storage infrastructure that 
eventually served a wartime aim during the First World War. 
 In keeping with the theme of myriad forces shaping the agricultural science and 
agronomic infrastructure on the steppe, the physical infrastructures like railways, roads, machine 
skladi, and windmills also defy definition or analysis through a single lens like the environment, 
technology, or economics. While this dissertation develops this theme across several aspects of 
scientific agriculture in the settler colonial project, it is perhaps most important in the discussion 
of wheat. Wheat was at the center of the vision for settlement both by officials and peasants. 
Wheat was also at the center of the eventual realization of these earlier imperial dreams when 
Khrushchev’s Virgin Lands Campaign plowed and planted the steppe on a scale previously 
unimaginable.  
However, the scale was in part unimaginable because of the scale of plowing that the 
Virgin Lands Campaign required, which was carried out via Machine Tractor Stations (MTC). 
These stations were meant to supply several communal or state farms with the machine 
equipment they required rather than having each communal farm have its own equipment. In a 
foreshadowing of the massive tractor infrastructure that would later be required some officials 
were already calling for something like it in 1911. That year, the head of resettlement in Akmola 
pointed out in a report that the main thing limiting the expansion of arable onto “virgin” steppe 
was that plowing was too expensive and required specialized equipment to do it on a large scale. 
Therefore, he proposed the creation of state-owned tractor centers that could be rented out to 
plow new lands. It does not appear this proposal went anywhere, but it does show how closely 
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the thinking of officials behind the Virgin Lands Campaign and the earlier imperial settler 
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CHAPTER SIX: THE ‘PLAGUE’ OF ARIDITY 
 
In 1897, the hydraulic engineer Kravtsev was sent by the Governor-General of the Steppe 
on an inspection tour of water resources in the resettlement districts in Omsk and Petropavlovsk 
uezds of Akmola oblast. During the course of his tour, he found a wide array of water sources 
being used by settlers to sustain themselves and their farms on the steppe. On the tour, he 
identified several villages that he believed had sufficient water and others whose water supply 
was insecure. The sources he found included lakes, streams, and wells whose water quality 
ranged from perfectly fresh to somewhat salty. It also included several wells that were so salty 
they were unsuitable even for livestock. In addition to a vast spectrum of quality, the artificial 
water sources he inspected were also constructed by an array of builders.  
In the village of Krasnoyarsk, water was supplied by a nearby lake called Kuday-Kuduk 
which provided water only during the spring until June. This was in addition to the village’s four 
wells. One well had been built by the government and was 65 feet deep and held 18 feet of 
water. A second government well was nearly 70 feet deep with 44 feet of water. The village was 
also the site of an earlier Kazakh-built well which was 35 feet deep and held just under 4 feet of 
water, as well as a peasant-constructed well of the same depth which only held one foot of water. 
This peasant-built well not only had the least water, it was the only well described as salty 
instead of fresh. Nevertheless, Krasnoyarsk was lucky in that it was considered to be secure in its 
water supply.424  
This collection of natural water sources and infrastructure that was constructed by 
Kazakhs, peasant settlers, and government officials reflects some of the various structures and 
                                                 
424Rossiskii Gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv, [Russian State Historical Archive] hereafter referred to as RGIA. 
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actors who created the hydrotechnical infrastructure on the Kazakh steppe in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. It also reflects the assortment of actors and structures that were 
typical for the first stage of post-1881 steppe settlement that saw an imperial bureaucracy 
scrambling to deal with the flood of (sometimes unwelcome) settlers to the region.425 In many 
ways this early mix of wells and water sources could serve as a juxtaposition to later hydrologic 
infrastructure on the steppe. Following the expansion and creation of the Resettlement 
Administration, an office that Willard Sunderland said approached a “colonial ministry,” 
hydrologic and hydrotechnical work took on a different form that was more strategic, 
widespread, and centralized.426 However, this centralized expansion narrative, while in some 
ways true, also needs to be complicated. In addition to later phases of hydrotechnical work that 
relied on this earlier assortment of infrastructures, the ideas and even the actors driving this 
change were not always working towards the same ends or driven by the same impulses.    
 Water was probably the most significant challenge to the settler colonial project on the 
steppe. Aridity placed real limits on the work and hopes of agronomists, bureaucrats, and settlers 
alike. According to Diana K. Davis, “land with an annual average rainfall below 400 mm is 
usually considered marginal for agriculture.”427 This meant that much of the steppe was at best, 
“marginal” and many areas were unsuitable. However, that did not mean that settlement on the 
steppe stopped at an imaginary border between those areas that received more than 400mm of 
rainfall and those that received less.428 If rainfall were the sole determining factor in settlement, 
                                                 
425 Although not focused on the Kazakh steppe, a good description of what he called the state of “correct 
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427 Davis, The Arid Lands, 8. 
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1897). For background on Powell’s life and useful insight into framing his thought see: Wallace Stegner, Beyond the 
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peasant settlement would have stopped much further north than it did.429 Therefore, while it 
never achieved all the wildest dreams of agronomists and officials, and was in many ways 
another example of colonial failure, imperial hydrotechnology on the Kazakh steppe had real 
material affects on settlement. The projects of well-building, dam and pond construction, dry 
farming techniques, and other water managing technologies developed, popularized, or used by 
agronomists and settlers were in fact crucial to expanding and maintaining peasant settlement 
deep into the Kazakh steppe.  
Furthermore, while officials and scientists in the hydrologic bureaucracy often did not 
agree on the specifics of how to do their work, they did agree in its fundamental goal: expanding 
peasant settlement. Therefore, the entirety of these hydrotechnical technologies were based upon 
a settler colonial ethos both in its assumptions and in its implementation, in its aims and in its 
effect. These technologies, imbued with settler colonial values were also a crucial component of 
the new “[hybrid] of technical systems and political practices that produce new forms of power 
and agency” which is according to Edwards and Hecht the very definition of technopolitics.430 
What is more, as this chapter illustrates, the search and securing of water often led directly to the 
dispossession of Kazakhs from their land. Peasant villages required water for settlement. The 
fact that Kazakhs also relied on water, meant that invariably areas with useable water in them 
were already being used by the Kazakhs. However, officials privileged the rights of settlers over 
the Kazakhs, and conflict over water was just as crucial as conflicts over land in the steppe. 
                                                 
been problematic from an environmental and policy point of view see, Gregory L. Simon, “The 100 th Meridian, 
Ecological Boundaries and the Problem of Reificiation” Society and Natural Resources 24 no. 1 (2010): 95-101. 
429 Sarah Cameron pointed to an outer limit of 8 inches (203 mm) of annual rainfall as the furthest extent of peasant 
settlement during the imperial period, which is far south of the “marginal” line for agriculture, Sarah Cameron, 
‘“People Arrive but the Land Does Not Move.”   
430 Edwards and Hecht, “History and the Technopolitics of Identity”, 619. 
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Given the imperial government’s interest in peasant settlement, it should come as little surprise 
that in these conflicts, they usually sided with peasant settlers against the Kazakhs. 
  However, in spite of their role in creating new forms of power, the story of these 
technologies was not an entirely triumphalist or hegemonic narrative. First, the infrastructures 
were not created as top-down technologies imposed on the steppe by scientists and engineers. 
Instead, the reality was that these technologies relied on peasant and indigenous knowledge, and 
in some instances were simply modifications of peasant or Kazakh engineering. Secondly, any 
success in increasing access to water for peasants overlooks the fact that peasant settlement was 
inimical to the preservation and well-being of Kazakh nomadic society. Finally, the creation and 
installation of new water technologies on the steppe was not driven entirely by rational scientific 
observation and decisions based on efficiency. In addition to the underlying assumption that 
peasant settlement and sedentary agriculture on the steppe was a positive development, the actual 
creation of hydrotechnical infrastructure on the steppe was much more contested than might be 
assumed. While there was a huge government bureaucracy and tomes of scientific knowledge 
produced in Russia and Europe as well as surveys and expeditions into the steppe, the decisions 
of when, where, and how to construct hydrotechnical infrastructure were in fact messy 
undertakings. These projects also included many actors sometimes acting in concert, and at other 
times acting at cross ends, and often with diverse motivating factors behind their involvement. 
Peasant Roots of Hydrotechnical Infrastructure on the Steppe 
 Like other agricultural knowledge created, popularized, and instituted on the steppe by 
agronomists and agricultural scientists in the employ of the empire, hydrotechnical infrastructure 
is another example of how this knowledge was not simply a story of the transference of scientific 
knowledge from European Russia to the steppe. Instead, it was created on the steppe itself and 
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had a variety of sources and influences. One of the most significant examples of this knowledge 
that was created on the steppe were called snezhniki or what I term “snow wells.” 
  In 1899, Ia. Nestorov, writing in the newspaper Kirgizskaia Stepnaia Gazeta described 
the transformation that a new technology had brought to the steppe around the city of 
Semipalatinsk, a region which is quite dry, receiving on average just 275 mm of precipitation 
each year.431 He described how just a few years earlier, the region was an uninhabited wasteland 
and was now a thriving community writing: 
The Belagachevsky steppe, about which I spoke above, was uninhabited, herds of Kazakh 
and Cossack horses only grazed in the winter, and in summer, the Cossacks and 
merchants of the city of Semipalatinsk gathered around their small settlement in the pines 
like pathetic rabbits. And now? The entire steppe with a radius of 80 versts is built up 
with the estates of Cossacks, merchants, and Kazakhs. Everywhere you look there are 
mounds of bread, merchant country houses, and herds of cattle grazing. From this 
fruitless land, Semipalatinsk exports via the Irtysh river to Tyumen, Yekaterinaburg, and 
even to Kostroma and beyond 1.5 million [pood?] of grain every year, with enough still 
left over for local consumption.432 
 
What had caused this transformation of an entire area from a desert around a small settlement to 
a prosperous farming community? Surprisingly, the technology that in Nesterov’s eyes had 
revolutionized this harsh environment was quite simple. It could be built from materials at hand, 
and was so easy even children could be involved in its construction. What is more, it had been 
invented locally in Semipalatinsk oblast. Nesterov credited the change around Semipalatinsk to 
snezhniki which is usually translated as “snow fields.” However, naturally occurring snow fields  
most commonly describe snow that continues to exist at lower elevations in the warmer months 
(usually below the tree line). These “fields” eventually forms a kind of mini glacier that help 
                                                 
431 Pogodaiklimat.ru “Klimat Semipalatinska.” 
https://web.archive.org/web/20161125144250/http://www.pogodaiklimat.ru/climate/36177.htm 




feed alpine streams. Nesterov’s snow fields were intentional constructions that usually included a 
man-made well or pond.433 Hence my use of the term “snow well.”  
 Nesterov’s article described in detail how residents across the steppe who lived in places 
with too little water could build their own snezhniki. The most important aspect to consider 
before construction was soil and to be sure there was a thick layer of clay soil under the snow 
well, if the soil was too sandy, it would melt and simply drain away. Site selection was also 
important because it needed to be constructed far away from any trees or structures that could 
inhibit the snow from drifting. This was because the snezhniki worked based on the idea of snow 
blowing in from the side, not from falling directly on the site. Once a location was selected, the 
turf needed to be removed and then a tall wattle fence was constructed down wind from the 
direction snow usually blew in order to capture and artificially drift the snow. Then once the 
builder believed there would be no more snow that season (usually sometime in March), they 
should cover it with a layer of hay. Later in the spring when the snows began to melt, an even 
thicker layer of hay should be added to the top and sides to insulate the mound. A small pond or 
even a well could then be constructed beside the snow well and, if properly constructed and if 
enough snow fell, it would give water for the entire summer.434 
 The simplicity of the device struck many as an answer to settling the steppe in places 
where there was neither drinkable surface water nor shallow groundwater that could be easily 
reached with a well. However, it was not only the simplicity of the technology that appealed to 
agronomists and officials They also believed in its effectiveness because in addition to its 
transformational power that Nesterov wrote about on the Bel-Agach Steppe, it was also invented 
                                                 
433 M. Martinelli, “Some Hydrologic Aspects of Alpine Snowfields under Summer Conditions” Journal of 
Geophysical Research 64 no. 4 (April 1959): 451-455; Nel Caine, “Snowpack Influences on Geomorphic Processes 
in Green Lakes Valley, Colorado Front Range” The Geographical Journal 161 (March 1995): 55.  
434 Ia. Nesterov, “Kak mozhno dobyvat vodu.” 
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on the steppe itself. According to Nesterov and the Kirgizskaia Stepnaia Gazeta, the first snow 
well was constructed by a Cossack Ivan Iakovlevich Shestakov from the village of Belokamenka 
in Semipalatinsk oblast. Shestakov reportedly noticed how some snow drifts lasted until mid-
May. As an experiment, in one of his fields he constructed a semi-circular windbreak 10 sazhen 
long (about 70 feet). This created a snow field of around 100 sazhen square (700 square feet) 
with a depth of 4 arshin (28 feet). He then covered the snow with straw and poked holes in it to 
allow the sun to melt the snow in spots and allow access to fresh water. After the first year, they 
made some adjustments. Most notably, on site where the snow field was constructed, Shestakov 
dug a wooden-lined pit to pool melted water with an outlet to allow the melted snow to flow into 
a well. Writers like Nesterov encouraged building these across the steppe, and the Steppe 
Governor-Generalship even published a booklet to assist all residents who were not “lazy” to 
construct their own snezhniki and encourage their neighbors to do so as well.435 
 
(Figure 5.1 Snezhniki with well and pond illustrated and described.)436 
 
                                                 
435 1899 “Kak dobavyt vodu v bezvodnoi stepi?” Kirgizskaia Stepnaia Gazeta (Omsk) November 28. 
436 Kirgizskaia Stepnaia Gazeta (Omsk) 3 November 1896. 
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 Although snezhniki were simple and seemingly useful almost anywhere on the steppe, it 
took fifty years after Shestakov’s first attempt for agronomists and popularizers to begin to 
disseminate it. However, what is more interesting is that directions and news stories about the 
snow wells in Kirgizskaia Stepnaia Gazeta were written in both Russian and Kazakh. The 
pamphlet published by the Governor-Generalship was also available in both languages. 
However, just like the lower agricultural schools that were begun sometimes exclusively for 
Kazakh children, this type of agronomic outreach was only targeted at Kazakhs for a short period 
of time. Beginning in 1902, the newspaper that popularized snezhniki which was one of the main 
publications for agricultural (and general news) on the steppe ceased dual-language publication. 
What is more, it changed its name and took on a more explicitly agricultural focus calling itself 
Sel’skokhoziastvennyi Listok (Agricultural Paper).437 This change was another way in which 
around the turn of the twentieth century, Kazakhs were overlooked with increasing frequency as 
potential farmers in spite of the fact that it was well known that they were turning more and more 
to farming as pure nomadism became increasingly untenable.438  
 Although they began to limit the population targeted with agronomic information like 
snow wells, the promise of snezhniki was such that officials saw them as a solution to the 
problem of aridity in areas of the steppe beyond Semipalatinsk. For example, in Akmola oblast 
already in 1902, before the massive influx of agronomists and money that came with the post-
Stolypin Resettlement Administration, snow wells were an important part of hydrotechnical 
work overseen and funded by the oblast administration. In fact, beyond forest work, the only 
                                                 
437 Although the editors announced that the newspaper was still for “all categories” of steppe residents including 
“peasants, settlers, Cossacks, and Kazakhs” the fact that it would later cease publication in Kazakh makes this claim 
suspect. Sel’skokhoziastvennyi Listok (Omsk) 7 April 1902. 
438 For discussion of how Kazakh animal husbandry was changed by increasing settlement see, Virginia Martin, Law 
and Custom in the Steppe, 74-83. See also, Turgaiskaia Stepnaia Gazeta (Orenburg), “Posev ozinmy kirgizami” 29 
January 1895 and “Probnyi umolit’ khlebov v Turgaiskom uezde” 17 September 1895. 
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public works completed under oblast initiatives addressed water shortages. In addition to 
dredging and deepening 13 lakes and building 19 new wells, these initiative also put around 500 
men to work constructing 24 snezhniki that would cover an area of over 15,000 sq. sazhen.439  
 This work continued and in 1903, the Akmola Oblast Engineer Pekovskii was assigned to 
conduct a survey of all hydrotechnical infrastructure. His report focused heavily on snow wells, 
and he believed they were an effective and efficient way to secure water in the region, especially 
as the best lands were largely occupied by settlers already by this early date. Pekovskii made a 
distinction between different types of snezhniki. Those modeled on Shestakov’s he called, “Bel-
Agach snezhniki.” In so doing, Pekovskii also wrote Shestakov out of his role in creating the 
wells. In fact, outside of the newspaper accounts there are almost no references to the Shestakov 
having invented the snezhniki.  
The other kind of snezhniki Pekovskki described appear to refer to simpler attempts to 
keep snow directly on the fields by constructing dikes out of snow. It seems that Pekovskii  
intended for these works to be constructed directly on the fields that peasants planned to plant the 
following spring. These structures could capture snow and allow it to melt directly into the soil 
where it lay. This would not have worked in sandier soils in places like the Bel-Agach Steppe, 
but in some regions of Akmola where the soil was less sandy and had more organic matter it 
could be effective.440  
                                                 
439 “Obshestvennyia raboty v Akmolinskoi oblasti” Sel’skokhoziastvennyi listok (Omsk), 5 May 1902. In this and in 
other cases, it is not always clear if these snezhniki included a well, or they simply referred to any attempt at 
controlling the drifting of snow that farmers sometimes tried to trap directly on their fields. 15,000 sq. sazhen  
divided by 24 snezhniki comes out to an average of about 1.5 acres of snow per snezhniki, which indicates that in 
this instance there was probably a well or pond attached. 
440 While dryland farming is a controversial topic, most proponents now agree that leaving crop stubble in the field 
can help retain snow and thereby increase moisture in the soil which is the critical component of successful dryland 
farming systems in cold areas with snow. See, Colorado State University Extension R.L. Croissant, et.al., “Dryland 
Cropping Systems” Fact Sheet 0.516 (December 2014). https://extension.colostate.edu/docs/pubs/crops/00516.pdf It 
also appears that Mennonite farmers may have already had a similar idea by utilizing furrows to capture snow over 
the winter on fields where they practiced “black fallow.” Moon, The Plough That Broke the Steppes, 263. 
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Pekovskii reported that already in 1901 there were orders for the construction of Bel-
Agach snezhniki and snow dikes, however, work had still not begun, on the projects in the fall of 
1902 and only started in January 1903. By this time, the snow was apparently too deep and the 
peasant horses in the area were not strong enough to move the snow in order to construct the 
snow dikes. In still other places, it was blown away or fell in too thin a layer to be of 
significance, which also made the construction of dikes impossible. Nevertheless, Pekovskii felt 
this method was significant because, unlike Bel-Agach snezhniki, it did not require wood which 
was in short supply in many places on the steppe.441 He only reported on one successful instance 
of snow dikes, which he found constructed in Supolevskii village in Kokshetau uezd. This 
project consisted of a hollow near the village that was open at one end to the wind which caused 
it to fill with deep snow. In this instance, Pekovskii focused on how he believed the effect of the 
dikes was similar to a forest where the snow was deepest at the forest edge. He went on to say 
that he hoped this would encourage further afforestation efforts in the region and bemoaned the 
fact that so little was being done to plant trees.442 Interestingly, most advice about creating snow 
fields emphasized the need to construct them far away from forests and how they were most 
effective on the open steppe, and Pekovskii’s afforestation dreams would potentially interfere 
with this.443 
 In spite of a general lack of wood in many parts of the steppe, in the more northern 
reaches of Akmola like Omsk uezd, wood was widely available, and construction of snezhniki 
                                                 
441 RGIA f. 391 op.2, d. 699, l.105, “Report from Akmola Oblast Engineer Pekovskii to the Military Governor of 
Akmola oblast N.I. Sannikov” 1 June 1902. 
442 RGIA f. 391, op.2, d. 699, l. 106. 
443 Afforestation had a strong grip on the colonial mind, however, most scientists agree that planting trees where 
they do not naturally grow see, Joseph W. Veldman, et.al., “Tyranny of Trees in Grassy Biomes,” Science 347, no. 
6221 (2015): 484-484. On the allure and folly of afforestation in the Russian Empire see: David Moon, “Planting 
Trees in Unsuitable Places: Steppe Forestry in the Russian Empire, 1696-1850” in Eurasian Environments: Nature 
and Ecology in Imperial Russian and Soviet History, ed. Nicholas Breyfogle (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 2018), 23-42. 
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was made possible because wattle fences did not require large trees or wood of high quality. 
However, it did require time to build the fences. In Omsk, under the auspices of the oblast 
administration, a large work project had been organized to encourage peasants to construct 
sections of wooden fences in their own homes during the winter months (it is unclear if this work 
was paid or not). Pekovskii was enthusiastic about this project both because it was work that 
women and children could assist in, and because he felt it allowed for each family as an 
individual unit to make as many fences as they needed if they had the work ethic and put them 
on their own fields.444 While this predated the Stolypin reforms to encourage the development of 
a peasant yeomanry to overcome the control of the peasant commune, these ideas were clearly in 
circulation much more broadly even before they came into practice. 
 Pekovskii was most enthusiastic about the fence making he observed in the villages in 
Kokshetau uezd. Villagers there had constructed a 2.5 arshin high and 22.5 arshin long fence. 
He went on to make significant calculations about the size and depth of the snow field this would 
create and cited the work of the famed agronomist P.A. Kostychev in Petersburg oblast.445 
However, he then seemed to contradict himself when he pointed out that this did not actually 
matter. Pekovskii wrote, “Of course, these numbers are not so important in themselves. It is 
important to show and make peasants aware of this work, which can help make it possible by 
means of the mass of blowing snow to fight the only enemy of the Akmola settler: droughts.”446 
What was important in the end was that peasants could see it work themselves, and even those 
                                                 
444 RGIA f. 391, op.2, d. 699, l. 105.  
445 Interestingly Kostychev was himself of peasant stock in spite of becoming one of the most famous soil scientists 
in Russia: Bol’shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, s.v. “Kostychev, Pavel Andreevich,” Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, 
1978. 
446 RGIA f. 391, op.3, d. 699, l. 105 obo. 
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neighbors who did not construct fences could see the advantages because the snow would 
remain.  
  Pekovskii spent much of the rest of his report discussing things that at first appear only 
tangentially related to snezhniki—peasant work ethics. That is, he saw peasant industriousness 
(or the lack of it) as interacting with this new technology in a significant way. It may seem odd 
that an engineer reporting on “hydrotechnical infrastructure” would spend so much time 
discussing human aspects of a particular technology. However, in the context of the late Russian 
Empire, many fields were involved in approaching questions of development from a holistic and 
human perspective. The most famous example of this approach of technical experts trying to 
solve problems related to Russia’s “backwardness” is what Nancy Frieden called, “zemstvo 
medicine.”447 These doctors relied on their scientific expertise to both treat disease as well as the 
underlying social problems causing the disease.448 Perhaps the best description of zemstvo 
medicine is John P. Davis’s, who wrote, “Zemstvo medicine stressed causation between science 
and the laws of nature, sociological phenomena and public and private human actions that aided 
in the discovery of these laws.”449 There were also other professions with a similar “zemstvo 
ethos” like teachers and agronomists.450 However, the Governor-Generalship of the Steppe like 
the rest of Russian Central Asia had no zemstvos and was instead under direct military rule. 
Nevertheless, a similar kind of concern and recognition that a singular focus on solving a 
                                                 
447 Zemstvo were local councils established in European Russia as part of the “Great Reforms” that included the 
liberation of the serfs in 1861. For an overview of zemstvo and their work see, Terence Emmons and Wayne S. 
Vucinich, The Zemstvo in Russia: An Experiment in Local Self-Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982).  
448 Frieden, Russian Physicians in the Era of Reform and Revolution, 15-18. 
449 John P. Davis, Russia in the Time of Cholera: Disease under Romanovs and Soviets (London: I.B. Taurus, 2018), 
28. See also Susan Gross Solomon, “The Expert and the State in Russian Public Health: Continuities and Changes 
Across the Revolutionary Divide” in The History of Public Health and the Modern State, Dorothy Porter ed. 
(Atlanta: Rodopi, 1994), 183-223.  
450 On zemstvo teachers see Scott Seregny, Russian Teachers and Peasant Revolution: The Politics of Education in 
1905 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989) on agronomists, Gerasimov, Modernism and Public Reform. 
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technical problem separate from human and social questions was at play among technical 
professionals in the steppe as well.  
 Something similar to a “zemstvo” ethos can be found in what Pekovskii wrote in his 
report to the governor, 
There is a widespread opinion that low harvests of settler is because of his insufficient 
energy, which in turn is explained by his low material inventory [tools] and his negative 
personal qualities of laziness, ineptitude, unwillingness to work the land, and even his 
unwillingness to increase the amount of plowed land within the limits that he has. This 
opinion is wrong. The government has done and does much to put the settler on his feet, 
and the settler does not use this aid. In order to judge his energy, it is enough to trace the 
growth of plowed land among the divided familial units of settler families found in the 
Akmola Oblast Reviews.451 
 
Pekovskii was curious about the idea that settlement had encouraged settlers to become 
the yeomanry of Stolypin’s imagination, and his hopeful comments that the peasants were 
increasing the amount of sown land indicates his support for those peasants he considered to be 
industrious. In fact, Pekovskii was rather sympathetic and supportive of most peasant settlers, 
and while he did not mention (or perhaps even know) that the Bel-Agach wells had been 
invented by a simple Cossack farmer, he appeared ready to give credit to the peasants for their 
industriousness in building fences for snow fields. What is more, he argued that, if peasants and 
officials could begin to more skillfully retain snow on the fields it would “not be difficult” to 
prove that snezhniki could greatly improve the material welfare of settlers, a fact recognized by 
the peasants themselves.452 In a clear indication of his role as a scientist with a “zemstvo ethic” 
he even pointed out that that there was simply not enough water in the area by citing the famed 
                                                 
451 RGIA f. 391, op.2, d.699, l. 106 obo. 
452 RGIA f. 391, op.2, d. 699, l. 106 obo. 
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agricultural scientist Herman Hellriegal who showed that one pood of wheat required 575 pood 
of water, and noted that Akmola rarely got that much rain.453 
 Pekovskii’s feelings towards the peasants, and how deeply his opinions as an engineer 
affected how he saw and understood these technologies is reflective of the complicated 
relationship many officials and agronomists had with the peasants. He certainly hoped they 
would do more and work harder, but he also did not entirely blame them for their fate. 
Nevertheless, he also had a rather patronizing attitude toward them and implied that peasant 
logic was simple, and all they needed was to see senzhniki in action and they would adopt the 
technology. A further layer of the complexities of the relationship between scientists and 
peasants is evidenced in the supposed inventor of snezhniki, the Cossack Shestakov. He was at 
first lauded but eventually written out of the story, but his role reflects other peasant technologies 
like anti-locust hopper dozers that were also often peasant engineered and then appropriated by 
scientists and officials discussed in the next chapter.  
Kazakh Hydraulic Engineering 
While in many places, snezhniki were offered up as solutions to the challenge of aridity, 
and eventually became part of the cannon of hydrologic technology, peasants were not the only 
ones who contributed to the base of knowledge. Kazakhs also played an important role. In spite 
of serving as scouts and local sources about the location of surface and ground water, they still 
occupied an ambiguous status in the eyes of agronomists and officials. This was in part, because 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries they were undergoing massive societal changes in 
how they raised food. This included a significant shift towards more sedentary forms of 
agriculture that included the widespread shift to haymaking as discussed in chapter 4 of this 
                                                 
453 RGIA f. 391, op.2, d. 699, l. 108-110. Hellriegel was most famous for proving that legumes can “fix” nitrogen 
from the air and thereby improve soil fertility.  
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dissertation. This meant that agronomists and officials were constantly referring to them as 
“nomads” even though many of them—especially in areas with the most dense peasant 
settlement—were at least harvesting crops, which was common knowledge. 
 However, Kazakhs were not only cutting some fodder in the meadows of river valleys. At 
least one group of Kazakhs had responded to encroaching settlement by undertaking significant 
irrigated sedentary agriculture in an area that was not typically associated with such agriculture. 
Regions to the South and East of the steppe in Semirechye or southern Semipalatinsk (like 
Zaisan) were often recognized as having some Kazakh irrigated agriculture.454 However, already 
in the early nineteenth century Kazakhs in the Karaturgai region of southern Turgai oblast were 
undertaking rather significant irrigation works. Closer examination of the story of the creation 
and use of these works, and of Russian responses to them, offers useful insight into how Kazakh 
knowledge was created, perceived, and even potentially utilized as part of the steppe settler 
colonial project. It also reveals a double standard with regard to how officials supported Kazakh 
sedentary agriculture versus their response and support of peasant settlers.  
 In the spring of 1882 violence broke out between Kazakhs from Sarykopinskii volost and 
the relatives of Gaimurat Turkebayev over access to several lakes in Karaturgai volost including 
a large lake called “Sulekty.” Disputes between different groups of Kazakhs, especially over 
access to water or pasture was nothing unique since nomads require access to water and pasture 
to support their herds. The sizes of these herds could fluctuate and sometimes resources that had 
previously belonged to one group no longer sufficed.455 Additionally, complex and sometimes 
shifting kinship networks meant that deciding who a particular lake or pasture belonged to was 
                                                 
454 For example the irrigated fields at the Zaisan Kazakh Agricultural School discussed in Chapter 1. 
455 For discussion of how environmental developments could cause fluxuation in herd size see: Ian W. Campbell, 
“’The Scourge of Stock Raising,” 60-74. 
189 
 
not always simple. This provided no end of headaches for Russian officials trying to keep order 
on the Steppe sometimes with only a light handle on Kazakh customary law.456 However, what 
made this conflict which killed two people unique was that it was not between two groups of 
nomads, but one group of nomads and another group that could be understood as “sedentary.” 
 What is more, word of the conflict very easily might never have made it into the records 
of the Russian imperial administration were it not for the issue of water which was the cause of 
this conflict. In 1901, the Turgai uezd nachalnik reported to the oblast administration what was 
in his eyes a rather strange situation, Kazakhs were farming grain via irrigated land who were 
now seeking government aid to maintain their irrigation infrastructure. According to the report 
sometime at the beginning of the nineteenth century, while the Kazakhs were “in a semi-wild 
state” a group of them who the official said were of the “Kaz’” branch , under their leader 
Zharylgat Shirlishev began to sow grain near their winter pastures on the banks of the river 
Turgai and its tributary the Kabirgi.457 These early plantings were apparently undertaken because 
Shirlishev needed to find work for “his” laborers which implies he was a man of some stature.458 
However, these early plantings required a significant amount of labor and were inefficient 
because they apparently relied on “chigir’” also known as a “sakia” or Persian water wheel. 
                                                 
456The best discussion of how Kazakh customary law changed under the influence of Russian colonization and 
conquest is Martin, Law and Custom in the Steppe. On Kazakh law and society before the conquest see, Elizabeth E. 
Bacon, Central Asians Under Russian Rule: A Study in Culture Change, 2nd ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1980), 29-42.  
457 Tsentral’nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Respubliki Kazakhstan [Central State Archive of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan] hereafter referred to as, TsGARK. TsGARK f. 25, op.1, d. 2755, l. 3 “Po voprosu o razvitii 
khlebopawstva v karaturgaiskii volosti Turgaiskago uezda” November 23, 1901. It does not seem that the report 
which identifies several Kazakh “branches” (otdelenie) is referring to either larger tribal groupings “zhus” or smaller 
tribes. However, they do not specify. 
458 In Kazakh society, according to Elizabeth Bacon “In the camps of wealthy families, there were often hired 
workers, orphans or men who had lost their livestock, who served until they had earned enough animals to set up on 
their own. These hired workers received food and clothing in addition to animals and were treated as members of the 




(Figure 5.2, An animal-powered “chigir” on the Kazakh steppe).459 
  
Due to this inefficiency, the water was mostly used only for livestock. Nevertheless, 
according to the report, though the plantings were not large, there was arable farming going on in 
the area and the report continued that, “Thus, in the steppes of Turgai uezd there appeared a new 
kind of industrial agriculture” which owed its beginning to Shirshilov. In spite of Russian 
officials’ apparent ignorance of this farming, the development was noted by other nearby 
Kazakhs who attacked the farmers several times and forced Shirlishev to construct several round 
fortified grain warehouses, which apparently could still be seen at the time of the report.460 
Desiring to expand the grain production, the Kazakhs under Gaimurat Turkebayev, a 
relative of Shirlishev’s (who had died in 1864) decided in 1879 that they needed a source of 
water more efficient than the chigir’. They identified a lake, “Sulety” north of the river that was 
higher in elevation from their fields and decided to dig an irrigation canal (aryk) to connect the 
                                                 
459 Pre-Revolutionary photo collection of the Central State Archive of Film and Audio Republic of Kazakhstan 
(hereafter referred to as TsGARKZRK). 
460 TsGARK f. 25, op.1, d. 2755, l. 3 obo. 
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lake to their fields. However, Turkebayev had difficulty persuading anyone to help with the 
project except his relatives who belonged to the “Shii” (an unknown group).461 Sixty people 
agreed to work for Turkebayev, and a wide canal with a depth of up to 5 arshin (35 feet) was 
completed in 1880.462 
According to the report, the canal irrigated enough land that each of the 60 families that 
helped dig the canal got 200 poods of millet (which would indicate a harvest total of 433,320 
pounds of grain). At first this might seem a huge amount of grain. However, to the south in 
Khiva, farmers averaged about 30 bushels of grain per acre on irrigated land using relatively 
simple technologies.463 If the Kazakhs in Karaturgai were also achieving roughly the same yield, 
this meant that they harvested about 240 acres of grain, which while significant seems feasible.   
Based on this initial success, the following year the total number of farmers increased to 200 and 
those involved became quite wealthy with even poorer farmers being able to buy livestock from 
a harvest of wheat and millet.464 The project was apparently so successful that his relatives asked 
for new irrigation sites and he encouraged them to construct a dam and canals at two places 
“Kyr-Kan” and “Sry-sai” which they did under his guidance. These dams and canals apparently 
were well constructed except for the dam on the Kyr-kan.465 
It was then that the wealth of these Kazakhs began to attract the attention of other 
Kazakhs nearby. In the spring of 1882, a group of Kazakhs from Sarykopinskii volost attacked 
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some of Turkebayev’s relatives who had only begun farming the previous year. The conflict 
apparently was dealt with by Kazakh customary courts and in order to stop the conflict, 
Turkebayev agreed to a truce in which he lost half of the arable land to the Syrkopinskii volost 
Kazakhs.466 However, Turkeybayev continued to construct new dams and irrigation ditches to 
irrigate from other lakes in the area, and even got aid from the uezd nachalnik in 1882 for one of 
these projects.467 In spite of these efforts, the economic situation deteriorated for the Kazakhs. 
Without the source of water from Lake Sulekty, other sources failed to provide enough water 
apparently to irrigate the fields. One project, the dam at Kyr-kan dried up entirely and farmers 
who had previously sold 100 pood of grain a year now had to buy grain.468 Even more troubling, 
there was not even enough water for livestock. It was not until 1900 that a new leader among the 
Kazakhs, Turkebayev’s son, Aytkul Baimurakhov organized 100 families to each donate two 
rubles and one sheep to support building a new dam. With this money, he hired workers, fixed 
the problematic Kyr-kan dam and raised its water levels from 7 to 12 arshin, and also installed 
an overflow on the reservoir to allow it to irrigate crops.469  
In order to rescue these pioneering Kazakhs who had turned to sedentary agriculture 
decades before, the uezd nachalnik had asked the oblast administration for aid. With the new 
dam and larger reservoir, the Kazakhs planned in 1902 to plant irrigated grain crops, which the 
uezd nachalnik was confident in. However, they still lacked tools or money to buy them. 
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Therefore, the uezd nachalnik requested a loan of 500 rubles to buy tools on their behalf. 
Additionally, since the dam was made of sand and bundles of brush, it was in constant need of 
repair, so he believd they would need additional funds for maintenance work. In total, he sought 
800 rubles that he would pay directly to Baimurkhanov.470 
Although the governor supported the idea, he did not think the oblast could afford it and 
he encouraged the uezd nachalnik to use local funds.471 However, he replied that there were no 
local funds available and that they needed to support this critical work that was “important for 
the entire population of Karaturgai volost.”472 The oblast governor eventually did write to the 
Ministry of Cultivation and State Property as the Ministry of Agriculture was then called, and 
they eventually gave the Kazakhs 400 rubles. However, the Ministry also informed the governor 
that they had also ordered a hydrotechnical survey of the area in the next year which would help 
identify what else was needed to secure water in the area.473  
After this, the archival record of this story disappears. There were some hydrotechnical 
surveys of the area in the following years, however, even those records are scattered and 
sometimes incomplete. Locating what happened to these irrigated lands is made even more 
difficult because the reports were not very specific on their exact location. However, it appears 
likely that by 1914, Baimurkhanov’s efforts were in vain and a peasant settlement called 
Grigorevskii now stood in its place, perhaps even using the same fields established by the 
Kazakhs nearly a century previously.474 If this was so, then this irrigation infrastructure, just like 
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the countless Kazakh wells commandeered and expropriated by imperial officials, became part 
of the imperial hydrotechnical apparatus. Even if this was not the case, and the Kazakhs were not 
displaced by settlement, the treatment of the Kazakhs, who were by all accounts doing the 
“right” thing by sedentarizing and engaging in agriculture reveals that the agenda of the Russian 
empire went beyond chauvinism and preference for sedentary agriculture. Given the huge 
financial outlays that were beginning to be undertaken on behalf of peasant settlers under the 
new Resettlement Administration, the 400 rubles given to the Kazakhs appears rather miserly. 
Hydrotechnical Surveys and “Legibility”  
 Hydrotechnical surveys were one of the first tools that imperial officials brought to bear 
in the battle against aridity in the steppe. At first glance, it might appear that the mapping, 
measuring, reporting, and organizing technology of a hydrotechnical survey was the embodiment 
of “high modernism” and of attempting to apply “foreign” science to the steppe to “make it 
legible.”475 However, closer examination of what the surveys actually involved complicates this 
picture. First, it should be noted that these surveys were not being carried out on a totally blank 
canvas. By the time these surveys became quite frequent (in the early twentieth century), the 
Russian Empire had over a century of experience on the steppe. Several previous surveys and 
scientific expeditions gave them significant knowledge of the human and natural resources and 
environments.476 Additionally, the surveys were conducted in areas that were planned for peasant 
settlement, and the hydrologic survey was part of the process by which the imperial government 
was attempting to control and guide settlement on the Steppe. As more and more peasants moved 
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into lands that were only marginally capable of supporting sedentary agriculture, they often 
found themselves in great need of government food aid.477  
Therefore, in some ways, these surveys were often conducted on land that could be 
already considered in part “legible” because the boundaries of proposed settlements were marked 
off on maps. This did not mean that the exact location of villages had already been identified 
however. For example before 1909 in Akmola oblast, the plots that were assigned to peasant 
settlements in some places were as large as 25,000 desiatins (an area over 100 square miles).478 
In Turgai-Uralsk Resettlement District, some plots were even twice that.479 Much of this 
preliminary work was not made solely on maps in St. Petersburg or Omsk, it was local, but it 
was carried out over extremely large areas in a short amount of time. For example, between 1895 
and 1903, around 800,000 square versts was surveyed by the Resettlement Administration.480 
Additionally, although the sites of hydrologic surveys were in some ways already “legible” to the 
imperial administration, and had been slated for settlement, it was up to the hydraulic surveyor to 
give a “final answer” to identifying the particular location of a village, how many people it could 
sustain, and if not enough water was found, whether or not the spot should be settled at all.481 
In spite of this important responsibility given to hydrologic surveyors, the instructions for 
how they should carry out and report about their work was quite structured and formulaic. In 
addition to being assigned particular plots to investigate, they were also given very specific 
instructions of what and how to measure and what information to record to send back to their 
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superiors. In fact, like heads of lower agricultural schools they were given pages of forms with 
blanks to fill out about a particular site.482  
In many ways, this was another unsuccessful attempt to force a natural landscape into a 
box or paper form, what Timothy Mitchell called, “the character of calculability.” In Mitchell’s 
opinion this:  
new regime of calculation did not produce, necessarily a more accurate knowledge of the 
world, despite its claims, nor even any overall increase in the quantity of knowledge. Its 
achievement was to redistribute forms of knowledge, increasing it in some places, and 
decreasing it in others. At the same time, it transferred this knowledge to new sites. By a 
series of removals, it opened up a certain distance, the distance between the field and the 
computing g office, between the farmer and the colonial survey officer, between the iron 
triangulation marker and the paper map.483 
   
However, as Mitchell pointed out, just because these projects were incapable of fully capturing 
the physical world, they did serve to make the representations and the created knowledge appear 
separate and fully under the control of officials. This gave it a power irrespective of its ability to 
capture reality.   
The formulaic nature of the oversight of the surveys also does not appear have held 
hydrotechnicans back from completing their survey work in a meaningful way. One partial 
explanation for this was the high level of training and professional identity that some 
hydrotechnical surveyors had in their work. They were engineers who were tasked with 
interesting and challenging work, not simply pushing papers around and filling out reports, 
which raises a question of the professional identity of these professionals. One indication of a 
potential professional identity is the wide array of instructions on how to conduct hydrotechnical 
surveys in the Kazakh Steppe that were composed by fellow engineers.484 Conversely, as 
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settlement increased, it was not always possible to get highly trained scientists to complete the 
work. This meant that in many cases students were doing work that was supposed to be 
undertaken by full time engineers which many felt reflected poorly on the profession.485 
In 1904 the engineer Shiriaev was sent on a “special” hydrotechnical survey in Turgai 
oblast. His report is quite typical and offers insight into how they were conducted. One of the 
first places Shiriaev investigated was a proposed peasant village to be called “Mikhailovskii” on 
one of the tributaries of the Berdianka River, which is itself a tributary of the Ural.486 This site 
was near an already existing village called Kikhailovskii which was created by settlers without 
the approval or sanction of the government.487 Shiriaev was hopeful about the proposed site. He 
commented on how there was plenty of fresh water flowing into the stream via groundwater. 
Although one tributary was stagnant, and not promising for building wells on, the main tributary 
seemed promising.488 At the site of another proposed village on a tributary of the Zhaman-
Kargaly (a tributary of the Kargaly River which leads to the Ilek and then the Ural) Shiriaev did 
not think the site was suitable for settlement in spite of the existence of water.489 However on a 
different tributary of the Kargali, the Zhaksi-Kargaly he did believe that in spite of the presence 
of some dry wells on one part of the site, another part of the site on the right bank of the river 
was promising for settlement.490 One final site that Shiriaev also believed would make a good 
village was a location called Karagandi-sai.491 
                                                 
485 RGIA f. 391, op.3, d. 1857, l. 128 In this case a majority of hydrotechnicians were students working in the 
summer between their studies. 
486 TsGARK f. 29, op.1, d. 17, l.1 “Rezultaty spetsial’nikh gidrotekhnicheskikh izyskanii proizvedennykh v 1904 
godu chinami partii gornogo inzhenera Shiriaeva”  
487 On the constantly changing relationship between officials supporting or opposing peasant settlement see: Willard 
Sunderland, “The ‘Colonization Question’: Visions of Colonization in Late Imperial Russia” Jahrbucher fur 
Geschichte Osteuropas 48 no.2 (2000): 210-232. 
488 TsGARK f. 29, op.1, d. 17, l. 1. 
489 TsGARK f. 29, op.1, d. 17, l. 2 obo. 
490 TsGARK f. 29, op.1, d. 17, l. 2. 
491 TsGARK f. 29, op.1, d. 17, l. 3.  
198 
 
Of these proposed sites how did Shiriaev first determine if they were suitable or 
unsuitable for settlement, and secondly, how did he identify the particular place to locate a 
village within the large area marked off on a map? The answer lay in a mix of advanced 
scientific observation and experimentation and also in other knowledge that was much more 
localized. Like all hydrotechnical surveyors he carried with him a mobile laboratory that 
accompanied the survey teams which included tools and supplies to analyze levels of chlorine, 
sulfuric nitrogen, nitrogen compounds, hydrogen sulfide, ammonia, and water hardness.492 This 
allowed him to test water for it salinity and other chemical qualities that could effect its 
usefulness, and also might offer insight into the underlaying geology. There were also earlier 
large-scale surveys of the region that had mapped out general courses of rivers and some of the 
geology.493 Shiriaev relied on his training to use and understand all of these technologies and to 
construct a narrative. He also relied on his training of scientific observation, taking exacting 
notes about the volumes of water, the size of pebbles, and even the plant life that grew along the 
riverbanks.494  
However, there were other clues to indicate water quantity and quality that had nothing to 
do with science he had learned in European Russia. In the proposed Mikhailovskii site for 
instance, the fact that there was already a peasant village nearby indicated that there was enough 
water to support whatever kind of agriculture Shiriaev observed in the village. In fact, there was 
a homestead (khutor) already on the site that he proposed for the village. While Shiriaev did use 
his scientific measurement to decide that the inflow of fresh groundwater and sandy glacial 
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layers meant that the location could support another village and several more wells, there was 
already ample evidence to the untrained eye that the site was suitable.495 
The two sites on the tributaries of the Kargaly River could also be judged by a mix of 
scientific and local knowledge for their suitability. The first indication that the Zhaman-Kargali 
site was unacceptable should have been the name of the river itself. “Zhaman” means “bad” in 
Kazakh. This information, coupled with the fact that Shiriaev found wells that held water part of 
the year, indicates that the Kazakhs already had significant knowledge about the hydrology of 
the place. The other site on the Zhaksi-Kargaly also could have given its fate away by its name 
as, “Zhaksy” means “good” in Kazakh. While Shiriaev reported that there were several dry wells 
in this spot (likely also built by Kazakhs that probably only gave water part of the year), he 
admitted to getting advice about water flows in the river from Kazakhs. They told him that the 
water in the river did not decrease even when they watered large flocks at certain spots. 
Shiriaev’s knowledge of hydrology told him these spots were probably groundwater inflows 
because he found the water to be cool and not salty.496 The final proposed settlement at 
Karagandi-Sai was a clear contender because Shiriaev noted that there were already three 
Kazakh wells on the site each with between 4-7 feet of fresh water in them.497 In fact, in his 
report Shiriaev did not even discuss any other scientific observations or tests, he simply saw the 
Kazakhs had already built wells with fresh water in them and used their work to declare the site 
suitable for peasant settlement. However, Shiriaev was not alone in relying in part on local 
knowledge. In his pamphlet titled Instructions for Producing Detailed Hydrotechnical Surveys in 
Akmola Oblast, the hydrotechnical engineer Lyschinsky encouraged all surveyors to examine the 
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“agricultural character and land-use” of the Kazakhs which would limit the number of test wells 
and other work.498  
The situation in which the hydrotechnical surveyor was tasked with giving a “final 
answer” regarding the specifics and even fundamental question of settlement could lead to 
disagreement between more powerful officials in St. Petersburg or Omsk. This was especially 
true when those officials wanted to open up new areas to settlement. This sometimes led to a 
situation where officials ordered additional hydrological surveys of an area that had already been 
surveyed. In fact, this appears to have happened to the region Shiriaev surveyed in 1904, when it 
was surveyed a second time in 1913 in the hopes of finding suitable locations along the Zhaman-
Kargali.499 However, this situation also existed because the hydrotechnical arm of the 
Resettlement Administration had two separate goals. The first was to bring land into a state that 
was suitable for settlement through securing water by building wells and other infrastructure, and 
the second was to study regions for future settlement and assess their water suitability.500 These 
tasks could be at odds with one another depending on differing interpretations of data and 
information. These tensions led to several changes in the way that instructions were created for 
new settlement plots, which attempted to integrate both surveying work and hydrological work 
throughout the early twentieth century. However, these conflicts appear to have remained 
unresolved.501 
In addition, hydrtotechnical surveys not only led to conflict within the colonial 
administration, it also led to conflict between Kazakhs and settlers, because part of the task of 
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surveying was also identifying land to remunerate the Kazakhs for their losses if the area 
contained an important water source or was not considered “excess.” While this should have 
protected Kazakhs, in truth, the privileging of settlers at the expense of Kazakhs and chauvinistic 
attitudes toward Kazakh agriculture meant that this was not the case. The example of the 
proposed settlement at Korgan-Kul in Pavlodar uezd, Semipalatinsk oblast illustrates how this 
situation actually worked in reality. In 1907, authorities approved the expropriation of 15,415 
desiatin of Kazakh land that included a lake to create a resettlement district called Kurgan-Kul. 
Hydrological and other surveys indicated that the location could support a village of 823 
families.502 Four Kazakhs from Aul number 10 of Kyzil-Alachskii volost (Magrym Kel’dinov, 
Taxe Abynbaev, Abdualet Karinzhanov, and Akhmat Boitsov) petitioned to be able to either 
keep the lake or at the very least to have rights to water their livestock, because it was their only 
source of water. They said that in addition, while they were left with some of their land, the best 
land went to the peasant settlement and they were left only with salinated soils with no water that 
were useless for hay and unsuitable for growing grain, which they claimed to have done on about 
20 desiatin of their expropriated land.503 These concerns were overruled by the commission and 
the creation of the village went ahead.  
However, the Kazakhs continued their complaints which caused some officials at the 
Resettlement Administration in St. Petersburg to look into the matter further. In his defense to 
the officials, the head of the commission that decided to establish the peasant village cited the 
study by the Scherbina expedition. This report said that the 40 Kazakh families were living on 
172, 046 desiatin of land, and the expedition found 152,949 desiatin of that (including Lake 
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Korgan-Kul) to be “excess. What is more, he went on to say that the Kazakhs were only “using” 
19,067 desiatin of their land, meaning they still had 121,942 desiatin extra. The defense also 
pointed out that the original survey had identified water in another winter campsite. In spite of 
this, a second survey was made of the region which included a survey by the hydrotechnician 
Nikitin who claimed to have found water of good quality and inflow at a depth of around 30 feet 
on another region of their territory.504 However, the Kazakhs were apparently supposed to build 
their own wells to reach this water. 
The Governor of Semipalatinsk also got involved in the dispute and on the 9th of March 
1909, he wrote to the Resettlement Administration in St. Petersburg defending the decision of the 
local authorities. He took the word of local officials and said that the Kazakhs were exaggerating 
and they would easily be able to make up the lost water with the wells proposed by the 
commission. What is more, the local officials accused the Kazakhs of lying about their plantings 
of grain, saying that these were not regular plantings and had only been there a few years. 
However, he argued that even if the Kazakhs were telling the truth that they were being hurt by 
taking away their lake and land, the fact remained that the village was in existence and according 
to the law of 1893, once a peasant settlement site was formed, it was final. The Governor then 
went on to imply that in spite of his protestations, the Kazakhs were probably being hurt by the 
loss of the lake. However, if this project were stopped because it did damage to the Kazakhs, 
then all settlement would have to stop because, “the whole part of the steppe suitable for 
agriculture is used, one way or another by the Kazakhs.”505 
In the end, the Resettlement officials in St. Petersburg largely agreed with the governor. 
They admitted that there was no way to take back the settlement, or give Kazakhs access to the 
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lake, because the settlers need it and giving it the Kazakhs would probably lead to conflict. Also, 
if they did not have the lake, the government would be required to build wells for the settlers.506 
However, they also took into account reports from the Ministry of State Lands that the Kazakhs 
needed more water and they were unable to afford to build the wells themselves.507 Therefore, 
since the governor said it would be illegal for him to give the Kazakhs money to build the wells, 
in the interest of peace and the settlers, the wells would be built with government funds, 
apparently from the Resettlement Administration.508 
Wells, Ponds, and the Growth of Hydrotechnical Infrastructure 
Hydrotechnical infrastructure developed in phases on the steppe. The first focused work 
was undertaken under the advice of the Trans-Siberian Railroad Commission, which together 
with the Ministry of Cultivation and State Property began a plan for surveys and well building in 
the Governor-Generalship of the Steppe beginning in May of 1895. Already in 1897, in response 
to settlers occupying lands far to the south of the railway line, officials began developing plans 
for transferring responsibility away form the railway onto the ministries responsible for 
agriculture and peasant settlement.509 In 1900, this was extended to the Turgai-Uralsk region as 
well. However, according to officials, this early work was mostly of a “demonstrative” character, 
to show peasants how to build wells and encourage them to build them on their own. It was not 
until 1905 that this work began to take on a much larger scale as peasant settlement was 
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increasing at the same time the Resettlement Administration was growing in size and 
influence.510 
Within only a few years, in 1909, hydrotechical work in the Turgai-Uralsk Resettlement 
District surveyed an area of over 1.7 million acres across just two of the steppe oblasts. These 
surveys and the construction of 57 new wells and repairs to older wells and dams were 
undertaken by 33 technical teams led by 9 permanent and 24 temporary hydraulic technicians. In 
addition to the wells built and repaired, the surveys identified 144 new resettlement plots of the 
potential 167 surveyed which could support another 55,000 new settlers in the region. What is 
more, this work appears to have been helpful and effective in aiding peasant settlement. That 
same year in Turgai oblast, in 83 new peasant uchastoks were considered to be “secure” in their 
water, only 10 were deemed “insecure.” This meant that in just one year in one oblast, across an 
area of 59,789 desiatins, 29,391 new settlers had enough water and only 5,704 did not.511  
Hydrotechnical infrastructure focused on two main ways of securing water if there was 
not an open body of water nearby, wells and ponds. Wells were the most common, they were 
cheap, and peasants could even easily often construct them without aid from the government. 
However, in some places either because groundwater was too deep or because the wells that had 
been dug were often impinged by salts as the groundwater changed, officials deemed it necessary 
to build a pond or dam a stream.512 This work was much more time consuming and expensive. 
When dams and ponds were built, they usually were located on a small stream or swamp that 
                                                 
510 RGIA f. 391, op.2, d. 700 l. 90, O gidrotecknicheskikh sooruzhdeniakh v pereslencheskikh poselkakh i o 
komandirovanii osobogo gidrotekhnika dliia nablyudeniia za sooruzheniami, 1900-1905. 
511 RGIA f. 391, op.3, d. 1860, ll. 3-4 ob. 
512 Although salinization of wells is most common through coastal salt water intrusion that comes from over 
pumping see: H. Murat Ozler, “Hydrochemistry and Salt-water Intrusion in the Van Aquifer, East Turkey” 
Environmental Geology 43 no. 7 (March 2003): 759-775; it also occurs through mineralization, which is more likely 
in arid environments like the Kazakh steppe, see: Hichem Yangui, et. al., “Recharge Mode and Mineralization of 
Groundwater in a Semi-arid Region: Sidi Bouzid Plain (Central Tunisia)” Environmental Earth Sciences 63 no.5 
(July 2011): 969-979. 
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was dammed to create a pond. Resettlement officials then typically constructed a well that could 
draw on the pond, but which had a filter to keep the well water as clean as possible. For example 
in 1908, the Resettlement Administration constructed three of these ponds and wells with a filter 
in Akmola oblast. While they were adequate, the earthen dam structures in less than ideal soils 
needed frequent dredging and repair on the banks. The filters also often failed to keep the wells 
clean.513 
 
(Figure 5.3. Well with filter and supply pond in the background, built by the Resettlement Administration, Koksheatu, 1911)514 
 
While ponds and wells with filters were built, they were relatively rare due to their 
expense and the time needed to construct them. Therefore, especially in the last years before the 
outbreak of the First World War, another technology appeared more promising in the battle 
against aridity on the steppe. This new technology—deep-drilled artesian wells—offered many 
officials hope that although the surface of the steppe might appear desolate and incapable of 
                                                 
513 RGIA f. 391, op. 3 d. 1861, Materialy o gidrotekhnicheskikh sooruzhdeniiakh 1908-1910. 
514 Pre-Revolutionary Photo Collection, TsGARKZRK. 
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supporting sedentary agriculture and peasant settlement, beneath the surface there was water that 
the advanced science of the Russian Empire could unlock. 
 Beginning in 1906, the engineer A. Kozyrev tasked with testing out exploratory deep 
boreholes in Atbasar and Akmola oblasts. Specifically, the areas he was charged with 
investigating consisted of 2.7 million acres (1 million desiatin) of land near the Ishim River. 
They drilled eight boreholes of a depth between 15 and 42 sazhen, and found water, which 
potentially opened up the entire 2.7 million acres to settlement if the government would agree to 
build another 60 drilled artesian wells at a cost of 2,500 to 3,000 rubles each. Officials believed 
if they undertook this project, it would allow for another 100,000 peasant families to settle in the 
region.515  
It appeared Kozyrev, his crew, and Russian hydrotechnical engineering had heroically 
opened up a massive area of settlement. However, this was not to be the case, while deep artesian 
drilling promised a great deal, the realities were more complicated. However, the lofty dreams 
that this technology inspired do reflect the views and hopes of scientists and officials on the 
steppe in their quest for water. The reality was that the area Kozyrev had been assigned to was 
far too large to make this kind of blanket statement, and while his wells did turn up significant 
amounts of water, later attempts to expand on his work faced challenges.516 For example, when a 
well was attempted in 1909, though the well was drilled to a depth of 37.7 sazhen and had 
significant water pressure, it was too salty even for cattle. 517 In other instances, the distance of 
the proposed sites from the railway or from Orsk where the drilling equipment was kept in winter 
made drilling the wells, especially deep wells cost prohibitive.518  
                                                 
515 RGIA f. 391, op. 3, d. 1862, l. 143. 
516 RGIA f. 391, op.3, d. 1862, l. 9.  
517 RGIA f. 391, op.3, d. 1862, l. 92. 
518 RGIA f. 391, op.3, d. 1862, l. 6. 
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However, in spite of these challenges and shortcomings, the allure of a hidden source of 
water deep below the Steppe that could be unlocked only with advanced technology was strong 
in the Resettlement and agronomic bureaucracy. Therefore, in spite of the problems in 
replicating Kozyrev’s work, some believed that Kozyrev simply hadn’t drilled deep enough.519 
Others believed that perhaps if the wells could use a steam drill they might be able to drill more 
quickly and deeply.520 All of these questions and concerns were why the hydrotechnician 
Nifantovi was sent to the Second All-Russian Congress of Applied Geology to get answers. 
While at the conference, most seemed to agree that the blanket statement of Kozyrev was 
unreasonable, this did not entirely dampen the allure of deep artesian well drilling in the 
steppe.521 
Instead of giving up the idea entirely officials began to focus and systematize their 
efforts. For example, in Kostanai uezd where engineers had the most success with deep artesian 
drilling, they focused their efforts on smaller regions with more intensive hydrological surveys. 
For example, Letovke number 94 (letovke means summer pasture indicating this was probably a 
Kazakh pasture) had already shown good plentiful water in an earlier survey and well drilled by 
Pankov, was divided into five peasant settlement districts which would eventually become 
villages. Each of these future villages was to have three wells drilled in it since it was believed 
they all drew from the same aquifer at roughly the same rate of 4,800 vedro per day like 
Pankov’s well. With these 15 new deep artesian wells (drilled to 23 sazhen) it was believed that 
this area could support another 3,250 settlers.522 What is more, once the initial drilling had 
identified the aquifer, the additional wells could be drilled and constructed at very little expense, 
                                                 
519 RGIA f. 391, op.3, d. 1862, l. 105-8. 
520 RGIA f. 391, op. 3, d. 1862, l. 227 ob. 
521 RGIA f. 391, op.3, d. 1862, l. 297. 
522 RGIA f. 391, op.3, d. 1862, l. 45. 
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especially if the individual wells were “nortonovskii” wells, more commonly known as 
“Abyssinian wells.”523   
 
(Figure 5.4. “Advert for Norton’s Abyssinian Tube Wells”524 
 
While the results of artesian deep well drilling were a far cry from what Kozyrev had 
promised, the fact remained that these wells (and others like them) did allow for settlement 
where none had been before. They reflect the frequent story seen throughout this dissertation that 
while imperial scientists and officials rarely attained their lofty goals on the steppe, they did 
advance towards them. Three thousand settlers on Letovke number 94 was not 100,000 across all 
of Akmola oblast, but it still represented a significant increase in settler populations. In Kostanay 
                                                 
523 The name “Nortonovskii” appears to be from the name of the British manufacturer of these wells, that were 
supposedly invented for another colonial undertaking, British military expedition into Ethiopia.  




uezd, where Letovke number 94 was located, the population of Russians increased by about 
10,000 persons each year, meaning that this single project completed in one season was 
responsible for nearly 1/3 of that growth.525 Insufficient records make it impossible to make 
these kind of numeric claims about the effects of hydrotechnical infrastructure and work. 
However, in the years before the First World War there were dozens or even hundreds of wells 
being built by the Resettlement Administration in some of the most challenging environments in 
each oblast. Therefore, this work deserves a significant amount of credit (or blame) for the large 
increases in peasant settlement in this period.  
Finally, it is important to note that the units the engineers themselves seemed most 
inclined to count were not only water flows, or even potential head of sheep a single well could 
support, but rather peasant settlers. This focus on settlers even by scientists and engineers 
indicates just how deeply the assumptions and aims of settler colonialism were rooted in the 
thinking and work of hydrotechnicians. While they might feely rely on ideas, information, or 
even wells built by Kazakhs, it was clear who they were there to help. One of the clearest 
examples of this is the view of the head engineer for hydrologic work in Akmola oblast. In the 
“Plan of Hydrotechnical Work for Akmola Region for 1909” he wrote that in identifying new 
settlement sites, the hydrotechnician “takes upon himself the moral responsibility to populate the 
site for all eternity with his own kind.”526 The “kind” here is clearly Russians, and this is one of 
the few instances where such clear racial competition comes to the fore in the archival record. 
Perhaps it is because the challenge of aridity felt so huge and threatening to the entire project. 
Whatever the reason, the fact that such an idea was included in a simple work plan for drilling 
                                                 
525 According to Demko, the Russian population in Kostanay uezd was 102,000 and in 1916 it was 200,000. Demko, 
The Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan, 211. 
526 RGIA f. 391, op.3, d. 1857, l. 127. 
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wells is a powerful example of how many engineers felt about their task. It was not simply a 
technical problem to be solved. Much like the zemstvo doctors, some saw their task as a moral 
crusade, albeit a racist crusade. 
Cholera 
While in many ways the large construction projects of artesian wells, dams, ponds, filters, 
and hydrologic surveys could be interpreted a story of the nascent frontier technostate with grand 
plans to remake a landscape through science, technology and expertise, this project was not 
entirely a story of technicians and officials enacting their vision on a passive landscape and 
nomadic and settler populations. In addition to the contributions of peasant settlers and Kazakhs, 
there was another important actor overlooked in this story—the environment. In addition to the 
aridity of the steppe and the salinity of the soil that made hydrotechnical work so challenging, 
there was also the water itself. For example, the lake, Kuday-Kuduk near Krasnoyarsk discussed 
at the beginning of this chapter—like many others in the steppe—supplied water only for part of 
the year was both an aid and a frustration to the goals of technicians and officials as it provided 
water but only on its own terms. While water and aridity were important constraints or aids to the 
work and vision of officials, there was another natural “actor” that illustrates the complex 
interactions of technology, the environment, markets, ideals of settler colonialism, and human 
and non-human actors on the Kazakh steppe: vibrio cholerae, the bacteria that causes cholera in 
humans.527  
The steppe, like the rest of the Russian Empire, was the site of frequent cholera outbreaks 
and scares throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and cholera was a major 
concern of officials who were in charge of overseeing the steppe and its settlement. Between 
                                                 
527 This lens is indebted to questions about mosquitos in the first chapter of Mitchell, Rule of Experts, 19-53.  
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1855 and 1922, Russia had an estimated 5.5 million cases of cholera and 2.2 million deaths from 
the disease.  In the first decades of the twentieth century (between 1901 and 1926) Russia was 
“free” of cholera for only two years in 1903 and 1906.528 In Central Asia, the record of cholera is 
more spotty. While it does appear the first cholera outbreak in Russia in 1823 was via the Silk 
Road, Central Asia’s proximity and historical and economic connectivity to India mean its 
history with cholera was both part of Russia’s story and also unique.529 Most significantly was 
that cholera typically was understood to have entered the Russian empire via ports on the Black 
Sea and spread across the empire.530 While after peasant settlement and railways began to 
increase in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Black Sea was one source of 
cholera on the steppe, direct transmission via caravan was also possible.531 
Therefore, it was a major concern not only of officials but also of ordinary residents. For 
example, in Omsk during the 1910 epidemic, the newspaper Omskii Telegraf gave frequent 
updates on the spread of the disease and numbers of deaths across the empire. The daily updates 
on numbers falling ill and dying as the epidemic spread gave a sense of foreboding, and the 
paper carried little more than information on the spread of the disease which in some ways made 
the progress of the disease seem inevitable.532 When cholera hit Omsk in September, however, 
the newspaper did offer more concrete descriptions of what measures were in place to combat it.  
In Omsk and in other places on the steppe, fears of cholera had caused officials in the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs to establish local city and regional sanitary commissions to carry out 
                                                 
528 John P. Davis, Russia in the Time of Cholera: Disease under Romanovs and Soviets (New York: IB Taurus, 
2018), 2.  
529 Ibid., 38. 
530 An example of this interpretation is, K. David Patterson, “Cholera Diffusion in Russia, 1823-1923” Social 
Science and Medicine 38 no. 9 (May 1994): 1171-1191. 
531 For example in 1829, a caravan brought cholera to Orenburg from Bukhara, Anna Afansayeva, “Quarantines and 
Copper Amulets: The Struggle Against Cholera in the Kazakh Steppe in the Nineteenth Century” Jahrbucher fur 
Geschichte Osteuropas 61 no. 4 (2013): 492. 
532 Omskii Telegraf, (Omsk), August to November 1910. 
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the recommendations of doctors and scientists to help limit the disease.533 These included the 
establishment of cholera barracks as well as special directions about trade, the sale of animal and 
food products, as well as cleanup of public and private spaces and wells.534 However, in spite of 
the best efforts of the city Sanitation Commission, by mid-September 90 residents of Omsk had 
contracted the disease and 50 had died.535 Sanitation was a crucial part of anti-cholera measures 
across all of Russia.536 This was in part because the zemstvo ethos of medicine caused doctors to 
understand that those weakened by poor nutrition or unsanitary conditions were more susceptible 
to the disease.537 It was also because cholera causes copious diarrhea (often referred to as “rice 
water” due to its milky white consistency) which can easily infect water supplies and the 
dehydration of this diarrhea is typically what leads to death in cholera victims.  
The 1910 outbreak that the residents of Omsk read about daily in their newspaper was 
already devastating regions of the steppe further west, specifically Kostanay uezd which was one 
of the regions to suffer most that year. The first person to fall ill from cholera in Kostanay uezd 
was the 28 year old peasant Kozuma Saschenkov who was hired by the merchant Korsakov to 
work in his store at the village of Ust-Uiskое in Cheliabinsk uezd which served as an important 
waypoint for settlers coming to Kostanay and parts of Aktobe uezds. Ust-Uiskoe had seen 120 
                                                 
533 Davis argues that this “flexible” approach to battling cholera was in fact more effective given Russia’s 
geographic position and the demands of its economy, and it could not use quarantine the way other countries more 
distant from India had. He also argues that the zemstvo ethos was crucial in imperial successes in controlling the 
disease and in the Soviet’s eventual eradication of cholera in the 1920s. Davis, Russia in the Time of Cholera, 2-5. 
534 For examples of these sanitary measures in Turgai Oblast and communications with the Ministries in St. 
Petersburg see see: TsGARK,  f. 25, op.1, d. 3886, ”O priniatii mer protiv kholernoi yepidemii 1893 v Turgaiskoi 
oblasti, 1892-1902.” for examples of how local authorities constituted and directed these committees see: TsGARK 
f. 25, op.1, d. 3916, “O merakh protiv chumy v sluchae poiavleniia ee v Turgaiskoi oblasti, 1897-1904.” 
535 Omskii Telegraf, September 18, 1910. 
536 For an example of how more draconian measures like quarantines could lead to violent conflict in Russia’s 
Central Asian Empire see, Jeff Sahadeo, “Epidemic and Empire: Ethnicity, Class, and “Civilization” in the 1892 
Tashkent Cholera Riot” Slavic Review 64 no. 1 (Spring 2005): 117-139. 
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cases of cholera just in July of 1910.538 Sashenkov completed his work and returned home to his 
village of Vvedenskii and fell ill on the 12th of July, but by the time the district doctor saw him 
on the 14th, he was already better. Although the doctor carried out a disinfection of the places 
where Sashenkov had been, the bacteria made its way into Kostanay uezd in the bowels of 
peasant settlers who had unknowingly come into contact with infected water or food that 
Sashenkov had soiled.539 The gestation period of cholera can be as long as five days before a 
person shows symptoms which was ample time for settlers to make their way to other population 
centers where the outbreak spread.540 
By August Kostanay uezd was the site of a full-blown cholera epidemic. By August 11, 
Kostanay already had 54 confirmed cases of whom 27 had died, in Aktobe 25 cases were 
confirmed and cholera had killed 15.541 Much of the volume of the cases was focused in towns 
like Kostanay and Turgai which had almost no sanitary infrastructure and denser settlement and 
in both cases relied on drinking water supplied by the adjacent Tobol or Turgai rivers.542 
However, the hardest hit places in terms of percentage of the population affected were usually 
settler villages where a combination of poor water supply, poor nutrition, and inadequate shelter 
left peasant immune systems more susceptible to the disease. For example, cholera arrived in the 
village of Kamenskii in Aktobe uezd on the 10th of August. By the 18th of August 54 had 
contracted the illness 30 of whom had died, and the village was still reporting 5-6 new cases per 
day. Officials pointed out that part of the reason Kamenskii suffered so severely was because of 
                                                 
538 TsGARK f. 25, op.1, d. 4068, l. 31, “Zhurnal osobago zasedaniia obschago Prisustviia Turgaiskago Oblastnogo 
Pravlneiia” 16 July 1910. Rail transport was a major influence on the speed and territory of cholera outbreaks and 
could mean that some areas suffered heavily and others nearby were barely affected, Patterson, “Cholera Diffusion 
in Russia.” 
539 TsGARK f. 25, op.1, d. 4068, l. 9, Report by the Kostanay uezd Head to the Turgai Governor, 17 July 1910. 
540 World Health Organization “Cholera Factsheet” http://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/cholera 
541 TsGARK f. 25, op.1 d. 4068, l. 265 “Zhurnal zasedaniia Turgaiskoi oblastnoi sanitarno-ispolnitelnoi komissi” 14 
August 1910. 
542 Ibid., 268. 
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the lack of adequate clean drinking water in and around the village. The village was supplied by 
two “small poorly-built wells” which villagers had named “Korsakovskii” and “Gladovskii.” In 
fact, these wells were considered dirty and hazardous even in “non-choleric times.” In order to 
stop the spread of cholera from these wells, officials ordered them closed.543 
However, closing the wells was not enough, the settlers still needed water to survive. In 
search of a new source, villagers in and around Kamenskii next began to collect water from the 
river Ui, located eight miles from the village. However, this spot was about two miles 
downstream from the village of Lugov in Orenburg oblast which recently had a cholera outbreak, 
meaning the water in the river was possibly now contaminated as well. Therefore, the Kostanay 
uezd sanitary commission asked the governor to request that the Resettlement Administration 
dispatch a team of technicians to Kamenskii to identify proper locations and to construct five 
wells to support settlers.544 On August 22nd the Turgai governor followed their recommendation 
and the hydraulic engineer Haldin was dispatched to Kamenskii to immediately begin 
construction of the five wells.545 
On November 3rd the Kostanay uezd Sanitary-Executive Committee met to discuss the 
summer and fall epidemic and make plans for future outbreaks.546 Members reported that cholera 
had appeared in 11 populated places in the uezd and had killed 130 people (meaning ¼ of the 
deaths occurred in Kamenskii because of inadequate wells). The commission also requested that 
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20 August, 1910. 
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district doctors provide it with an update on the status of water supplies in the entire uezd. Early 
reports from two doctors indicated they found water supplies inadequate.547  
In the spring of 1911, the threat of cholera was in the air (and water) once again. 
Therefore, the Governor of Turgai Oblast wrote to the head of the Turgai-Uralsk Resettlement 
district asking for them to construct more wells in the region, especially in several poorer 
communities who lacked the resources to do this on their own. He pointed to a direct correlation 
between the outbreak in 1910 and the lack of clean and plentiful wells writing, “…the past 
epidemic polluted drinking water and severely contributed to the spread of the cholera epidemic, 
therefore, I believe the measure proposed by the Chairman of the [sanitary] commission [asking 
for Resettlement funds to be spent on wells] to be appropriate.”548 It is unclear if the Governor 
ever got a response, however, given the example of Kamenskii and others, it appears likely that 
in many cases, the Resettlement Administration was factoring cholera into its decisions on where 
and how to build wells. Even those wells seemingly unconnected to cholera outbreaks were still 
built to specifications which were concerned with the installation of proper uniform lids to keep 
out litter, animals, and hopefully disease.  
Ironically, the source of some of the cholera outbreaks appears to have been driven by 
more peasant settlers coming from South Russia where cholera often entered the empire via the 
Black Sea. Therefore, as the settler colonial project was more and more successful, it also made 
it more likely that cholera outbreaks would continue, which would spur more wells and thereby 
allow for more settlement.549 However, there is also evidence that the Black Sea was not the only 
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route that brought cholera to the steppe. In fact, in addition to outbreaks in the nineteenth 
century, like the Orenburg epidemnic in 1829, it appears that older routes that connected the 
steppe to regions to the south and then on to India were also responsible for cholera on the 
Kazakh steppe.550      
Therefore, while the rapid expansion of well and dam building carried out by the 
hydrotechnical section of the Resettlement Administration can be clearly seen as—and was 
indeed—a manifestation of growing state and technopolitical power in the Kazakh steppe settler 
colony, it was anything but a top-down project except perhaps in the imaginations of some 
officials and technicians. Indeed, perhaps the cholera bacteria should not be seen entirely as an 
obstacle to hydrologic technicians like it was for those in the medical bureaucracy. In some 
cases, it encouraged more well building and more work for these technicians. Perhaps it is even 
possible to view vibrio cholerae as a co-constructor of (or at the very least a catalyst for) the 
wells in Kamenskii and elsewhere. 
Conclusion 
Nevertheless, there were other important actors too who helped create the hydrotechnical 
infrastructure that supported peasant settlement on the steppe. In addition to the peasant settlers 
who constructed some wells that the settler colony made ample use of, Kazakh wells were also 
integral parts of steppe hydraulic infrastructure. Furthermore, the hydrological surveys did not 
only rely on the portable laboratories and expertise of scientists alone. Local Kazakhs also often 
provided information to the surveyors on where good water was to be found, especially in places 
where water appeared only seasonally. Nevertheless, the process of creating a narrative around 
                                                 
and on actions to help settlers on arrival fight cholera see: RGIA f. 391, op.2, d. 409, “O priniatii mer dlia bor’by 
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550 On cholera entering the oblast from the south see for example: TsGARK f.25, op.1, d.3991, l. 5, “Protokol 
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this infrastructure could obscure these sources of knowledge, and indeed frame science in a 
triumphalist narrative, which in colonial contexts so often created greater distance between 
colonizer and colonized as a technology of rule. This collection of varied sources of science and 
knowledge along with the wide array of human and non-human actors offers a useful lens and 
framework for understanding and synthesizing the various bureaucratic, environmental, and 
scientific forces at work on the steppe with regard to water. There were many interacting parts, 
persons, ideas, and organisms that all played a part in this story.  
However, the complexity of the story should not be misunderstood as an attempt to hide 
the truth about what was driving the changes on the steppe. While cholera bacteria and local 
Kazakhs sometimes played a role in the creation of this imperial knowledge, the project of 
hydrotechnical work on the steppe was overwhelmingly and fundamentally about supporting the 
settler colonial project. Perhaps the hubris of Russian scientists caused them to believe they 
could succeed where previous attempts at settled agriculture had often failed cause them to 
overlook evidence of successful settled agriculture at places like the irrigated Kazakh farms in 
Karaturgai volost. Certainly, the dream of a “settled and prosperous” steppe had inspired 
hydrotechnicians and officials to take on an incredibly daunting and difficult task, and while this 
task did not achieve their highest aims, their ability to find and supply water to keep settlers on 
the steppe should not be overlooked. Nor should their focus on protecting settler populations 
more than Kazakhs be ignored.  
If this work was simply about finding water and giving it to residents regardless of their 
ethnicity, the hydrotechnical arm had ample opportunity to do so and they did not. This focus on 
supporting settlers and ignoring Kazakhs make it clear that at its root, the goal of steppe 
hydrotechnical work was resettlement of Slavic settlers (or in the words of one hydraulic 
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engineer, his “own kind”) onto “excess” Kazakh lands. This reality underlay not only hydrologic 
work on the steppe, but given the clear necessity of water, and the fact that imperial hydrologists, 
engineers, and technicians did not only find water, they were also part of a bureaucracy that 
allocated it from some groups (usually Kazakhs) to another (usually peasant settlers) is a 
powerful reminder of the implications and power of science on the steppe. Therefore, while the 
work of the hydrotechnical arm of the Resettlement Administration was impressive in its scope, 
innovation, and scale, those must be viewed alongside its legacy of dispossession and 
destruction.  
The success of the Resettlement Administration in securing water for new settlers where 
it appeared no settlement or agriculture was previously possible continued to serve as a hope and 
inspiration for officials and engineers alike. It also meant that all steppe lands could eventually 
become the target of resettlement projects, and as such the promise of new lands made fertile 
through irrigation or artesian wells continued to attract the attention of settlers and officials at the 
expense of Kazakhs. The dreams of settler colonialism that universally promised the chance to 
remake not only an environment but also the settlers themselves was a powerful motivator when 
coupled with the possibilities that imperial science and the bureaucracy unlocked (that this 
science was created in part by Kazakhs or peasants did not always matter). However, like most 
settler colonial undertakings things did not always go according to plan. Lastly, this impulse was 
constrained by a web of interactions between cholera, the steppe environment, hydraulic drilling 






CHAPTER SEVEN: THE TECHNO-SETTLER COLONY VERSUS THE LOCUST 
In the spring of 1914, with talk of war in the air across Europe, the Siberian Cossack Host 
mobilized to prepare for battle in defense of their homes and the Russian Empire. True to the 
nature of this twentieth century conflict, the bravery and muscle of the Cossacks would be 
deployed alongside chemical and mechanical warfare in the upcoming struggle, and the success 
of this campaign relied—as modern warfare so often does—on the infrastructure of railways and 
supply lines. However, the invasion the Cossacks faced was not the combined military might of 
the Central Powers whom they would soon fight on the battlefields of the Eastern Front. Instead, 
the enemy was one that officials, farmers, and nomads on the Kazakh steppe had failed to 
eliminate during decades of previous battle: the locust. 
 This conflict did not only employ the methods of modern warfare, it was also, like the 
First World War, a war for empire. However, battle against the locust was fought on a front in a 
different imperial project than the one that dragged Russia into war in Europe, it was just one 
front in the long war of settler colonialism on the Kazakh Steppe.551 The ideologies behind this 
conflict with the locust were no less important than the ideas of colonialism that helped bring 
about the Great War. However, they were—like the other aspects of scientific agriculture 
described in this dissertation—obscured by assumptions of scientific objectivity and rationality. 
 A closer examination of the story of locust control reveals that ethnic chauvinism, classist 
othering of peasants, hidden assumptions of what constituted progress, and belief in the 
superiority of market relations were just as important for scientists as faith in the scientific 
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method, objective observation, or Newtonian physics. The various projects of locust control also 
show the development, growth, and deployment of the nascent technostate that was in its early 
stages of development on the steppe as illustrated in the previous chapters of this dissertation. 
This nascent technostate culminated in the chemical locust control campaigns which were the 
technostate’s fullest manifestation. While this settler colonial technostate was in many ways 
expansive, invasive, and powerful, it also came close to failing in its project of remaking the 
steppe in part because of the locust.552 Reports like the following that describe the destruction the 
locust brought were consistent, and indicate the real threat locusts posed to settled agriculture: 
This year the locust has caused such large loses that peasant food stocks must be 
considered since the wheat was almost totally eaten by the locusts. The population was 
powerless to fight against them on their own and the means available to the regional 
administration were negligible. If next year a proper struggle is not organized, it is almost 
certain that in many villages the crops will be completely destroyed. I think that the loses 
from locusts this year amounted to something in the region of hundreds of thousands of 
rubles, but they of course could grow larger if preparatory work is not begun in time.553 
 
The inability of scientists and settlers to solve the pressing locust problem put the entire 
settler colonial project at risk for several reasons. First, locusts were primarily a threat to 
sedentary agriculture, nomads could and did move to areas untouched by the locusts.554 By the 
early twentieth century nomads were being pushed on to less and less land and had their grazing 
lands and migration routes curtailed. Prior to heavy peasant settlement, nomadism was thus a 
                                                 
552 While the locust was a significant problem, it was not the only pest threat, in addition to poor soils and water 
discussed elsewhere in this dissertation, plant diseases like wheat bunt (also known as smut) was also the target of 
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Department of the Steppe Governor Generalship, 20 April 1910. 
554 Though he also rightly points out that locusts did attack nomadic pastures, mobility as a defense against locusts is 
also made by Dolbee in his dissertation on nomads and locusts in a different region, Samuel Dolbee, “The Locust 
and the Starling: People, Insects, and Disease in the Late Ottoman Jazira and After, 1860-1940” (PhD diss., New 
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useful adaptation to the locust problem on the steppe. Secondly, settler colonialism is a project of 
remaking the environment and the settlers within it, and as such has a kind of utopianism at its 
roots. Lorenzo Veracini pointed to this when he wrote, “Settlers, unlike other migrants, 
“remove” to establish a better polity, either by setting up an ideal social body or by constituting 
an exemplary model of social organization.”555 The case of agricultural science on the Kazakh 
steppe enables us to broaden conceptions of settler colonialism that focus on the ideas and 
practices of the settlers, and, enables us to see that settler colonialism is not always driven by the 
ideas and actions of settlers alone.  On the steppe, imperial agronomists and scientists also 
played an important role that created similar outcomes to other settler colonial experiences. 
While Veracini focused on cultural and political power in his theoretical abstractions, the Kazakh 
steppe indicates that technopolitical power could serve much the same ends.    
However, this did not mean that the settler colonial state on the steppe was always 
successful. As previous chapters of this dissertation have shown, nearly all of the agronomic 
projects suffered significant setbacks and sometimes outright failure. Veracini recognized a 
similar tendency for settler colonialism “recurrently failing to establish the regenerated 
community.”556 Nevertheless, in other areas, imperial officials could point to physical 
infrastructures such as wells, railways, grain storage facilities, and the presence of wheat on the 
steppe where none had grown before. While other agricultural challenges officials had faced in 
the steppe—like weather, poor soils, and a lack of water—could be navigated and engineered 
around with at least something to show for their efforts, even if these projects often promised 
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more than they delivered.557 Scientists could also reinforce their power and legitimacy by using 
science to declare that certain areas were unfit for settlement due to low rainfalls, and poor soils 
fell into a similar category. Wells and irrigation ponds strengthened the narrative of settler 
colonial claims because they represented a physical presence that reinforced ideas of remaking 
and progress. Even if their symbolic significance sometimes outweighed their impact on 
agriculture, these structures still served as a kind of transcription written on the landscape that 
marked the land as colonized and signaled the supposed power of the colonizer.558 
The locust defied the claims of the Russian settler colonial project in part because they 
were often present in areas that had been deemed suitable to steppe settlement with plentiful 
rainfall and good soils.559 However, scientists had no effective infrastructure that they could 
place on the steppe to signify their work like they could with irrigation works or wells. 
Nevertheless, while not a physical signifier, the anti-locust spraying campaigns on the eve of the 
First World War served a similar role. What is more, these campaigns were in some ways even 
more effective physical representations of the settler colonial project because they were a 
demonstration of the vast power behind them. Similar to how the pageantry of a royal court or 
parades on Red Square served as a performance of power, the campaigns could potentially do the 
                                                 
557 On how even failed imperial agricultural projects could strengthen the colonial regime in Central Asia see, 
Ekaterina Pravilova, “River of Empire: Geopolitics, Irrigation, and the Amu Darya in the late XIXth Century,” 
Cahiers d' Asie Centrale 17/18 (2009): 255-287.       
558 Although they do not use the term technopolitics, other scholars of the Russian Empire have examined the 
connection between science and empire most notably: Nathaniel Knight, "Science, Empire, and Nationality: 
Ethnography in the Russian Geographical Society, 1845-1855" Imperial Russia: New Histories for the Empire eds. 
Jane Burbank and David L. Ransel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 108-141. David Moon, The 
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559 The problem of locusts was not limited to the Kazakh steppe. Other regions like Southern Russia and the North 
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suitable for sedentary grain agriculture. On the locust problem in other regions see Anastasia Fedotova and Aleksei 
Kuprianov “Resultat khimicheskoi bor’by blestiaschii, posevy zaschischayutsia, nastroenie bodroe: Boris Uvarov i 
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same.560 However, unlike parades that took place in colonial or imperial capitals, the pageantry 
of the anti-locust campaign came right to the doorstep of peasant settlers and Kazakhs.561 
In the process of combatting the locust, these campaigns enabled the empire to transcribe 
onto the landscape a narrative that symbolized and represented the power, organization, and 
effectiveness of the settler colonial project. What is more, it was a project of remaking settlers, 
nomads, and the environment that reached into the smallest localities and tied some of the most 
peripheral farmers and regions into the empire, and into a network of agronomic knowledge, 
technical machinery, and chemical pathways that stretched around the globe. The horse drawn 
sprayer overseen by the rayon agronomist or an agronomy student from St. Petersburg was a 
physical marker not only of the sprayer. It also signified the earlier mapping by imperial 
officials,  reports by the village nachalnik to the regional agronomist, as well as a connection to 
the railway lines that brought the sprayer and the rayon agronomist to the doorstep of the 
peasant, all of which were connected physically to the chemical factories in Estonia that supplied 
the insecticides.  
Therefore, the anti-locust campaigns represent this highest form of the nascent techno 
settler state because they were both a representation of the complex knowledge, personnel, and 
infrastructure networks that made up the settler colonial project, and were also the actual 
physical networks themselves, made manifest. The campaigns were then also the process of 
remaking the environment and people of the steppe while simultaneously being remade and 
reorganized itself. However, it is impossible to separate out these actors and forces into neat 
                                                 
560 Richard S. Wortman, Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy From Alexander II to the 
Abdication of Nicholas II, vol. 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). Michael Woods, “Performing Power: 
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561 This pattern was reflected in Russia as a whole with deeper penetration of the state into previously under-
governed areas, see: Judith Pallot, Land reform in Russia, 1906-1917: Peasant Responses to Stolypin's Project of 
Rural Transformation (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1999). Yanni Kotsonis, "“No place to go”: taxation and state 
transformation in late imperial and early Soviet Russia." The Journal of Modern History 76, no. 3 (2004): 531-577 
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categories, especially, or what Bruno Latour described as “the divide that separates exact 
knowledge and the exercise of power—let us say nature and culture.”562 
Physical and Mechanical Locust Control 
While steppe agronomists eventually pursued the mass spraying of pesticides to combat 
the locust, this practice only became coordinated on a large scale in the years just prior to the 
First World War. Before adopting chemical spraying, agronomists on the steppe proposed a 
variety of physical and mechanical locust controls, many of which were of marginal 
effectiveness, to create a cannon of anti-locust advice. Examining what made it into the cannon 
of appropriate techniques, and how agronomists talked about approved practices shows the 
hidden—and not so hidden—assumptions at work in the applied science of locust control.  
One of the main challenges of early attempts at locust control was the lack of effective 
advice, which had the potential to undercut the legitimacy of agronomists and their work on the 
steppe. This added to the cloud of mistrust and lack of confidence many peasant settlers had in 
agricultural science.563 The low opinion many peasants had of agronomy coupled with the real 
damage that locusts did to crops meant that agronomists needed some advice to offer steppe 
farmers. This advice usually consisted either of practices that peasants already used to control 
locusts or new techniques that agronomists hoped farmers would adopt on a wider scale. 
However, agronomists did not simply repeat peasant methods and recognize them as such. 
Instead, they described simple methods in exacting and complicated terms, a practice that could 
be described as making the simple complex. This repackaging made the advice seem new and 
more substantive even if it differed little in practice and effectiveness from peasant practices. It 
                                                 
562 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, 3. 
563 TsGARK f. 64 op. 1 d. 6175 ll. 23 “Otchet o deiatel’nosti agronomicheskoi organizatsii v Akmolinskoi oblasti za 
1913 god,” 31 January 1914. 
225 
 
also increased the perceived distance in knowledge between agronomists and farmers. Creating 
this kind of distance is a well-known method of producing and exerting power, especially in 
colonial contexts.564  
In 1894, the applied entomologist I.A. Porchinskii, disparagingly described how peasant 
settlers on the steppe had attempted to protect their crops from locusts by collecting them on 
large pieces of canvas.565 The peasants first spread the canvases around the infested fields and 
then attempted to chase the locusts onto the canvases.566 Porchinskii was only an observer and 
not a participant in this “sad” and demoralizing scene. He had described the peasants in order to 
make a point about the backwardness of peasant locust control that did not use science and 
juxtapose it with his own locust control advice later in the text.  
Therefore, it is surprising that in spite of Porchinskii’s apparent skepticism on gathering 
locusts by hand, later, in the same text he gave his own advice on the proper approach to hand 
gathering locusts. His approach consisted of two methods, one for young locusts and the other 
for adults, although in truth they operated on the same principle, and simply required a slightly 
modification to the equipment. Porchinskii’s methods consisted of using a small homemade 
butterfly net that he gave the important soundings name of “entomological net.”567 
His description of the net is somewhat excessive because it was actually a rather simple 
construction made of a metal loop, “not more than one and a half arshin in diameter.” For 
catching young locusts the net was supposed to be used without a handle and the farmer was 
directed to hunch close to the ground, but for an adult locust infestation a long handle was added 
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so the farmer could stand. Porchinskii’s advice even came with illustrations in case peasants 
were unsure how to crouch and stand.  It is difficult to read this advice and not suspect that 
Porchinskii was not in part compensating for a lack of scientific advice on how to deal with 
locusts by using overly exacting instructions. If he had simply said to peasants “make a net and 
go catch locusts” the reality is his advice would not be very different from what many peasants 
were already doing.568 
However, Porchinskii, and other steppe agronomists were able to turn their lack of 
effective advice into an effective means of creating difference and the perception of useful 
specialized knowledge. Giving specific advice using units of measurement to construct the net, 
Porchinskii emphasized his credentials as a scientist, trained in St. Petersburg.569 This classroom 
and laboratory training also prepared Porchinskii in his own mind to give ergonomic advice to 
peasants who no doubt spent significantly more time working outside than Porchinskii. In 
advising peasants to use his carefully described etymological net, Porchinskii effectively 
changed the conversation from one where he had little to offer peasants beyond what they were 
already doing, to one where he was the expert, with exacting and complex advice. Porchinskii 
made the simple complex, which reinforced his position as an expert with specialized training 
and also highlighted the difference between himself and peasant farmers.  
 Just as agronomists could try to increase their legitimacy and difference from peasant 
practices by making simple technologies seem complex, they could also co-opt peasant practices 
and claim them as their own to achieve similar results. In fact, by the time Porchinskii was 
writing, peasants were already devising more complicated methods to catch locusts. In numerous 
newspaper articles peasants were reportedly constructing their own plows and locust gathering 
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farm machinery to deal with the locusts.570 Especially in the South Russian steppe and Siberia 
peasants had invented simple lawnmower-like machines with nets attached to collect locusts. 
These locust catching machines were usually referred to as “hopper dozers” and worked either 
by scooping up locusts from the ground and dumping them into an attached bag or barrel, or by 
utilizing a sticky substance like tar that the locusts would be jump into only to become stuck.571 
Hopper dozers were, however, not unique to the Russian locust experience as farmers in another 
settler colony plagued by locusts, the American West, also constructed similar machines.572  
Agronomists like Porchinskii described and advised peasants to use hopper dozers and 
other similar machines, however, they rarely recognized that peasants were often the ones who 
designed and constructed them. Porchinskii reported that peasants in Orenburg Oblast “used” 
these types of machines, but he did not describe who built and designed them. Instead, he 
remarked on how “in spite of [the machines’] simplicity uncomplicatedness” construction of 
these machines is beyond the power of every peasant household, and requires the help of the 
local administration.573 The fact that scientists often did not make a point of mentioning the folk 
roots of these machines stood in stark contrast to the discoveries and inventions of agronomists 
whose names and places of discoveries litter the pages of agronomic texts and newspapers. 
However, it was not only that agronomists failed to emphasize the original source of these 
inventions. Publishing these ideas gave them the mark of science as well. Once a diagram was 
drawn and printed in an agronomic pamphlet, whatever its original source, the technology could 
then be placed into the category of agricultural science since scientists rarely credited the 
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inventors.574 They were not only writing peasants out of history and ignoring them and their 
innovations, they were actively expropriating their ideas and calling them their own.  
 The appropriation of peasant methods did not mean that agronomists had no innovations 
or new suggestions for dealing with locusts. Most agronomists suggested plowing as a way to 
defend against locusts, and the majority of agronomic advice discussed proper plowing in depth, 
although it sometimes seemed little more effective than other means of locust control, probably 
due to the large areas of unplowed steppe. Nevertheless, recommending plowing was a 
significant innovation for two reasons. First, the steel plows that agronomists recommended were 
a technology that they could claim some type of authority over (as opposed to traditional wooden 
plows), since the plowing was to take place at specific depths and in a manner in keeping with 
exacting scientific advice.575 Secondly, plowing fit in neatly with agronomic assumptions about 
how the steppe should be utilized, because it reinforced the fact that farmers should work plowed 
and planted fields that stayed in the same location every year.  
In spite of plowing’s significance for the above reasons, its effectiveness appeared to be 
at times marginal, and most believed that it should be used in conjunction with other control 
methods.576 Nevertheless, because plowing fit within agronomists’ other ideas about what the 
steppe needed it was a central part of their advice. Additionally, the way agronomists talked 
about plowing further reinforced their authority as experts. Almost any advice on locusts began 
with a discussion of how agricultural scientists had discovered there were several types of locusts 
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and that locusts laid their eggs in the ground.577 However, it was not until relatively later that 
agronomists paid much attention to the idea that different species of locusts might require 
different approaches, instead their advice was almost always identical regardless of the species. 
This raises the question of why they always mentioned it, even in pamphlets specifically 
targeting peasants.  
More significant was the observation that locusts laid their eggs in the ground. 
Agronomists often erroneously claimed that before they had made this discovery, peasants 
believed that locusts came falling out of the sky, and were a punishment from God.578 The fact 
that at least one peasant was credited with leading agronomists to an egg infestation on the 
steppe however, makes this claim suspect.579 Nevertheless, this framing had the effect of 
distancing peasant knowledge about locusts to the realm of ineffective and irrational superstition, 
and again contributed to the creation of difference between peasant and scientists’ knowledge. 
Furthermore, centering the discussion on egg laying made it possible to reiterate that plowing 
was based on the scientific discovery that locusts lay eggs in the ground. It allowed agronomists 
to finally bring something new to the discussion: plowing. Once on the subject of plows, 
agronomists were on their home turf and were therefore willing to give even more specific 
advice including specific plows, typically heavy steel plows, whose wider adoption many 
agronomists had encouraged separate from the locust problem.580 Buying a new plow also tied 
peasant farmers closer into the networks of market relations that were also part of the agenda of 
scientific farming. Therefore, while not necessarily a primary concern, it was a welcome side 
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benefit because throughout the entire empire, and especially on the Kazakh steppe, agronomists 
bemoaned the lack of advanced technology employed by peasants.581 
Agronomists did not simply encourage peasants to plow, they had specific ideas of when 
and how, and also to what ends. Agronomists did not only want peasants to adopt more technical 
and science-based farming practices because it fit into their worldview (although importantly, it 
did). Many agronomists were concerned that land in the steppe was quickly filling up with new 
peasant settlers. They worried that settlers and Kazakhs were using too much land and farming it 
too extensively. Therefore, they hoped that more intensive agricultural practices that were also 
more capital and science intensive, would allow for greater productivity for the empire, and also 
for more dense settlement that would help relieve pressure on overcrowded provinces in 
European Russia.582  
In addition to addressing land pressure, agronomists also believed that a move toward 
more intensive farming would help with locust control. Some agronomists even claimed that 
good agricultural practices and locust control were in fact the same set of practices. One went so 
far as to say that, “Locusts are not found in gubernia which practice proper agriculture, where 
there is not idle or empty land,” and that proper plowing and compact planting were not only 
good at protecting crops from locusts they could also “facilitate the transition from backward and 
unsound methods, or to say it another way from extensive to intensive farming.”583 Similarly 
agronomists in Akmola Oblast encouraged farmers to decrease and consolidate plowed areas, 
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and leave behind the practice of scattered fields spread over the steppe with large areas of 
unplowed steppe in between. The agronomists hoped this would allow for an easier defense of 
planted crops while the locusts ravaged the open steppe.584 
While nearly all steppe agronomists hoped to encourage more intensive agriculture, they 
were not monolithic, and often differed in their ideas about how to achieve these ends. Part of the 
way some agronomists proposed making peasant agriculture more productive and intensive 
beyond better machinery and intensive plowing was by planting more winter rye instead of 
spring wheat. This was because winter rye could be harvested earlier in the spring, which meant 
it was in less danger of being harmed by a summer drought or by locusts if it was harvested early 
enough. Winter rye also had the added benefit of fall plowing and planting, which agronomists 
believed was most effective at disrupting and killing locust larvae buried in the ground.585 
Therefore, many agronomists recommended fall plowing for winter wheat to a depth of 3.5-4 
vershok (1 vershok equals 1 ¾ inches) and to fully turn the ground over to be sure and expose 
any locust eggs.586  
While winter wheat with fall plowing held great potential for locust control, it is also a 
less valuable crop than spring wheat. Most peasant settlers to the Kazakh steppe came from the 
provinces of South Russia, and tended to prefer to eat wheat bread and so they had sold rye on 
the market. Since the distance to markets was much greater on the Kazakh steppe, winter rye 
held little appeal as the cost of transport.587 Had agronomists been solely concerned with 
encouraging farmers to maximize quick profits and expand cash crop production they might have 
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favored spring wheat over winter rye, which most peasant settlers already favored. However, 
many agronomists took the position of discouraging spring wheat at the expense of less 
profitable rye.  
These agronomists wanted to encourage more winter rye production not only because of 
its locust control benefits, but also because they hoped that growing winter rye would free up 
space and time for peasants to produce more hay. Nearly all agronomists and officials frequently 
bemoaned the fact that large amounts of land on the open steppe discouraged the production of 
hay and fodder on the farm. Open land meant that peasants could simply rent out steppe pasture, 
and the availability of cheap land for rent nearby meant that there was little incentive to plant and 
tend pasture or cut hay. This was especially true because hay cutting often intersected with peak 
labor times for spring wheat. Some agronomists hoped that if peasants switched to winter wheat 
they would have more time in the spring and summer and to plant pasture and harvest hay. This 
hay could potentially be fed to improved livestock which could be kept either as dairy animals, 
or sold for a much higher price than either spring wheat or winter rye.588  
In the pre-chemical spraying campaign era, agronomic advice was not strictly a question 
of effective versus ineffective science, nor was it a question of expanding market relations versus 
self-sufficiency. To understand how knowledge about locust control was created and deployed, it 
is also useful to think of early locust control as a kind of technopolitics which Edwards and 
Hecht describe as a “hybrid form of power [that] has cultural, institutional, and technological 
dimensions.”589 While most historians use technopolitical power to explain twentieth century 
phenomenon, as an analytical lens it is useful in helping to illustrate how steppe agronomists 
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were not simply choosing what kind of advice to give based only on scientific research in a 
vacuum free of other influences. Additionally, the technostate was beginning to form (although 
still incomplete) already in the late imperial period on the steppe.  
Furthermore, a technopolitical lens offers important insight even into understanding the 
period before the technostate was fully formed. If the questions of plowing and spring wheat 
were considered using only the lens of environment, technology, or the development of 
capitalism, the policies and conflicting advice of agronomists can appear to have little 
intellectual coherence. Similarly, one fruitful way some scholars have attempted to make sense 
of the bureaucracy’s role in settlement is by focusing on the question of professionalization, and 
the work of those like Willard Sunderland and Peter Holquist in this area is invaluable.590 
However, locust control was about more than only the internal workings of the bureaucracy. The 
advice agronomists gave was not only made to combat the locust or because of bureaucratic 
culture, nor was it given simply to encourage peasants to cash in quickly on spring wheat, or 
conversely to engage in more intensive diversified animal husbandry. It was all of these impulses 
and forces working themselves out while attempting to administer and transform the steppe in a 
colonial context. To put it another way, agronomists on the steppe were creating knowledge that 
created and in turn was created by their power in their roles as both imperial officials and 
scientists, and neither identity was guaranteed to have the upper hand. Furthermore, the projects 
the agronomists were developing were not entirely of their own making. There is a certain 
instability in technopolitics because the project is neither fully political nor technological. Its 
creators include both scientists and administrators in addition to peasants and nomads, and as 
Timothy Mitchell argued, non-human actors like mosquitos and disease, or in this case, 
                                                 
590 On the technocratic ethos in settlement see: Willard Sunderland, "The Ministry of Asiatic Russia” and Holquist, 
““In Accord with State Interests and the People's Wishes.” 
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locusts.591 It is this interaction of human and non-human with culture, economics, and other 
forces that creates the instability and contradictions of technopolitics that technopolitical power 
is so effective at obscuring. 
Biological Control 
 In spite of their best efforts, imperial agronomists and scientists recognized that 
mechanical or physical control of locusts was often ineffective, even when practiced 
scientifically and utilizing several methods such as plowing, compact planting, and hand picking. 
Therefore, many agricultural scientists sought other means of addressing the problem that 
potentially threatened the existence and legitimacy of the settler colonial technostate. Over the 
course of several years on the eve of the First World War, some agricultural scientists became 
convinced that parasitic bacteria offered the best hope at protecting crops and destroying the 
locust. Examining the story of this failed experiment reveals that rather than a peripheral 
backwater, the Kazakh steppe was an important part of a transnational network of innovative 
science and scientific debates. This contradictory status of the steppe as both peripheral and 
underdeveloped in the eyes of agronomists and officials and at the forefront of scientific 
knowledge creation and experimentation is an important aspect of the steppe’s role in the nascent 
settler colonial technostate and reflects a need for an examination of this tension found in many 
frontier technostates. This ambivalent status of the settler colony that understood the steppe as 
once a vacant underdeveloped region, and also the site of a utopian project uncovers a 
connection between the utopianism of both the settler colony project and of western science as 
an ideology. 
                                                 
591 Mitchell, Rule of Experts, 19-53. 
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 Finding mechanical controls ineffective scientists around the globe at the beginning of 
the twentieth century began searching for alternatives. On the Kazakh steppe, two of these 
alternatives eventually found themselves as competing solutions to the locust problem. These 
two alternatives were biological controls that sought to use bacteria to control the locusts, and 
chemical controls that sprayed chemical pesticides. However, both approaches represent an 
important difference from mechanical control as they were an opportunity not just to mitigate the 
problem, but rather in many instances they sought outright extermination. While chemical 
controls eventually won out as the primary means of control in the debate on the Kazakh steppe, 
this outcome was not at all certain at the dawn of the twentieth century and reveal an important 
aspect of historical contingency in the steppe settlement story. Furthermore, examining the 
claims of biological control and its competition with chemical controls uncovers the story of the 
settler colonial technostate’s attempts at legitimacy and also the role of steppe science on both 
empire-wide and global scales. 
 Bacteriological control of locusts began in Central and South America with the work of 
Candian-born Felix d’Herelle. D’Herelle who later became famous during the First World War 
as one of the discoverers of bacteriophage, work that he continued in Soviet Georgia with the 
famed microbiologist George Eliva.592 While the later connection to the Soviet Union is well 
known, d’Herelle had an earlier role in the development of science in the Russian empire. In 
1910 he was working in Mexico on a project to turn sisal into alcohol when a locust invasion 
arrived in the Yucatan, curious, he collected dead locusts that he noticed, “sick locusts, easily 
picked out since their principal symptom was an abundant blackish diarrhea.”593 D’Herelle 
                                                 
592 On the debates and history of bacteriophage, Donna H. Duckworth, “Who Discovered Bacteriophage?” 
Bacteriological Review 40 no. 4 (December 1976): 793-802, William C. Summers, “The Strange History of 
Bacteriophage” Bacteriophage 2 no. 2 (2012): 130-133. 
593 D. P. Shrayer, “Felix d’Herelle in Russia” Bulletin Institute Pasteur 94 (1996): 91. 
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investigated the bacteria in the locusts stomach and isolated the “locust coccobacilli” which he 
later argued was his first observation of bacteriophage. Ultimately, he went on to test his locust 
killing bacteria in Argentina and Tunisia.594  
Word of d’Herelle’s experiments eventually reached Sergei Sergeivich Merezhkovskii, 
the head of the Agricultural Bacteriological Laboratory for the Ministry of Agriculture in St. 
Petersburg.595 The laboratory had been established in 1891 to conduct, “battle against 
agricultural pests” similar to d’Herelle’s own work several decades later.596 By 1910, as head of 
the laboratory, Merezhkovskii had already conducted several successful experiments into 
utilizing a strain of salmonella bacteria that was harmless to humans in order to kill rodents. 
However, his main challenge was not isolating a bacteria that was effective and harmless to 
humans, but rather keeping that bacteria alive in the natural environment long enough for mice 
and groundhogs to eat it.597 In spite of his own similar experience—or perhaps because of it—
Merezhkovskii seemed at first to have been skeptical of d’Herelle’s claims. However, the appeal 
of a bacteria that was harmless to humans and that could defeat the locusts in the face of the 
powerlessness of the imperial agronomic bureaucracy was too great. By the spring of 1912, 
Merezhkovskii was in communication with Pierre Paul Emile Roux, the director of the Pasteur 
Institute in Paris in search of a sample of d’Herelle’s locust killing bacteria.598  
In the winter of 1913, Merezhkovskii, still unable to obtain a sample of d’Herelle’s 
bacteria cast a wider net in his search, and thereby connected the battle against locusts on the 
                                                 
594 Eric C. Keen “Felix d’Herelle and Our Microbial Future” Future Microbiology 7, 12 (December 2012): 1337. 
595 Rossiskii Gosudarstvenniyi istoricheskii arkhiv [Russian State Historical Archive] hereafter referred to as RGIA. 
RGIA f. 462, op. 1, d. 22, “Perepiska s yentomologicheskimi stantsiami, agronomami i dr. uchrezhdeniami i litsami 
o vysyske kul’tur batsili i ob organizatsii issledovanii po izucheniyu bakteriologicheskikh metodov dlia istrebleniia 
saranchi” saranchi.”  
596 GNU Vserossiiskii nauchno-issledovatel’skii institute sel’skokhoziiastvennoi mikrobiologii 
http://www.arriam.spb.ru/rus/history.html. 
597 “S. S. Merezhkovskii” Bolshaya Medizinskaya Encyclopedia. (Moscow: Sovietskaia Entsiklopediia, 1970). 
598 RGIA f. 462, op.1, d. 22, ll. 3. Correspondence between S. S. Merezhkovskii and Professor Roux, Feb. 27, 1913. 
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Kazakh steppe to a global network of imperial scientists working on the same problem. During 
the spring, d’Herelle had also been busy, after Mexico, he had attached himself to the Pasteur 
Institute in Paris, and through this connection, although unpaid, parlayed this work into a locust 
control project using bacterialogical control in Argentina. After Argentina, where he claimed 
success, but local authorities said his work was ineffective, he moved to French North Africa to 
combat locusts using the same methods he claimed success with in Argentina.599 Merezhkovskii, 
having apparently received no answer from his original request from Professor Roux at the 
Pasteur Institute, next tried directly contacting the Argentinian Ministry of Agriculture. The 
Argentinian’s appear to have been happy to oblige and supplied Merezhkovskii with some 
samples of the bacteria. However, perhaps sensing d’Herelle’s claims might have been 
overblown, he also requested the ministry send him copies of all the reports on the “question of 
the bacteriological destruction of the locust.”600   
 In addition to contacting the Argentinian Ministry of Agriculture, Merezhkovskii also 
contacted the head of the Pasteur Institute’s office in Algeria, Musapha-Alger.601 It was perhaps 
through this connection that at some point in 1913 Merezhkovskii was able to travel to Algeria 
where he observed d’Herelle’s experiments first hand.602 However, he had not given up on the 
Paris office in his attempt to collect a sample. In an apparent attempt at using his personal 
networks in the Russian scientific community, he wrote to Ilya Mechnikov, the famed Russian 
zoologist who had left his laboratory in Odessa for Paris in 1888.603 In this communication, 
                                                 
599 Eric C. Keen “Felix d’Herelle and Our Microbial Future”, 1337. 
600 RGIA F. 462, op.1, d. 22, ll. 7. Merezhkovskii correspondence with Argentinian Ministry of Agriculture. July 
1913. 
601 RGIA F. 462, op.1, d. 22, ll.1. Merezhkovskii correspondence with Mustapha-Alger. December 6, 1913. 
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603 On Mechnikov’s life and work see, Simon Gordon “Elie Metchnikoff: Father of Natural Imunity” European 
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Merezhkovskii also asked Mechnikov to confirm a rumor that the Pasteur Institute was sending 
the bacteria even to private individuals, something that he believed was a bad idea.604  
Whether it was through his personal appeal, or his trip to the Algerian laboratory, 
eventually in the spring or early summer of 1913, Merezhkovskii received samples of d’Herelle’s 
bacteria from the Pasteur Institute.605 The breadth of scientists that Merezhkovskii was in contact 
with to obtain the bacteria is indicative of the broad network of expertise closely tied to colonial 
apparatuses like the Pasteur Institute.606 This global network of colonial science and scientists 
did not always have a strict allegiance only to their own nation, and the involvement of Russian 
imperial agronomy with the French underlines the transnational nature of the colonial sciences 
with power centered in the global north. Russian imperial science and the global network of 
locust control scientists in the early twentieth century shares another connection through 
Merezhkovskii’s work. The father of modern locust control, Boris Uvarov, who Merezhkovskii 
communicated with as part of his work on locusts in the North Caucuses later left Russia and 
moved to Great Britain where he founded the Anti-Locust Research Centre in London. This 
center was the central research institution for locust control projects in the British Empire in the 
post-World War Two period. In addition to his locust experience on the North Caucasus steppe, 
Uvarov also grew up in Uralsk on the Kazakh steppe and was certainly already familiar with 
locusts from childhood.607  
                                                 
604 RGIA F. 462, op.1, d. 22, ll. 4. Merezhkovskii communication with Ilya Mechnikov. March 1, 1913. 
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In addition to illustrating the ease with which colonial scientists crossed imperial 
boundaries and created knowledge in the aid of colonialism, Merezhkovskii’s work also shows 
how, in Veracini’s words, “Settler colonialism as a mode of domination things geopolitically.”608 
The regions that were most interested in d’Herelle’s bacteria like North Africa, Argentina, or the 
steppe, were typically settler colonial projects. The parallels between Argentina and the steppe 
are particularly interesting because both the Argentinian pampas and the steppe were regions that 
were being settled by non-indigenous settlers during roughly the same time period, and with 
roughly the same goals of securing a peripheral region and expanding wheat production.609 In 
fact, it was this increase and desire of authorities in Russia and Argentina to extend sedentary 
agriculture and settlement that caused the locusts threat. The communication between 
Merezhkovskii and the Argentinians make clear this connection is more than only a question of 
environment but also one that was linked to policy choice and ideology.610  
 Simultaneous to his attempts to secure the sample bacteria across the globe, 
Merezhkovskii was busy working with the imperial Russian agronomic bureaucracy on its own 
experiments. During the spring and summer of 1913, he was in contact with numerous officials 
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on the Kazakh steppe as well as other regions, seeking test sites. In his communications with 
potential test sites, Merezhkovskii requested that the agronomists identify one or more fifty 
square kilometer test sites that were not more than one to two hours ride from a site that had seen 
a locust outbreak. While Merezhkovskii did not limit his search to the Kazakh steppe, he did 
specifically seek out agronomists in Turgai, Akmola, and Semipalatinsk oblasts to test 
d’Herelle’s bacteria.611 
All of the steppe scientists contacted by Merezhkovskii responded enthusiastically to his 
questions about testing the bacteria in their region.612 The Turgai oblast agronomist, suggested a 
site near Zatobolsk whose land was “infested over a large area with locust eggs.” He went on to 
recommend the site as it was close to the town of Kostanay, where Merezhkovskii could stay. He 
also noted that while the local agronomic organization had planned on conducting an anti-locust 
pesticide spraying campaign, they had no plans for this site and his help would be most 
welcome.613 This willingness on the part of the local agronomist to use any and all means at his 
disposal to combat the locust indicates that his main concern was not necessarily discerning the 
superiority of the chemical or the biological control method, he simply hoped for something that 
would work. 
 While the outbreak of war in 1914 meant that the records of Merezhkovskii’s 
experiments in the steppe are incomplete, it is clear that at least one test site did receive samples 
of d’Herelle’s bacteria. The head of the Omsk Veterinary Laboratory, a man named Kuleshov, 
already had a working relationship with Merezhkovskii before word of d’Herelle’s experiments 
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arrived in Russia. Merezhkovskii’s own work, and indeed the primary work of the St. Petersburg 
laboratory had focused on using bacteria to infect rodents. Most of the attention was focused on 
mice and rats as grain thieves and carriers of disease. However, on the steppe, another rodent, the 
groundhog, was a serious pest as well. Groundhogs were a problem because they destroyed 
crops, but also because they were carriers of plague and other diseases, therefore, much of the 
steppe veterinary bureaucracy was concerned with controlling them, and the scientists at the 
laboratory in Omsk were among them. They had been conducting experiments on mice on 
Merezhkovskii’s behalf that they were quite hopeful about. Kuleshov wanted Merezhkovskii’s 
permission and advice on how to utilize the same bacteria on groundhogs.614 However, 
Merezhkovskii “could not yet recommend” this use of the bacteria. Nevertheless, he hoped they 
would carefully utilize the seven vials of d’Herelle’s bacteria he had sent them to test on locusts, 
and asked them to recommend additional sites where the bacteria could be tested.615 
 While Merezhkovskii was interested in additional sites near Omsk, this was not because 
he had a lack of willing volunteers. In fact, the Semipalatinsk agronomic bureaucracy was 
desperate for help in combatting the locust. However, this was not because they had been 
inactively waiting for help from St. Petersburg, rather they had themselves been busy 
experimenting on and battling with locusts. According to the Semipalatinsk oblast head 
agronomist, the region had “long suffered from locusts, and therefore such measures [as 
bacteriological control] would be warmly welcomed by both the local administration and the 
local agronomic organization.” He went on to offer Merezhkovskii the use of the agricultural and 
milk testing laboratories as well as the former school for lodging.616  
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 In spite of the oblast agronomist’s enthusiasm for Merezhkovskii’s help, he did raise 
questions about the effectiveness of the bacteria. He reported to Merezhkovskii that he had 
already seen the bacteria at work at the laboratory in Omsk when he had visited Kuleshov. The 
laboratory had a locust under glass that had been infected with the bacteria and was still alive 
and eating grass after 10 days. He also indicated that he had himself written to scientists in Paris 
(presumably at the Pasteur Institute) to inquire about the most up to date scientific literature on 
the topic. Finally, he noted that he and his associates were already beginning experiments with 
the bacteria. While he did not indicate the source of the bacteria, it appears it may have been 
from his trip to Omsk.617  
This correspondence does not indicate a relationship in which all information and 
direction flowed from the central laboratory in the capital. Rather, it shows that agricultural 
scientists working in a peripheral region were—both through St. Petersburg and on their own—
in close communication with a global network of scientists, while simultaneously creating their 
own localized networks of knowledge and connection on the steppe. In fact, if there was a client 
in this relationship, it was Merezhkovskii who had come rather late to the study of locusts. For 
example, the scientists in Semipalatinsk indicated they had been undertaking serious study of the 
locust problem and attempting to combat it first starting in 1908, and they gave Merezhkovskii 
specific information about the species of locusts to be found in the region, indicating that most of 
the locusts were Italian locusts.618  
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 In early November 1913, the Military Economic Board of the Siberian Cossack Host met 
in Omsk to discuss the failures of the previous two years of campaigns against the locust.619 
During the meeting, the members commented that attempts to control locusts through spraying 
the insecticide “Paris Green” could only “protect crops against locusts, and the complete 
destruction of the locusts with this method is not possible.”620 Bemoaning the “enormous harm to 
crops” caused by the locusts, the board was interested in new ways of combatting locusts, 
especially if they allowed these military minds the opportunity to destroy rather than simply 
control their enemy. In search of new methods, they had summoned the head of the agronomic 
department who reported he had read about experiments carried out near Baku under the 
command of the Viceroy of the Caucuses, Illarion Vorontsov-Dashkov. These experiments 
involved using samples of d’Herelle’s bacteria. The article itself had been shared with the 
Cossack head agronomist by the Governor General of Semipalatinsk Oblast, who had been 
informed of the experiments in Baku by his chief agronomist at a meeting in Zaisan. Armed with 
this knowledge the agronomists of Semipalatinsk oblast and his Cossack counterpart petitioned 
the head of the Russian Society of Acclimatization, N.I Babushkin, who had conducted the 
experiments in Baku, to travel to Omsk and report on the possibility of conducting similar 
bacteriological control experiments.621 
 Babushkin arrived in Omsk on August 7, and that day spoke to a meeting organized by 
the Cossack administration, at their headquarters. Also invited to the meeting were 
representatives of the Akmola and Semipalatinsk agronomic organizations, Kuleshov, the head 
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of the Omsk Veterinary Laboratory, and officials in the Cossack administration along with 
members of the local agronomic organizations.622 This wide array of representatives was in part 
a recognition of the problem of locusts not adhering to administrative boundaries.623 Officials 
often reported that effective locust control would be impossible without input and activity from 
across administrative borders.624 The experiments were to be conducted under the direction of 
Babushkin and Kuleshov, but with the involvement of the agronomic staff of Akmola and 
Semipalatinsk oblasts in addition to the Siberian Cossack agronomic staff.625  
 The planned experiments for the spring of 1914 consisted of creating a “broth” in which 
scientists could grow larger numbers of bacteria. An area of 1,000 desyatins of military land in 
Pavlodar uezd where there was a major locust infestation was to be fenced off for the 
experiment. Meanwhile, Kuleshov set to work brewing 3,000 litres of broth filled with 
d’Herelle’s bacteria. Babushkin, and four university students from Moscow were to conduct the 
experiments. By the fall of 1913, Kuleshov was already brewing broth and beginning to test it on 
locusts, both by infecting individuals, and by spreading the broth on the steppe, and he seemed 
happy with the results, however the outbreak of war meant the experiments were limited.626 
Bacterial control, while promising, was limited in its success. Some sceptics like 
Merezhkovskii believed this was because the bacteria mutated over time and became less 
effective at killing locusts.627 Nevertheless, these failed experiments offer useful insight into the 
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work, outlook and effects of steppe agronomy as a technopolitical and settler colonial project. 
Additionally, because d’Herelle’s bacteria lended itself to the sharing of information and 
materials, it shows how even scientific collaboration between scientists, and a levelling of the 
hierarchy between center and periphery could further the colonial project. Finally, the levels of 
deep and applied local knowledge being created not in the center but in peripheral regions 
supports Marina Loskutova and Anasatsia Fedotova’s work on the role of scientists working in 
South Russia grain growing regions. Their work “[examines] the role of networks that connected 
naturalists and agriculturalists, academic scholars, state officials, and local public activists in the 
nineteenth-century Russian empire. These networks enabled the circulation of specimens, 
observations, research guidelines, and farming recommendations, thus ultimately leading to the 
advancement of knowledge about insect.”628 While the story of biological control in a later 
period shows a similar mix of actors and points away from a top down center-periphery 
relationship, it also adds a global dimension. Addressing the problem of locusts in the steppe was 
not only a case of local networks, but of localized knowledge networks connected to a global 
conversation that was deeply imbedded in colonial power and ideologies. However, with the 
coming of chemical control, these networks would not survive in their dispersed form. Instead, 
locust control, like water, plant and animal breeding shifted towards a more centralized 
agronomic and technopolitical power on the Kazakh steppe. 
 In spite of the potential of bacteriological control, spraying pesticides was the only 
effective method of killing large numbers of locusts before 1917. Nevertheless, there were still 
some voices within the agronomic and administrative bureaucracy of the Siberian Cossack host 
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and the Akmola administration who believed bacteriological control was the best path 
forward.629 While they were given some support for smaller experimental projects like the one 
led by Babushkin described above, these projects were much smaller than the large chemical 
spraying campaigns that emerged as the preferred method of locust control by 1914. 
Chemical Control 
By 1905, pesticide spraying to protect crops against locusts was relatively widespread 
agronomic advice. Several pamphlets had been produced to advise peasant settlers on how to 
defend against locusts, and spraying was usually part of the advice. However, it was only 
suggested in conjunction with other practices, and usually only as a last resort. While these 
pamphlets often included information on horse drawn sprayers, most of the attention was focused 
on smaller backpack sprayers, indicating that the advice was mostly for peasants who would only 
spray a few acres.630 Therefore, it was not the practice of chemical spraying that separates the 
1913 and 1914 anti-locust campaigns in Turgai and Akmola oblasts and the Siberian Cossack 
lands from earlier locust control attempts. The technologies were in fact largely the same.631 
However, they were fundamentally different in their scale, scope, and vision, and in the 
resources and plans required to carry them out.  
 While officials and farmers had been battling locusts in Turgai for years, 1913 marked a 
significant change, especially in the administrative response. The Turgai-Uralsk Resettlement 
district carried out the largest, and best documented campaign, but similar campaigns took place 
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in both Akmola and in the lands of the Siberian Cossack Host during the same period.632 During 
the spring of 1913, in response to ever increasing crop loses to the locust, the Governor General 
of Turgai Oblast ordered a survey of the extent of locust infestation. The results alarmed officials 
because the number and extent of the eggs found indicated that 1914 would be worse than the 
already difficult 1913.633   
 In response to the coming calamity, the administration called in an expert from the 
Ministry of Agriculture in St. Petersburg, S. A. Zhurin. His plan for addressing the locust threat 
consisted of two parts to be conducted simultaneously. The first part of the plan was to study and 
record the spread and infestation of the locusts, the second part was a massive “continuous” 
insecticide spraying program.634 Zhurin focused his efforts on the northern 2/3 of Qostanay uezd, 
although there was a relatively large mapping project in Aktobe uezd as well.635 The plan 
centered on protecting the 138,590 desyatins636 of cultivated wheat and rye in Qostanay uezd, the 
vast majority of which was cultivated by peasant settlers.637 Zhurin and others felt that the 
greatest threat to these cultivated lands were the large areas of uncultivated steppe. Therefore, 
they focused most of their attention on the areas nearest peasant settlement districts, and largely 
ignored cultivated Kazakh areas, saying that these areas were too far from railway lines, and too 
widely dispersed to be worthwhile.638 In other regions, similar studies of the extent of locust egg 
                                                 
632 TsGARK, f. 64 op. 1, d. 6175, “Otchet o deiatel’nosti agronomicheskoi organizatsii v Akmolinskoi oblasti za 
1913 god” 31 January 1914. 
633 S. A. Zhurin, Otchet зavedyvayuschago rabotami protivosaranchevoi ekspeditsii, 1914, 2  
634 RGIA f. 391 op. 5 d. 1028, ll. 2, “O bor’be s kobylkoyu i drugimi vrediteliami v sel’skom khoziaistve Turgaisk-
Ural’skogo raiona,” 31 January 1914. 
635 Zhurin, Otchet, 24-29. 
636 1 desiatin equals 1.1 hectares. 
637 TsGARK f. 25, op. 1, d. 311, ll. 6, Zhurnal soedinennogo zasedaniia obshego prisustviia Turgaiskogo 
oblastnogo pravleniia i oblastnogo agronomicheskogo soveshaniia za ianvaria, January 1915. 
638 Zhurin, Otchet, 12. 
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infestation were also carried out, typically before spraying campaigns started in the late spring 
and early summer.639 
 Zhurin proposed to concentrate his efforts on 30,000 desiatins of land that would buffer 
more densely cultivated areas from the open steppe. This area was then divided up into 36 
districts. Each district was overseen by a district head, nearly all of whom were students, mostly 
in the natural sciences, at universities in Moscow or St. Petersburg who were brought to the 
region to oversee the work. While at first the creation of ordered districts might seem an 
innovation, even pre-conquest locust control had divided lands to be protected into plots to 
gather, trample, or burn locusts.640 The district heads were responsible for visiting sites of locust 
infestation, and determining the amount of labor needed to deal with the problem. They were in 
turn overseen by seven instructors, all of whom were also students (though presumably more 
senior). Zhurin was at the head of the entire operation, which he guided with the help of three 
assistants who were also students. Spread out over dozens of miles, these workers main job was 
to locate and record locust infestations, attempt to identify the species of locust, and to record 
what damage they had done and what plants the insects ate first.641 
However, since the students were not locals, they needed local assistance. This help was 
supplied by the peasant headmen (nachalniks). They served as intermediaries who told the 
students where the locusts usually were, and they also reported and relayed new locust 
sightings.642 The headmen were also often the ones responsible for gathering up the work teams 
                                                 
639 TsGARK f. 64 op. 1 d. 6157 ll. 8, Correspondence between the Governor General of Semipalatinsk and the 
Chancellery of the Governor General of the Steppe, 8 October 1910.  Also ll. 47 Zhurnal Obshago prisustviia 
Akmolinskago Oblastnogo Pravleniia po Krest’ianskim delam, 8 August 1913. 
640 TsGARK f. 64, op. 1, d. 6157 ll. 14 Communication between the Semirechie Military Governor and the Steppe 
General Governor 23 November 1910. 
641 Zhurnal Soedinennago Zasedaniia Obschago Prisutstviia Turgaiskago Oblastnogo Pravleniia I Oblastnogo 
Agronomicheskago Soveschaniia, (Orenburg: Elektro-tip Turg. Oblasti. Pravl. 1914), 4. 
642 TsGARK f. 64 op. 1 d. 6157 ll. 3, Correspondence between the Chief Agronomist of the Governor Generalship 
and the Semipalatinsk Oblast Agronomist, dated 20 April 1910. 
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to do the work of spraying, using hopper dozers, and marking off lands, although, the actual 
hiring of laborers was the responsibility of the instructors.643 Finally, they were also given 
responsibility for doing bookkeeping, and the plans for the 1915 campaign included extra money 
to pay and train peasant nachalniks.644 
The anti-locust campaigns illustrate an ambiguous relationship between the center and 
periphery. While local knowledge of infestations and local labor was essential to the success of 
the campaigns, there was little local power, and in fact little education. Earlier efforts had 
focused on pamphlets to educate peasants about how to control locusts on their own land, the 
chemical spraying campaigns instead treated the campaigns themselves as the education.645 
Several agronomists commented on how it was best to keep peasants out of the work except as 
hired laborers, and let the power of poison speak for itself. In Semipalatinsk, one agronomist 
remarked that it was, “best to let the peasants be spectators, since the act of spraying will be the 
best means of dispersing any prejudices.”646  
 The districts were not set up only to observe the locusts. Based on the incoming data, as 
well as the data from 1913, Zhurin had ordered 60 horse drawn, and 300 hand sprayers to attack 
infestations and protect crops.647 The spraying eventually covered 19,885 desiatins (over half the 
area under Zhurin’s project in Qostanay) and sprayed 722 poods of Swiss green and 906 poods 
of sodium arsenate.648 These numbers totaled to nearly 32 tons of insecticide over an area of 
54,270 acres.649 The environmental impact of such intense spraying can only be guessed at, 
                                                 
643 Zhurnal Soedinennago Zasedaniia, 3. 
644 TsGARK f. 25, op. 1, d. 311, ll. 1, Zhurnal soedinennogo zasedaniia obshego prisustviia Turgaiskogo 
oblastnogo pravleniia I oblastnogo agronomicheskogo soveshaniia za ianvaria January 1915. 
645 Skalozubov, O Kobylke. 
646 TsGARK, f. 64, op. 1, d. 6157, ll. 24, Correspondence between Semipalatinsk Agronomist and the Ministry of 
Agriculture, dated 19 December 1910. 
647 Zhurin, Otchet, 2. 
648 1 pood equals 36.11 pounds. 
649 Ibid., 14. 
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however, given that the pesticides being used were general pesticides, these campaigns were 
killing more than only locusts.  
The machinery and chemicals, like the student administrators had to be brought to the 
steppe, which was no small task. The insecticide came from factories in another imperial 
periphery, the Baltics, and the 32 tons brought to the steppe were made possible because of the 
newly created railways that penetrated the region.  However, when war broke out, this 
connection to the Baltics via an overused railway line led to difficulties in transporting the 
pesticides from Riga.650 Additionally, the price of chemicals increased from three to four times 
after the outbreak of war, and many chemicals were simply unavailable.651 The increased 
demand for these locust poisons is a chilling reminder of their toxicity to humans, and an eerie 
parallel between the militaristic campaigns against the locust and the use of poison gas during 
the Great War.652 
 In addition to the parallel with the modern technopolitical approach to warfare, Zhurin’s 
plans in Qostanay uezd also illustrate how the anti-locust campaign was not meant to help all 
steppe residents to the same extent. While technopolitics helps explain some of the decisions of 
administrators and agronomists, on its own it can miss the fundamental underlying reality of the 
Kazakh steppe as a settler colonial region. This meant it protected the interests of the settler 
colonial project with its close ties to settled agriculture at the expense or neglect of indigenous 
Kazakhs. However, it should be noted that it is an overly simplistic categorization to associate 
Kazakhs with nomadism and peasants with sedentary grain growing. In fact large numbers of 
                                                 
650 TsGARK f.64, op. 1, d. 6157, ll. 118-121, Corrrespondence between the Steppe General Governorship 
Agronomy Section and Ministries of War and Railways, January 1915. 
651 TsGARK f. 64 op. 1 d. 6157 ll. 118 Correspondence between Semipalatinsk Governor and the Governor General 
of the Steppe 21 January 1915. 
652 Although less well-known and less prevalent, the Eastern Front also saw the deployment of chemical weapons by 
both the Russian Empire and the Central Powers, see: Steven J. Main “Gas on the Eastern Front During the First 
World War (1915-1917)” Journal of Slavic Military Studies no 28 (2015): 99-132. 
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Kazakhs were engaged in sedentary agriculture, and even planted grain. Conversely, many 
peasants practiced extensive animal husbandry on rented land.653 Therefore, locust control that 
protected grain producing regions is more complicated than a simple Kazakh versus peasant 
binary. Nevertheless, the types of grain growing, and the regions that were protected were 
overwhelmingly made up of peasant settler regions, not Kazakh auls. Of the 58 peasant villages 
and 44 Kazakh auls where the work was supposed to be carried out, it was fulfilled on all peasant 
lands, and only fulfilled in the areas around 25 of the Kazakh auls.654 The tendency for anti-
locust campaigns to overwhelming help white settlers, and ignore indigenous communities is not 
unique to the Russian Empire on the steppe and has been described elsewhere.655  
 Zhurin explained this discrepancy and preference for protecting peasant over Kazakh 
crops by arguing that to be effective, the sprayers had to stay in one place and spray an area 
several times because the locusts did not hatch all at once. This, “riveted the detachment in one 
place, so as not to leave the work half-finished and ruin the work already completed.” He also 
blamed the dispersed nature of Kazakh settlements and cultivated lands, saying it made it harder 
to reach these areas and also that it made it less efficient to spray them.656 Therefore, one of the 
possible Kazakh adaptations to the locust (smaller dispersed plots of cultivated land) was being 
used against them, signifying that there would now be one way of farming that would be 
protected, and those practicing dispersed farming would be left to face the locusts alone.657  
                                                 
653 TsGARK f. 64 op. 1 d. 6175 ll. 64 Zhurnal Obshago prisustviia Akmolinskago Oblastnogo Pravleniia po 
Krest’ianskim delam, 8 August 1913.  
654 Zhurin, Otchet, 12. 
655 Samuel N. Chipungu, “Locusts, Peasants, Settlers, and the State in Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), 1929 to 1940” 
Transafrican Journal of History 15 (1986): 54-80. 
656 Zhurin, Otchet, 12. 
657 By this period in the regions where the spraying campaigns took place, the vast majority of Kazakhs were semi-
nomadic and raised crops alongside practicing curtailed animal husbandry, although animal husbandry was the main 
livelihood for most. On changes to Kazakh agriculture and economy see, Aldashve and Guirkinger. "Colonization 
and Changing Social Structure: Kazakhstan 1896-1910." 
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   Zhurin also did not think that the Kazakh recognized the locust for the threat they were. 
He said that they usually failed to observe or report the locust until they were actually eating 
their crops, and complained that they did not see locusts in the steppe beside planted fields as a 
problem. Zhurin was not alone in making this complaint as other agronomists also had the same 
observation, however, they were usually complaining about Russian peasant settlers, not 
Kazakhs.658 Additionally, Zhurin was less enthusiastic about protecting Kazakh lands because he 
believed they were lazy. In his report Zhurin said, “The Kazakhs are bad workers, they come to 
work at nine or ten o’clock, which they consider to be very early, and at three of four o’clock 
they ask to go home.”659  In other regions like Akmola, it was not the Kazakhs who were 
considered lazy, but rather peasant settlers, and agronomists frequently highlighted the need for 
paid labor to conduct the work of the campaigns properly.660 
 The fact that Zhurin acknowledged anti-locust work required large amounts of local labor 
was evident in his remarks about the Kazakhs unwillingness to do it. However, Zhurin assumed 
this was because of a defect in Kazakh character. In doing so, Zhurin overlooked another 
reasonable, and more likely explanation. Kazakhs could see that the whole undertaking was of 
more benefit, and constructed to help peasant settlers and not themselves. While some Kazakhs 
did request aid in dealing with the locusts, they were often ignored or dismissed.661 In fact, 
imperial officials themselves never hid the fact that the locust campaigns were carried out “to 
protect the crops of settlers especially.”662 
                                                 
658 TsGARK f. 64, op. 1, d. 6157, ll. 25. Correspondence between the Semipalatinsk Oblast Agronomist and the 
Ministry of Agriculture, dated 19 December 1911. 
659 Zhurin, Otchet, 13. 
660 TsGARK f. 64, op. 1, d. 6175, ll. 58, Otchet o deiatel’nosti agronomicheskoi organizatsii v Akmolinskoi oblasti 
za 1913 god 31 January 1914. 
661 Zhurin, Otchet, 13. 
662 TsGARK f. 25, op. 1, d. 311 ll. 6, Zhurnal soedinennogo zasedaniia obshego prisustviia Turgaiskogo oblastnogo 
pravleniia I oblastnogo agronomicheskogo soveshaniia za ianvaria January 1915. 
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In large part because of Kazakh unwillingness to engage with the spraying campaign, in 
1914 in Akmola Oblast, the government instituted a new law. They criminalized interference in 
the spraying campaigns, and made it a punishable offense to fail to report a locust infestation.663 
This change likely indicates that some Kazakhs and peasant settlers were interfering with the 
spraying. The interference probably occurred because after spraying, livestock had to be kept out 
of the sprayed areas for several days. During times of locust swarms, this could be significant as 
pasture was harder to find, and it is reasonable that this would breed resentment among Kazakhs 
especially who got little out of the campaigns, possibly leading them to sabotage the work. While 
the 1916 revolt had many causes, projects like anti-locust spraying campaigns, which alienated 
Kazakhs and privileged peasant settlers certainly contributed to the feeling of alienation and 
unfair treatment among Kazakhs.664 
 Just as significant as criminalizing interference in the spraying campaigns was the fact 
that the decree also forced all residents to report locusts and dictated when they could cut hay. 
This action brought the potential for legal punishment against those who did not adhere to the 
new scientific and expert driven form of agriculture on the steppe. Before it was possible to 
ignore what agronomists were doing, and for the most part many Kazakhs and peasant settlers 
did just that. However, the decree signaled that it was no longer possible to ignore the agronomic 
bureaucracy, instead all residents were now legally compelled to take an active part in support of 
the technopolitical project as well as colonial administrative power.665  
                                                 
663 TsGARK f. 64, op. 1, d. 6157 ll. 85, Ob’iavlenie Akmolinskogo Gubernatora, 12 May 1914. 
664 The revolt was sparked by a decree that Kazakhs (and all Muslim subjects in Central Asia) would no longer be 
exempted from the military service, however, this was only the “spark” that set off long simmering ethnic and 
religious tensions in Central Asia. The revolt was widespread but was particularly violent towards ethnic Slavs in 
Turgai and in the oasis regions in modern day Uzbekistan. It was violently suppressed by imperial forces and led to 
hundreds of thousands of deaths and refugees. On the revolt see, Edward Dennis Sokol, The Revolt of 1916 in 
Russian Central Asia (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016). 
665 Imperial administration and law had already long impacted indigenous animal husbandry on the steppe see, 
Virginia Martin “Barimta: Nomadic Custom, Imperial Crime.” 
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Wheat growing not only had the immense and invasive locust spraying campaign 
supporting it, it also was now being defended by the state criminalizing those who refused to 
help combat one of its greatest threats: the locust. It would be too great of a leap to say that there 
was a direct connection between criminalizing the refusal of some to be a part of the new 
agricultural system on the steppe, and the heavy-handed state power that came with Stalinist 
Collectivization. However, it is not too much to say that soviet developments should be seen less 
as a total break with the past than we might first assume. More importantly, the fact that the type 
of farming being supported on the steppe with the rule of law was sedentary wheat growing, and 
not animal husbandry or nomadism, illustrates a significant continuity in the use of state power 
on the steppe to bolster and support a particular type of agriculture that was neither indigenous 
nor particularly well suited to the ecology of the region. 
Conclusion 
 In spite of the setbacks of weather, unenergetic laborers, and the poor quality and late 
delivery of spraying machinery, when the regional agricultural council met in 1915 to discuss the 
previous year and make plans for the 1915 campaign, most viewed it as overall a success. They 
even went so far as to commend Zhurin personally for overseeing the 1914 campaign and asked 
him to lead the 1915 campaign as well.  It does not appear that the 1915 campaign was fully 
carried out, but the scope of work is impressive, especially when compared with the struggles 
and plans of imperial agronomy in the steppe in the 1880s. After commending Zhurin, the oblast 
agronomic council then stated that chemical spraying was the only effective means of locust 
control, thereby settling the long running debate with bacteriological control firmly in favor of 
insecticide. Otherwise, the 1915 plan made few changes to 1914, it consisted of the same system 
of districts and of focusing on protecting more densely planted areas, usually at the expense of 
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Kazakh lands. However, the increase in scope was impressive. During the previous year’s 
campaign, agronomists had identified 97,424 desiatins of land in the oblast as infected with 
locust eggs. Of this area, 72,629 desiatins, or over 300 square miles of the oblast was to be 
continuously sprayed with 5,628 poods (over 100 tons) of sodium arsenate.666 In order to oversee 
this expanded spraying program, the number of districts was expanded to 89 and the number of 
horse drawn sprayers to 172.667 According to the council, this plan represented a “permanent 
anti-locust organization” in the oblast.668  
With a permanent organization in place, agronomists and officials believed they had 
finally solved the problem of the locust. However, solving the problem in this way required 
sacrifices. Local agronomists gave up much of their autonomy and were now dependent on 
sprayers built in Ukraine and pesticides manufactured in the Baltic provinces. However, there 
were other sacrifices as well. Those who did not adhere to the assumptions of what made proper 
agriculture (usually Kazakhs), and those whose lands were too dispersed or distant from railway 
connections, would have to face the locust on their own. In short, they would be sacrificed 
because in the eyes of agricultural scientists, protecting them was inefficient. These sacrifices 
reveal the truth about technopolitics and settler colonialism.  
Technopolitics promises stability based on a set of technologies that claim to be, but are 
in fact not, entirely new. What is more striking is rather than brining stability for all, they often 
bring disruption for those who do not fit within official visions, and the new system is often quite 
vulnerable because of its complexity. However, technopolitics is not only about technology, it is 
also about how human factors like the imbalanced power relations between government officials, 
                                                 
666 TsGARK f. 25, op. 1, d. 311 ll. 1, Zhurnal soedinennogo zasedaniia obshego prisustviia Turgaiskogo oblastnogo 
pravleniia I oblastnogo agronomicheskogo soveshaniia za ianvaria, January 1915. 
667 Ibid, pg. 3. 
668 Ibid., pg. 6. 
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peasant settlers, and Kazakh nomads became embedded in the technopolitical system and appear 
natural. The decision to leave some lands outside of the realm of protection was passed off as a 
rational and reasonable decision, because the Kazakhs were believed to be backward and not as 
deserving of defending.669 However, another reasonable and rational observer could look at the 
entire situation and question why the peasants and their wheat deserved the huge amounts of 
labor, money, frustration, and time that the empire went through in order to protect them. The 
same observer could see the pre-settlement era nomads as being much better adapted to the 
steppe environment, but the processes of technopolitics and settler colonial ideology have 
obscured this view. 
Tracing locust control practices on the Kazakh steppe in the late empire reveals a 
complex story of continuity and change. While the technologies themselves did not change in 
any significant measure aside from the failed experiment of bacteriological control, the shifting 
approach reveals both the insects’ challenge to steppe agronomy and the relative impotency of 
agricultural science in the face of the locust. However, this impotency did not necessarily 
weaken the march of agronomy onto the steppe. As this dissertation has shown, the creation of 
steppe agronomy was not a victorious march where science, rationalism, and problem solving 
overcame the obstacles of a steppe environment and indigenous population hostile or ambivalent 
to sedentary grain agriculture. Instead, it is also a story of setbacks and defeats that included 
devastation by locusts, droughts, and a high percentage of peasant settlers who gave up and 
returned to European Russia. Nevertheless, steppe agronomists rarely seemed to tire of the task, 
                                                 
669 It should be noted that some agronomists did not always embrace a view that Kazakh animal husbandry was 
backwards and deserved to be replaced, but these were minority (and sometimes Kazakh) voices, see Ian W. 
Campbell, Knowledge and the Ends of Empire. 
257 
 
and the settler colonial project went ahead and continued to displace Kazakhs and the open 
steppe. 
This chapter, and this entire dissertation is not an attempt to uncover effective or 
ineffective technologies or sciences, although it does closely examine how technologies and 
scientific practices were created, functioned, and implemented.670 It also does not seek to 
uncover a technological determinism that explains how agronomy worked on the steppe. Instead, 
its task is in many ways much simpler. By closely examining the science and technology of 
locust control, it seeks to understand and explain how those technologies interacted with people, 
the environment, bureaucracy, economics, and colonial power dynamics, and thus created the 
changes and lack of changes that occurred on the steppe. Just as early control methods that 
encouraged the intensive planting of grain crops was not only a recommendation to deal with 
locusts, but was driven by cultural chauvinism, professional identity, and economic theories, 
bacteriological control and chemical spraying campaigns were also created through complex 
interactions.  
However, too much focus on the contingencies of science and technology, and indeed the 
insights of technopolitics also has the potential to obscure an important factor in the creation of 
locust control science on the Kazakh steppe. It can potentially ignore the somewhat controversial 
claim of this dissertation that the Russian experience on the Kazakh steppe was a case of settler 
colonialism. The eventual creation and implementation of widespread systematic chemical 
spraying campaigns underscores, as part of the settler colonial project, how steppe agronomy, as 
part of an imperial bureaucracy, adhered to what Patrick Wolfe called a “logic of elimination.”671 
                                                 
670 The importance of studying the technology itself is discussed by Winner in, Langdon Winner, “Do Artifacts 
Have Politics? Daedalus 109 no. 1 (Winter 1980): 121-136. 
671 Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology (London: Cassell, 1999).  
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Wolfe, and other theorists of settler colonialism do not mean elimination requires the killing or 
total destruction of indigenous populations, ecologies, and landscapes although it can.672 Settler 
colonialism simply requires the destruction of indigenous peoples and ecologies as a distinct 
culture and group as a goal, which can occur through assimilation or other means. The 
experience of the Kazakh steppe certainly fits this criteria even if the settler colonial state was 
unable to fully achieve it.  
However, settler colonialism is not only a story of what happens to indigenous people. It 
is also a story of how the settler colonial polity and society set about destroying and replacing the 
indigenous with a new—and in their minds—better society. The dreams and goals of steppe 
agronomy, especially those that envisioned the total destruction of the locust either through 
bacteriological or chemical methods, are a significant corollary to settler colonialism’s goal of 
the destruction of the indigenous. In fact, the use of the locust as a kind of mascot by an 
Orenburg satirical journal “Kobylka” is reminiscent of the similar use of American Indians as 
town mascots in New England after they were no longer a threat.673  
Additionally, the need for locust control was innately tied up in the visions of Stolypin 
and proponents of resettlement who hoped that resettlement in Siberia could break the hold of 
the commune and turn peasants into an independent yeomanry. However, as is typically the case 
of settler colonial projects, it rarely turns out exactly as proponents had hoped. Peasant 
resettlement was costly, and the availability of open steppe meant that many peasant settlers took 
up extensive cattle or horse breeding rather than intensive farming, and the frequent loans of cash 
and grain in bad harvest years meant that most settlers were far from independent farmers. 
                                                 
672 Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native”. 
673 On the changing meaning of American Indians based on their perceived threat see Jill Lepore, The Name of War: 
King Philip’s War and the Origins of American Identity (New York: Vintage, 1999).  
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Similarly, chemical locust control was expensive, labor intensive, and often began too late in the 
season because of late deliveries of equipment and supplies. Therefore, imperial locust control 
never attained the the total destruction of the locust and the free expansion of grain farming. 
Instead, these environmental, political, technological, social, and economic factors limited the 
effectiveness of the technology, as well as the settler colonial project, in spite of the growing size 
and importance of the bureaucracy who attempted to harness science and technology to achieve 




















CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION: “WE ALL HAVE ENOUGH, AND THERE IS NO 
REASON FOR THEFT” 
 
 In 1958, at the height of the Virgin Lands Campaign, when Nikita Khrushchev proposed 
the cultivation of over 25 million acres of previously uncultivated land in northern Kazakhstan 
and Siberia, the Soviet government published a book entitled The Reclamation of Virgin Land in 
Semi-Deserts. The author of the book was described as “one of the first to study the techniques 
of reclaiming virgin land in the semi-desert zone of Kazakhstan,” and was none other than 
Sokrat’ Chaianov, the first director of the Temirskii Experimental Field (described in Chapter 
Two of this dissertation). At the time the campaign was facing both successes and difficulties. 
While the harvests of 1954 and 1956 had been good, the 1955 harvest was a failure. What is 
more, the amount of new land to plow up and expand onto was shrinking on account of the scale 
of the project. (In an echo of peasant settlement, the campaign faced a similar problem of the 
best lands being cultivated first.)  
If the Virgin Lands Campaign was to continue to expand as Khrushchev hoped, one 
direction was to expand onto less favorable—usually more arid—lands to the south and west. 
That was where Chaianov’s book came in, as it was explicitly about reclaiming virgin land in dry 
areas. However, given that much of the already cultivated area also faced a challenge of too little 
rainfall, Chaianov’s book was meant to be just as useful for those working on lands already part 
of the campaign or in other arid areas of the Soviet Union.674 
 Chaianov himself had not been back to the Kazakh steppe since he left the Temirskii 
farm before the Bolshevik Revolution to direct another experimental farm in Voronezh in 
European Russia. After narrowly avoiding being purged along with his more famous cousin 
                                                 
674 S. K. Chaianov, Osvoenie tseliny v polupustyne (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo sel’skokhoziastvennoi 
literatury, 1958), 2-3. 
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Alexander Chainov, he worked at various universities before publishing this book in 1958. As 
part of the book, he returned to the region in 1954-55 and visited many of the sites including the 
old experimental field, now the Aktobe Oblast Agricultural Experiment Station. On the visit, in 
addition to seeing institutions like the Temirskii field still in operation, he also reconnected with 
some people who were still involved with agriculture including at least one head of a kolkhoz 
(collective farm). This continuity was not unusual. Much of the institutional infrastructure 
described in this dissertation during the Tsarist period continued to exist, often in slightly 
different form, far into the Soviet period. In many cases, like the Temirskii field, it even still 
exists today.675   
 However, in addition to institutions, much of the physical infrastructure was also still in 
place including things like railroads, grain elevators, and wells. Knowledge infrastructure from 
an earlier period, including successful growing practices and approaches to animal husbandry, 
also remained intact. Finally, there was the human infrastructure that was what made this a 
settler colonial project. During the Tsarist period three million peasant settlers came to the 
steppe, most of whom stayed, and their descendants multiplied and made up large numbers of 
steppe inhabitants.676 There were of course later settlers that came with the Soviet project of 
industrializing Kazakhstan and during evacuations during the Second World War.677 However, 
these later arrivals built on the firm foundation of the infrastructures created by this earlier 
project of peasant settlement.  
                                                 
675 Official website of the Aktobe Experimental Farm. http://acxoc.kz/о-нас/. 
676 Demko, The Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan, 86. 
677 In 1941, of the 1,523 “industrial enterprises” evacuated and rebuilt in the Soviet hinterland, 308 were moved to 
Kazakhstan and Central Asia, Sanford R. Lieberman, “The Evacuation of Industry in the Soviet Union During 
World War II” Soviet Studies 35 no. 1 (Jan 1983), 91.  
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Patrick Wolfe wrote that in settler colonialism, “invasion is a structure not an event.”678 
In the case of settler colonialism on the Kazakh steppe, part of the structures of invasion were the 
actual physical (infra)structures like railways and wells. Another part was intellectual and 
scientific like growing practices and crop and livestock varieties. Other aspects of this invasion 
structure were economic, such as land dispossession and supports for grain markets, in addition 
to peasant loans for mills, grain cleaning machinery or butter cooperatives. All of these were 
both part of—and were also meant to support—the human infrastructure of invasion—that is the 
actual peasant settlers and their descendants. 
In 1925, one of those peasants, M. S. Petlina, wrote a letter to the editors of the 
newspaper Krestianskaia Gazeta (Peasant Newspaper). This letter was not necessarily meant to 
be published, but was instead a complaint to an official he hoped might care about the problems 
in his village, Tatarka, in Akmola Gubernia.679 Petlina pleaded that his village and the area 
around it be moved from being part of the Kirghiz Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic which 
had been created in 1920.680 Petlina wanted it instead to become part of the Russian Soviet 
Federative Socialist Republic. He explained that this was in part due to geography. Although the 
village was supposed to be administered by officials in Petropavlsk, it was 450 versts away. 
Much closer was the larger city of Omsk, only 135 versts away, which villagers always passed 
through anyway when they had business in Petropavlsk.681  
                                                 
678 Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” 388. 
679 In the Soviet period, the region was again reorganized, this time into Gubernias instead of Oblasts, this also 
included some boundary reorganization. 
680 Somewhat confusingly, between 1920 and 1925, the area that makes up most of modern day Kazakhstan was 
identified by the name Kirghiz even though it had nothing to do with the lands of modern day Kyrgyzstan. It was 
eventually officially renamed the Kazakh Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic between 1925 and 1936. 
681 With another reorganization in 1936, Petlina’s hopes became a reality as it became part of Omsk Oblast in the 
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, and is today part of the Russian Federation.  
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However, Petlina’s concerns were not only about efficiency and rationalizing boundaries. 
Instead, he made it quite clear that his complaint was about being administered by Kazakhs. He 
wrote, “…in the Kazakh Region there are many thieves, and the thieves are the most 
distinguished and wealthy, and the police are made up of Kazakhs who will never change their 
laws given by Allah to those given to us by Christ.” He went on to say that Kazakh officials, 
which he referred to by the traditional name of “aksaqal” (white bone) instead of their official 
government titles, never prosecute a Kazakh for a crime and instead cover up for them. 
Frustrated, Petlina declared that, “there needs to be a police force of Russians to police the 
Kazakhs.”682  
It is clear that even after the revolution in 1917, in spite of the new Soviet government 
that promised an end to colonial domination, the structure of ethnic chauvinism that was at the 
heart of the imperial settlement project on the Kazakh steppe was still alive and well in the hearts 
and minds of at least some of the settlers. This was in part because, as settler colonialism is so 
effective at doing, indigenous dispossession, (and the role agricultural science played in it) was 
often obscured in a logic of its own making, a logic of “progress.” Therefore, it is crucial to 
understand all of these “infrastructures of invasion” being part of a process of simultaneous and 
mutually reinforced creation. It is not that peasant settlement created government grain silos or 
the other way around, instead they both are best understood as part of a process (settler 
colonialism) that was both created by and also created peasant settlers and grain silos. 
In fact, the chauvinistic sentiments of Petlina should little surprise if we accept the notion 
that invasion is a structure. It does not simply go away because one set of settlers takes over from 
another. In fact, it is an open question if even indigenous political rule would immediately erase 
                                                 
682 Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv ekonomiki, RGAE f. 396, op. 3, d. 78, l. 76, Letter from M.C. Petlina to the 
Editors of Krestianskaia Gazeta, 1925.  
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the settler colonial structure, although it is an important start.683 To address the deeply ingrained 
logic of settler colonialism in Petlina’s worldview would have required a deep rooting out of 
many things beyond simply giving Kazakhs political power. Instead, as this dissertation has 
argued, you cannot simply remove just one part of settler colonialism like railroads or 
agricultural schools and erase their impact. All of the structures: scientific, technological, 
economic, ethnic, environmental, demographic, and political were and are intertwined with the 
settler colonial project.684 Therefore, simply changing the political system from settler colonial to 
socialist republic (whether or not that political change even occurred is doubtful at best) would 
not mean the scientific, agricultural, or demographic realities on the ground were also suddenly 
transformed.   
In addition to the ways dispossession was often hidden by the logic of settler colonialism, 
there was also obfuscation about how the agricultural science and agronomy that was meant to 
aid settlement was actually created and deployed. Therefore, on the steppe, there was a kind of 
double obfuscation occurring with regard to agricultural science, technology, and engineering. 
For example, steppe hydrologic infrastructure was often presented as rational, new, and 
thoroughly Russian. While in fact it relied heavily on Kazakh and peasant knowledge and labor 
and was often misguided by an irrational faith that its technical superiority could overcome the 
realities of aridity and salinity. Therefore, in order to uncover this double obfuscation, it is not 
enough to simply rely on the lens of settler colonialism, it is also necessary to critically analyze 
steppe agronomy utilizing the insights of technopolitics.      
                                                 
683 For a thought-provoking discussion of how political recognition by indigenous leadership can continue 
indigenous dispossession see Glen Sean Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of 
Recognition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014).  
684 My own path to understanding how oppressions are intertwined in their creation and deployment was first 
influenced by the work of Huey Newton who wrote, “Never convinced that destroying capitalism would 
automatically destroy racism, I felt, however, that we could not destroy racism without wiping out its economic 
foundation” Huey P. Newton and J. Herman Blake, Revolutionary Suicide (New York: Penguin, 2009), 69. 
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 Perhaps tellingly, the ways settler colonialism and technopolitics act as both systems of 
power and the ways they obscure their very presence is quite similar. Timothy Mitchell has 
described technopolitics as, 
…always a technical body, an alloy that must emerge from a process of manufacture 
whose ingredients are both human and nonhuman, both intentional and not, and in which 
the intentional or the human is always somewhat overrun by the unintended. But it is a 
particular form of manufacturing, a certain way of organizing the amalgam of human and 
nonhuman, things and ideas, so that the human, the intellectual, the realm of intentions 
and ideas seems to come first and the control and organize the nonhuman.685  
 
In short, the process of technopolitics not only obscures developments on the ground to make it 
appear that something is happening that is not. It also makes it appear that those in power are in 
control, when in fact they are not. Much like settler colonialism, technopolitics can also obscure 
the role of contingency and of other actors besides those who claim to be in control of the 
process. This dissertation has attempted to uncover the role of these other actors and factors in 
creating the agricultural science, engineering, and agronomic work on the steppe in order to 
better explain not only how knowledge and technopolitical power operated in this particular 
settler colonial environment, but also to understand just how contingent much of this story was.  
In the process it has attempted to hold the analytical frameworks of settler colonialism 
and technopolitics in tension with one another in order to create a balance between the real 
power that officials and settlers had on the steppe while also recognizing that they were not alone 
in exercising power and agency. Even more crucially, it shows that they were hardly able to 
enact their plans on a passive steppe environment or the Kazakh people. To put it another way, in 
this story we can see much truth in the adage that “more than one narrative can be true at the 
same time.” The steppe was, in the Tsarist period, at once the site of an early kind of top-down 
                                                 
685 Mitchell, Rule of Experts, 42-43.  
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“high modernism” described by James Scott and others while still remaining a place where the 
imperfect knowledge of officials, the realities of the steppe environment, as well as peasant and 
Kazakh resistance (or recalcitrance) all played important roles. It is these tensions between 
contingency and power, between structure and resistance, between human and non-human that 
created a complex historical process and dynamic. 
However, in addition to the utility of these frameworks for understanding big questions, 
this dissertation has also sought to answer questions that are somewhat more rooted in the places 
of Kazakhstan and the Russian Empire. It has sought to tease out the stories and importance of 
much less prestigious and lesser known agricultural scientists like Chaianov the experimental 
farm director, Zhurin the locust expert, or Lisovskii and Nurbzhanov who both taught at the 
Zaisan agricultural school. The fact that individual scientists and officials often had a wide array 
of opinions and biases, yet in the end were still part of the dispossession of Kazakh nomads, is an 
important reminder of the limits of an individual’s ability to make change in a large bureaucratic 
system.  
Conversely, these individuals and others also changed the story in important ways. For 
example, the resistance of the Kazakh student, Kumanov, at the Semipalatinsk agricultural 
school was part of the reason officials stopped encouraging Kazakhs to attend the agricultural 
schools. Also Vasily Benzin’s plant exploration trips in Central Asia increased the germplasm of 
rye and other plants for the entire globe. Rather obscure people played a crucial part of this story, 
and while their contributions are less clear and prevalent in the archival record, this dissertation 
has sought to capture pieces of those stories and fit them into a narrative about an incredibly vast 
and diverse region in a massive empire administered by a large and complex bureaucracy. 
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While this dissertation seeks to put individuals back into a broader story, it also illustrates 
how the Kazakh steppe region and environment played an important role in the development of 
agricultural science, bureaucratic systems, and social and economic change in the broader 
Russian Empire. The work of scientists like Chaianov or Benzin might have begun in the steppe, 
but it did not end there, and their work had implications and effects on other regions, even 
sometimes in other settler colonies beyond the boundaries of the Russian Empire. What is more, 
the Kazakh steppe was by no means peripheral to the empire, instead its wheat, animal products, 
as well as its role as a “safety valve” for peasant settlement tied it deeply into the story of the 
empire beyond just the connections of individual scientists and scientific studies in the region. 
 These networks illustrate how the Russian Empire operated as an empire: interconnected 
and drawing on all regions in ways that had both center-periphery aspects, and in ways that are 
better understood perhaps as ecological with different regions interacting in mutually beneficial 
and mutually destructive ways. Additionally, the connections between agricultural science on the 
steppe with those in other empires also illustrates how colonialism (and perhaps especially settler 
colonialism) was a global project. While settler colonies like the United States and Russia may 
have competed for dominance on the world grain market, their scientists were also part of 
supportive scientific communities. 
However, in spite of these aspects of empire, contingency, and indigenous agency, what 
still stands out most is the longevity of the processes begun in the late nineteenth century and 
how they would forever change the landscape and people of the Kazakh steppe. While today 
Kazakhstan is a leading producer of wheat, it is also the site of environmental problems 
connected to that success including water scarcity and the ecological catastrophe of conventional 
chemical monoculture. With the coming of the Virgin Lands Campaign, the transition to this new 
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way of raising food on the steppe was complete. However, for those of us observing it from the 
future who recognize this same story told around the globe throughout the twentieth century, 
perhaps what is most astonishing is not the fact that it happened, it is how quickly and totally the 
costs and human impacts of this story have been erased or simply forgotten.   
 In 1955, when Chaianov returned to the steppe for the first time since he left the 
Temirskii Experimental Field before the revolution, he visited the kolkhoz, “Stalin” located 
nearby in Dzhurunskii raion. The farm was home to 150 families, and like most of the other 
kolkhozi in the region, it was created in part out of the consolidation of settler communities 
founded mostly before 1917. The Chairman of the farm, Grigorii Oleinikov was a man who 
Chaianov had first met in 1909. In the conclusion of his book, Chaianov described the Stalin 
kolkhoz under Oleinikov’s leadership. The farm had a one million ruble annual profit and 
contained several well-built buildings to house not only livestock, but also kolkhoz members at 
the club and library. Chaianov was keen to note that the 200 head of dairy cattle were milked not 
by hand, but by machines in new purpose-built milking barns. In addition, he happily noted that 
the farm kept two years of fodder in reserve in case of drought or crop failure.  
It is clear that the things Chaianov was most excited about (a profitable farm, advanced 
technology, large-scale agriculture, stored fodder, and an educated and “cultured” rural 
population) reflected the hopes and worries of agronomists and officials (himself included) a 
half-century earlier. It is easy to see how Oleinikov and Chaianov, both of whom knew the 
steppe in a very different era at the start of the twentieth century, would be amazed and excited 
about the changes they had been part of some time earlier. This region in particular had gone 




 However, hidden in the excitement and accomplishments were real losses that had begun 
during the Tsarist period. Chief among these was the loss of Kazakh wealth, livelihood, and 
nomadic culture. Chaianov reported that there were no nomads left in the area although they had 
made up the majority of the population when he first arrived. While there were still many 
Kazakhs, many of whom probably even worked on the Stalin kolkhoz, they were not nomads. 
Their losses of livestock and culture were hidden in the profitability and “progress” that the 
kolkhoz represented. In commenting on how wealthy the kolkhoz members were, Chaianov told 
a story about how he walked through the village at midnight having just finished a lecture at the 
kolkhoz club. On his walk he noticed that no one in the village locked their doors. When he asked 
Oleinikov about this, the Chairman replied, “We all have enough, and there is no reason for 
theft.”686 
Oleinikov might not even have been lying exactly, however, it did obscure a darker truth. 
The reality was, the theft had already occurred. Over the nearly two centuries of Russian and 
then Soviet rule on the steppe much had been stolen from the Kazakhs. This included of course 
the very land upon which Oleinikov issued his proclamation and where Chaianov delivered his 
lecture. However, as this dissertation has aimed to show, there was a theft of culture and 
knowledge about how and where to raise food in the challenging steppe environment.  
Some of that theft was from peasant cultivators written out of the story by agronomists 
and officials, their invention of things like hopper dozers or snow wells quickly forgotten. Other 
thefts included seeds cultivated over millennia by farming communities in places like Taraz or 
Semirechye in today’s southern Kazakhstan; those indigenous communities were never justly 
compensated, even if the collectors purchased the seeds fairly. Finally, there were the thefts of 
                                                 
686 Chaianov, Osvoenie tseliny, 127-129.  
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knowledge about water and sites of arable land in the steppe as well as ways of raising livestock 
and breeds, all of which helped make peasant settler agriculture possible, and eventually (in the 
case of the Stalin kolkhoz) profitable on the steppe. While these thefts might sometimes have 
been small or legal, the fact that they were incorporated into a growing bureaucracy and state 
intent on settling more and more peasants from European Russia on the steppe meant that they 
helped contribute in concrete ways to the further dispossession of Kazakhs and theft of their 
lands. Therefore, while by the time Oleinikov mentioned the lack of theft, there were even 
Kazakhs potentially benefitting from the new system, his comment, just like the claims of 
agricultural scientists and officials on the steppe in an earlier period, obscured as much about 
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